

Political Science Quarterly

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Winter 1984–85

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Dennis Ross — The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf

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Title Page and Index to Volume 99

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Political Science Quarterly

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In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Monday, January 21, 1985, at 3:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the executive director's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting.

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

FRANK J. SORAUF asks to whom are political action committees (PACs) accountable for the resources they spend on American electoral politics. He finds that with some significant exceptions, the main line of accountability in a PAC is not to its donors, but to its parent organization.

DENNIS ROSS assesses Soviet strategy in the Persian Gulf, looking at Soviet goals, local opportunities and constraints, and Soviet risk-taking propensities. He argues that the Soviets are finding their current strategy generally satisfactory.

DAVID B. TRUMAN argues that state Democratic parties essentially abdicated their power over the nomination of presidential candidates when presented with the McGovern-Fraser "reform" proposals of 1968–72 and explains this abdication in terms of two long-term influences: the nationalization of legislative power in the 1930s and the system of nomination by direct primary. He also speculates on future prospects of the two major national parties.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD challenges the widespread thesis that the politicization of ethnicity will result in fragmentation of many multiethnic Third World states. By examining the cases of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, he concludes that modernization and economic development have shifted power in favor of the center, complicating the prospects for ethnic separatists.

CHRIS LAMB attempts to satisfactorily explain American behavior in the *Mayaguez* crisis of 1975 and to evaluate the relative efficacy of alternative decision making models in accounting for that behavior.

ALLAN PESKIN takes a close look at Republican party factionalism in the late nineteenth century through a collective biography of the delegates to the Republican convention of 1880. He concludes that these factions were not held together solely by patronage, but instead exhibited striking demographic and other distinctions which accounted for their different views on issues and political strategy.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

Readers of *PSQ* will note in the masthead a change in the name of the Managing Editor. Lesley A. Rimmel, who has been with *PSQ* since 1981, resigned to enter doctoral studies in Soviet history. Her successor, Tilly Friedman-Lichtschein, comes to *PSQ* after having served as Managing Editor of the *Journal of International Affairs.*

Lesley A. Rimmel will always have my special thanks for managing the affairs of the journal with consummate efficiency, thus permitting me to perform the duties of Editor while also remaining a full-time professor.

D. C.

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Who's in Charge? Accountability in Political Action Committees

FRANK J. SORAUF

Of all the resources of political power, none excites American suspicions quite as surely as money. When the source of the money is novel, well organized, and, above all, widely thought to be politically effective, suspicions turn quickly to apprehensions or even to real fear. That, in brief, seems to explain the preoccupation with political action committees (PACs) in the last few electoral cycles.[1]

Most public and scholarly attention to the newly vigorous PACs has centered on two issues of influence and power. The first concerns their ability to affect the outcome of elections, both as a consequence of the sums of money they give to candidates and the precision and sophistication with which they do so. Implicit in this issue is a possible altering of the balance of political interests—the favoring of incumbents or conservatives, for example—as a result of the uneven distribution of PAC expenditures. The second is the issue of subsequent donor influence in legislatures: the belief that PACs will eventually influence some of the legislative behavior of their recipients. It is the issue summed up in that cynical cliché about "the best Congress money can buy."

If these suppositions or fears are right, or even partially right, PACs have become major organizers of political power in American politics. And therein lies another major policy issue: their accountability. Americans have worried for

[1] The extent of the attention to PACs in American newspapers, magazines, and television networks is obvious; perhaps it suffices to note that PACs made the cover of *Time* on 25 October 1982.

FRANK J. SORAUF, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, is the author of books and articles on both political parties and judicial politics. His recent survey of PACs in American politics was published in the 1984 volume of the Twentieth Century Fund, *What Price PACs?*

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most of the last century about the power and resources of political organizations. In the cases of political parties and interest groups that lobby, they long ago translated their worries into a body of regulatory legislation without parallel in the democratic world. As an emerging form of political organization, PACs raise many of the same questions of accountability that parties and lobbyists raised decades ago: who controls their political decisions, and to whom do they answer for the political choices they make? It is those questions that this article addresses.

The PAC Phenomenon

Throughout the forty-year history of "political action committees",[2] those three words have been used with a certain looseness, and even today it is not uncommon for the phrase to be used synonymously with "lobbyist" or "interest group." Moreover, some political action committees do not call themselves by those three words; labor PACs, for example, prefer phrases such as "political fund" or "committee on political education." In legal and scholarly use, however, a consensus on definition has emerged, largely as a result of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and its significant amendments of 1974 and 1976.[3] A political action committee is a political committee, other than a committee of a candidate or a political party, that collects and spends resources (usually, but not necessarily, cash) to elect candidates to public offices. It does so either by giving its resources to candidates or other committees, or by spending independently of any other committee to urge the election or defeat of a candidate. Almost all of that summary definition emerges, to be sure, from the words and meanings of federal statutes; the exception is the very phrase "political action committee." It is a product of popular use and appears nowhere in the FECA or its amendments. Such are the vagaries of political semantics.

In short, political action committees are political organizations that specialize in aggregating resources with which to affect the outcomes of elections. Their burgeoning during the past ten years invites a long and complicated analysis. For the sake of brevity let it simply be noted that PACs grew in the 1970s in part as a result of the diminished role of political parties in campaign politics and in part as a result of the need of candidates for cash with which to "rent" the new campaign personnel and technologies. And in a more proximate sense their development in the 1970s was stimulated by the post-Watergate legislation on cam-

[2] The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) founded the simply named Political Action Committee in 1943; a year later it formed the National Citizens' Political Action Committee to collect funds outside the labor movement. The PACs were a response to the prohibition in the Smith-Connally Act of 1943 against direct labor contributions.

[3] This legislation and other relevant statutes are codified as 2 U.S.C. sec. 431–456. See also Title 11 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* for the rules of the Federal Election Commission.

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TABLE ONE

*Growth of Political Action Committees: 1974–1982**

	Total Number Registered	Contributions to All Senate, House Candidates, Primary and General Election (in millions)	Percentage of Cong'l Candidates' Receipts Given by PACs**	
			House	Senate
1974	608	$12.5	17	11
1976	1,146	$22.6	23	15
1978	1,653	$35.2	25	13
1980	2,551	$55.2	29	20
1982	3,371	$83.1	31	19

* All data from reports of the Federal Election Commission.

** Data for this column report percentages of receipts of all candidates in the general election.

paign finance. By putting severe limits on individual contributions, for example, it encouraged contributions to PACs.[4]

Whatever the reasons, PACs have flourished since 1972 (see Table One). Only 608 existed in 1974, but a total of 3,371 were alive by the time of the 1982 Congressional elections.[5] By the same token, PAC contributions to candidates and their relative importance to those candidates' treasuries have increased apace. While PACs accounted for only 17 percent of the receipts of House candidates in 1974, they contributed 31 percent in 1982. And the growth continues in the 1983–84 election cycle, at least in absolute sums. Experts routinely predict that PACs will have spent well over $100 million in contributions to Congressional candidates before the end of 1984.[6]

Among the 3,600 or so political action committees registered with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 1984 there is almost exotic diversity. They differ radically in the amounts of money they get and spend, in their strategies for affecting elections, in the ways in which they raise their funds, and in their internal organization and workings. For the purpose of examining questions of accountability, two dimensions of difference are especially crucial. First, most PACs are

[4] For a fuller account of the ways in which the legislation of the 1970s facilitated the growth of PACs, see Edwin M. Epstein, "The PAC Phenomenon: An Overview," *Arizona Law Review* 22 (1980): 355-372.

[5] Close observers of FEC data will note that three different numbers of PACs appear for any year under different circumstances. They are, using 1980 data as an example: number of PACs registered in FEC history—2,779; number of PACs extant in December 1980—2,551; number of PACs active in 1980 elections—2,155.

[6] As these data suggest, I deal only with PAC activity in federal elections, both Congressional and presidential. Although candidates who accept public funding for presidential campaigns are precluded from accepting other funds, contributions may be made to candidates before the nominating conventions.

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the creature of an ongoing parent organization—a labor union, a corporation, a trade association (for example, the National Association of Realtors), or a professional membership association (for example, the American Medical Association). But a minority—22 percent at the end of 1982—are not. These are overwhelmingly the ideological PACs, among them such notable examples as the National Conservative Political Action Committee and the National Committee for an Effective Congress. They are most commonly known as the independent or "nonconnected" PACs. For the majority, however, parent organizations define the structure and decision making of their PACs; they are free to pay their administrative and overhead expenses and to make sure they serve their political goals and purposes. Only the actual political funds of the PAC must be raised separately and kept in what the statutes somewhat redundantly call a "separate segregated fund."

Second, most PACs attempt to influence federal elections by direct contributions, either in cash or in kind, to candidates. In 1980 they gave $55.2 million to Congressional candidates and another $1.6 million to would-be presidential candidates before the nominating conventions. Yet, PACs spent a very substantial $14.2 million in another way: independent campaigns, for and against candidates, conducted without the knowledge or cooperation of the candidates. Without the occasion of a presidential election in 1982, PACs spent a total of $5.3 million independently on Congressional races.

Moreover, these two dichotomies are closely and importantly linked. The PACs attached to parent organizations generally pursue a political strategy of direct contributions to candidates. On the other hand, the nonconnected, "independent" PACs, the largely ideological PACs, are much more apt to engage in independent expenditures. To be sure, not all of them do, but in 1980 the "independent" PACs accounted for 93 percent of all the independent expenditures made by PACs, and in 1982 their share was 85 percent.

The Internal Lives of PACs

Discussions of accountability begin most profitably with issues of power and influence. And to find the locus of power within political action committees one looks to their internal, organizational lives. For PACs with parents, the key to that life is the organizational life of the parent. The parent or sponsoring organization sets up the PAC and pays its overhead costs; understandably it controls the PAC activities closely and imposes on it a style of governance it finds congenial.

In practice that means that corporate PACs are generally run by a board chosen from the higher (but not highest) management circles by the chief executive officer, top management, and/or the corporate board. Though drawn largely or entirely from the upper reaches of the corporate structure, the PAC board usually is representative of the operating divisions, the plant locations, or other

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functioning parts of the corporation. In the case of labor and association PACs, governance flows through the elected officers of the organization, with at least nominal responsibility to the periodic assemblies or conventions of the membership. Once chosen, most PAC boards are reasonably independent and work without external organizational interference. They tend, understandably, to be dependent on the permanent staff that runs the PAC's day-to-day affairs. As professionals, these technocrats (often called "PAC managers") control vital information about candidates, electoral politics, and the law and administrative regulations that govern the operation of PACs.

When the PAC's parent organization has a Washington office or a lobbyist, that person or group of persons tends to have an informal role in PAC affairs. Some corporate and association PACs are run right out of the Washington office, but more commonly the Washington operatives merely represent a point of view or interest different from that of the PAC board. Above all, Washington representatives want to make sure that PAC activities will maintain their access and keep doors open for them. Theirs is the "inside Washington" pragmatism of those who know the incumbents and have established useful relationships with them. But, to repeat, such influence is usually informal; very few PACs give a formal role to the Washington people and a few even explicitly deny one to them.[7]

In formal terms the contributors to a PAC—the donors, or the "members", as some PACs call them—do not participate in PAC governance. They do not choose the PAC's trustees, and they only rarely sit on its important committees. The most important committee, of course, is the one that disperses the PAC resources; it is most often called a contributions or allocation committee. Donors are not without informal influence, to be sure, and the extent to which they can indirectly influence PAC decisions is central to the whole issue of PAC accountability. But more of that in the next two sections.

Those PACs without parent organizations—746 of the 3,371 PACs registered with the Federal Election Commission in 1982—are governed quite differently. No corporate or membership organization generates a board for them or vests them with a tradition of organization or governance. Most of them are, in fact, "one person" operations in which a single executive director, or at best a small group of insiders, makes the crucial decisions without much review. A substantial number of them are also entrepreneurial organizations, ones founded and maintained by an enterprising individual. In some cases—for example, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and its executive director, Terry Dolan—they appear to be extensions of the ego or persona of one

[7] On the internal governance of PACs, see Edward Handler and John R. Mulkern, *Business in Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), chap. 4; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, "Political Action Committees: Varieties of Organization and Strategy," in Michael J. Malbin, ed., *Money and Politics in the United States* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984), 122–141.

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individual.[8] Such PACs may indeed have broadly based and active boards, but in most cases they are really "paper" boards composed of donors, distinguished personages, and old friends and acquaintances of the staff, and little inclined to exercise any control over the business of the PACs.

Different patterns of governance among PACs reflect different configurations of interests at stake in their activities. In the case of a PAC with a parent organization, the PAC must respect the organization's image, its future, and its broader nonpolitical interests. Certainly a PAC cannot ignore a corporation's relationship with its customers or the entire reputation or public perception of a profession. The agenda of interests of the PACs without parent organizations is, perforce, much simpler. Their political goals and interests are unencumbered by those of a parent; they generally reflect the homogeneous policy or ideological views of their leaders.

Donors and Their Roles in PACs

About the donors to PACs we know very little. It is hard even to estimate their number. In 1982 some 8.5 percent of a national adult sample responded that they had contributed money in that year to a "political action group." This poll was the regular survey of the American electorate conducted by the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of the University of Michigan. That figure as a percentage of the 160 million Americans eligible to register and vote yields a total of 13.6 million contributors. That total is probably too high for a number of reasons, but even if one reduces it by an arbitrary third, there remain a very impressive 9.1 million donors.[9]

It is even more difficult to calculate the size of the average annual contribution. A recent survey of more than 300 corporate PACs put the figure at $91.50 for 1982.[10] But labor, association, and unaffiliated PACs consistently report

[8] To take another example, the press in early 1982 reported the attempts of Robert Samuel to promote Senior PAC, the PAC he created to advance the interests of senior citizens. Mr. Samuel, age 30 in that year, had had seven years of experience in Washington as a legislative assistant, a lobbyist, and a political organizer. At the time of the press coverage he was not only the PAC's founder; he was its sole staff member. The board of Senior PAC was apparently assembled by Samuel; it was composed largely of past and present office holders. See, for instance, the *New York Times*, 1 March 1982.

[9] The CPS question was this one: "Now, what about political action groups such as groups sponsored by a union or a business, or issue groups like the National Rifle Association or the National Organization for Women? Did you give money this election year to a political action group or any other group that supported or opposed particular candidates in the election?" I suggest that the wording of that question invites positive responses from members of national associations and contributors to lobbying groups, and that is the chief reason for deflating the recollections of PAC contribution. Moreover, a calculation of the number of contributors based on total sums given and average size of contribution leads me to a somewhat lower figure. For the latter, see Frank J. Sorauf, "Political Action Committees in American Politics: An Overview," in *What Price PACs?* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1984), 81–82.

[10] The poll was conducted in early 1984 by Civic Service, Inc. for the Business-Industry PAC, the

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TABLE TWO

*Comparisons of Donors to Groups with Donors to Candidates and Parties: 1982**

Percentage of Respondents who:	*Donors to Groups*	*Donors to Candidates*	*Donors to Parties*	*All Adults in Sample*
Went to political meetings	18	49	37	9
Reported as having voted in 1982	78	91	94	60
Were "very much" interested in campaign	45	60	65	26
Were "very much" interested in outcome of Congressional election	37	54	56	21
Followed government and public affairs "most of the time"	43	60	75	28

* Data from Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan; made available through Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

lower averages. The American Medical Association's PAC, for example, received contributions averaging about $30 from more than 46,000 people in 1982. The PAC of the National Realtors Association reports an almost identical average for that year.[11] Labor PACs do not, to my knowledge, disclose such specific data, but their estimates (and those of experts on them) are even lower. All of these fragments of data suggest an average annual PAC contribution of between $30 and $50. That rough range also squares with the fact that all PACs reporting to the FEC in 1982 received only 13 percent of their funds in contributions of $500 or more.[12] Even though these estimates are surely imprecise, one important conclusion seems warranted: the average PAC contribution is hardly "big money" even by the standards of middle class personal finance.

About the politics of PAC donors we know somewhat more. In the 1980 and 1982 surveys the Center for Political Studies asked a question about contributions to "political action groups"; it identified 120 donors (8.5 percent of the sample) in 1982. Since the survey also identified citizens who gave to candidates and those who gave to parties, comparisons among them are possible. In many ways the donors to PACs are less active politically than Americans who give money to parties and candidates. (See Table Two; the data from 1980 describe very similar differences.) Moreover donors to PACs are a more separate group.

National Association of Business PACs, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Public Affairs Council. I have no data on what percentage the "over 300" PAC respondents constitute of the universe polled.

[11] The American Medical Association figure comes from testimony by Dr. Fred C. Rainey at the hearing of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on 26 January 1983, on "Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983" (Senate Hearing 98-588). The data on the Realtors PAC come from a personal conversation with Richard Thaxton, its executive director at the time.

[12] Under federal law PACs must report the names of contributors and the sums of their contributions only if their annual contribution is $200 or more. For practical reasons the FEC aggregates and publishes only sums of $500 and above.

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Only 24 percent of them also gave to a party or a candidate, but 54 percent of the givers to parties and 40 percent of those to candidates also gave money elsewhere. Having said all of that, of course, one must point out that PAC donors are far more active than the rest of the population. Only 9 percent of the entire sample went to political meetings in 1982, and only 21 percent were "very much" interested in the outcome of Congressional elections. So, on the one hand, PAC donors are not, as some claim, apoliticals brought into the political process by the expanding PAC movement. Yet, on the other, they are probably among the less political and less active members of the active minority in American politics.

Some motives for giving money to PACs are clearly political, but some are surely not. Unhappily, they are not easy to separate. In thinking about the question, it helps to draw on the close analogy of the United Way campaigns in most American communities. There, too, donors willingly give and yet willingly surrender ultimate control of their money to a brokering intermediary, even when the option of making direct contributions to the final recipients is available. Why?

Quite simply because giving through a broker – a PAC or the United Way – permits the donor to make a political or social contribution while reducing the "costs" of doing so and achieving some nonpolitical "side" benefits. Among the "costs" reduced are these:

- The donor is saved the annoyance of repeated solicitations.
- The donor is spared the psychic costs of saying "no" to even worthy causes. He or she may always resort to the talismanic words: "I gave at the office."
- Decision costs are reduced, even eliminated; the donor does not have to collect information on worthy recipients or agonize over attractive alternatives.
- The donor escapes responsibility for unhappiness over the final allocation decisions.

As for the nonpolitical "side" benefits in giving to a PAC:

- The donor contributes to professional or workplace solidarity.
- The donor's image or reputation for social responsibility is enhanced, perhaps attracting the approval or favor of superiors in the organization.
- The organizationally-loyal donor enjoys the benefit of promoting the interests of the parent organization.

So, PACs offer the marginally active an attractive, low-cost way of seeking limited political goals while dispensing both their political and organizational obligations.

Such analyses, however, do not speak directly to questions of the extent and kind of political goals among PAC donors. In the instance of contributors to unaffiliated PACs, one can safely assume there is some political response to the ideology or the interest the PAC has organized itself to promote. However imperfectly they may understand the commitments of, say NCPAC or SeniorPAC, most contributors to them do identify with their political goals and causes. But what of contributors to a PAC with a parent organization? Are they motivated

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by loyalty to the parent and its interests, or do they bring a wider agenda of support for a party, an ideology, a set of policy goals?

Once again, we are very short of data with which to address these questions. Worse, what data we have are conflicting. There is a conventional wisdom among administrators of corporate and association PACs that a significant number of their contributors are more "ideological"—either to the right or the left—than the PAC's centrist, pragmatic strategy of supporting friendly and supportive legislative incumbents.[13] Such differences, it is said, are reflected in criticism that the PAC gives too much money to legislative candidates of the "other" political persuasion. In the words of an internal memo reporting the results of a survey of donors to a PAC of a corporation we shall simply call "A", "the contributors would prefer less support of Democratic candidates in the future . . . "[14] The dissonance in labor PACs takes a special form; because labor PACs give overwhelmingly to liberal, Democratic candidates, their critics espouse not a more extreme political position, but a more centrist one. In any event, the belief is strong that many donors to PACs have conventional partisan or ideological goals.

And yet there is evidence to the contrary. The best survey of PAC contributors of which I am aware—one by PHIL-PAC, the political action committee of Philip Morris—provides the most useful bits of evidence.[15] One lengthy question in its survey began by presenting respondents with the three criteria by which PHIL-PAC decides which candidates it will contribute to: voting records on important Philip Morris issues; committee assignments that are important to the company; importance of area represented, e.g., district includes a PM plant facility. Those allocation criteria are, of course, almost classic examples of PAC pragmatism. Respondents next were asked: "Are there any other equally important criteria you think should be used? If so, what are they?" In the answers to that open-ended question only 3 percent of the respondents mentioned criteria coded as "voting record on nontobacco issues," and only 1 percent favored tests of "support of the free enterprise, business, capitalism." Donors and nondonors among the Philip Morris management personnel reacted very similarly.

In the same survey management employees assessed the importance of Philip

[13] There is, however, no shortage of data supporting the proposition that PACs support incumbents heavily. For example, see the excellent summary of Joseph E. Cantor, *Political Action Committees: Their Evolution, Growth, and Implications for the Political System*, rev. ed. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1984), Report no. 84-78.

[14] The PAC and its corporate sponsor wish to remain anonymous. The survey was taken in 1980 among a random sample of 643 administrative and executive personnel; 282 individuals responded. The PAC contributed between $100,000 and $150,000 to Congressional candidates in 1982.

[15] The survey was designed and executed in 1984 by Research Strategies of Princeton, N.J. Questionnaires were sent to all administrative and executive personnel eligible to contribute to PHIL-PAC; from this universe of 2489, 1165 responded for a return rate of 47 percent. I am greatly indebted to Diana J. Platts, the administrator of PHIL-PAC, and James C. Bowling, Senior Vice-President of Philip Morris, for their generosity and confidence in permitting me to use their data without restriction.

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TABLE THREE

*Relationship between Perceived Importance of Governmental Affairs Programs and Contributions to PHIL-PAC**

Philip Morris (PM) Operations	*All Say "Very Important" for Operation*	*Employees in Operation Say "Very Important"*	*% Who Are Frequent PAC Donors*
PM USA	81%	86%	38%
PM Corporation	78	77	51
PM International	60	67	40
Miller Brewing	48	73	38
Seven-Up	30	43	33
PM Industrial	28	41	30
Mission Viejo	24	51	42

* Data on the PHIL-PAC survey can be found in footnote 15.

Morris's government-relations activities for the various operations of the company (Table Three). The assessments varied greatly, but those essentially political judgments seem not to be related to PAC contributions within each division or operation. Furthermore, management employees within each division tend to see governmental-affairs programs as more important to their division than do their fellow workers as a whole. Organizational loyalty thus would appear to affect political judgment, but political judgment appears not to determine contributions to the PAC.

Fragments of evidence such as these from the PHIL-PAC survey suggest four related observations about the motives of at least these PAC donors. First, they feel very comfortable with PAC decisions that pursue pragmatically the interests of the parent organization. Second, they feel little or no need to inject partisan or ideological considerations into PAC decision making. Third, they often see the different political positions and vulnerabilities of their parent organizations, even if loyalty to their particular operation tends to cloud judgments about its position. And fourth, their decisions to contribute to the PAC may even ignore pragmatic calculations of the parent's interests! In short, to the extent that the Philip Morris employees are at all typical, PAC donors show a considerable inclination to give on the basis of loyalty to or general concern for the parent organization—or out of purely nonpolitical, side-benefit considerations. To put the matter the other way, these fragments reinforce the conclusion that PAC contributions are less politically and less ideologically inspired than those of contributors directly to parties and candidates.

Both PACs and the United Way suffer the charge that all of this is irrelevant, that the major motive or spur to contribution is coercion. Indeed, such allegations of coercion or undue pressure surround virtually all American fund raising, posing the issue of how voluntary American voluntarism really is. Evalu-

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tation of the charges, though, founders on the difficulty of agreeing on an operational definition for "coercion." Is it in persistent solicitation, in the bringing of peer pressure? If those conditions are coercive, one must conclude that coercion is an integral part of American voluntarism. Better instead is a standard of coercion that hinges on substantial personal costs (for example, denial of material rewards, status, or social acceptability) to the reluctant donor.[16]

By this standard, most decisions to give money to a political action committee must be considered voluntary. To be sure, there are those PACs in which solicitation may be coercive. One hears stories of gold stars on the doors of contributors in one corporate PAC. But there is no evidence that coercion in any set of PACs is widespread, and there is evidence to suggest that it is not. First of all, rates of participation in PACs are not high. The survey of corporate PACs in early 1984 found that on the average only 28 percent of these solicited in 1982 actually contributed.[17] Even so effective a PAC as the one of the National Association of Realtors enrolls only 30 percent of the membership.[18] Second, while allegations of coercion have been made in federal courts and before the Federal Election Commission, none have been upheld.[19]

So, the question of donor motivation is still central. The bits of evidence of the last few pages suggest that PAC donors give their money largely out of a combination of nonpolitical and very pragmatic political motives, and that, moreover, both their political and nonpolitical motives are deeply rooted in their lives within the parent organization and the interests it represents. To that generalization, of course, there is one great exception: the contributors to the unaffiliated, heavily ideological, or issue-involved PACs.

The Accountability of PACs: Internal Mechanisms

The very notion of accountability suggests the responsibility of agents for the resources and/or authority they have been permitted to control. To hold their agents accountable, the principals must have some sanctions with which, if necessary, to enforce their superior judgment or intent. Within political systems one looks primarily to the sanctions of the ballot box and its related processes. In voluntary organizations in which there are no formal avenues of choice or participation—in organizations such as PACs—the sanctions are more apt to be those of the political marketplace, primarily the withholding of resources.

[16] I realize that such a summary treatment of "coercion" is of necessity superficial. It ignores, for example, the effect on voluntary choice of external and internalized expectations. But this does not seem to me to be the place for an extended discussion of political free will.

[17] The survey is described in footnote 10.

[18] Interview with Richard Thaxton.

[19] The most celebrated piece of litigation was the suit of the International Association of Machinists alleging coercion in the raising of funds in a number of corporate PACs. The FEC dismissed the complaint, and so did several federal courts. See *IAM* v. *FEC*, 678 F. 2d 1092 (1982).

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Within PACs, resources come from two sources: the parent organization and the donors. They constitute, therefore, the two chief internal objects of PAC accountability. Turning first to the donors, they in turn have two chief avenues by which to exert their authority; in the words of one classic analysis, they are "voice" and "exit."[20]

Donors to PACs generally have a formal voice in the distribution of PAC monies in only one instance: earmarking. It is a practice by which donors designate the candidates who will receive their contributions; the PAC merely transmits their money to the chosen recipient. Donors thus deny the PAC any option in the allocation; at most the PAC can try to claim some credit for raising the money in the first place. But only a small number of PACs permit earmarking: very, very small numbers of labor and association PACs, and by recent count only 36 percent of corporate PACs.[21] Even among the PACs that permit earmarking, very few encourge it and some actively discourage it. Its perils are apparent: it is a denial of the very collective purpose of a PAC, it can be used to exceed statutory limits on individual contributions, it imposes an extra record-keeping burden on the PAC, and it may embarrass the PAC by forcing it to transmit money to candidates it opposes. Understandably, earmarking accounts for a small percentage of money given to the PACs; the study of corporate PACs in the 1982 elections finds that only 16 percent of donors made earmarked contributions.[22] Since the sums earmarked are by all accounts small, the percentage of earmarked dollars is much smaller. Earmarking is not, therefore, a major factor in PAC accountability.

Apart from earmarking, there is virtually no formal or assured donor voice in the decision of PACs. Most PACs do, however, actively solicit recommendations from their donors about the allocation of PAC monies. PAC administrators and allocation committees, by their own accounts, heed those suggestions. In the words of Clark MacGregor as he explained the contributions of United Technologies' PAC: "We frequently find people urging us to support an incumbent or a challenger whose philosophy may not accord with our long-range objectives." Usually, he concluded, the PAC abides by their recommendation.[23] In short, observers and PAC people agree that very few PACs will support a candidate if local contributors do not, and many feel compelled to offer at least token financial support, regardless of the better judgment of its leadership, to a candidate with important local backing.

Beyond these reports from the PACs, there is a good deal of indirect evidence pointing to a substantial donor voice. The decentralization and dispersion of

[20] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[21] The survey is described in footnote 10. An earlier survey on the 1980 experience by the same groups and under the same auspices set the figure at "over 25 percent."

[22] Ibid.

[23] *Congressional Quarterly,* 25 October 1980, 3204.

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PAC contributions suggest a sensitivity to the local wishes and initiatives of the many constituencies of most PACs. Among those constituencies, certainly, the donors are important, if not preeminent. In 1982, for example, PACs contributed to an average of thirty-five congressional candidates, giving each an average of $939. Furthermore, one ought not ignore the PAC policy statements that actively seek donor opinions, or even those statements of allocation criteria that give preference to candidates sponsored by donors. In fact, as Edward Handler and John R. Mulkern point out, some of the PAC giving to both sides in an election may reflect the honoring of donor wishes.[24] PACs, moreover, cannot ignore local political realities; a conservative business association, for instance, realizes that its local members in a heavily Democratic district want access to the local member of Congress. The informal voice of donors in PAC matters above all reflects two well-known realities of large scale organization: decentralization and the need to maintain cohesion.

In truth, though, there is limited demand for voice in PACs. Corporate PAC administrators, in fact, lament not receiving more donor messages about the operation of the PAC.[25] The donors share the political goals of the parent organization—and thus those of its PAC—and they derive many of the nonpolitical benefits of giving from that organization. The demand for voice in PAC decisions is also muted by the restricted political information and involvement of the donors. To seek and use a voice within the PAC would raise exactly those participatory "costs" that many donors to PACs want to avoid.

As for the PACs without parent organizations, a concept of "voice," whether formal or informal, hardly applies. Donors to most of them are scattered across the country. They have no contact either with each other or with the leadership or staff of the PAC. They are bound together, not by a common profession, occupation, or workplace, but by computer-based mailing lists and the U.S. mails. They share no common or regular means of communication, nor have they a common loyalty to an ongoing parent organization. In the independent PACS, therefore, donors rarely can affect, even indirectly, the allocative or strategic decisions of the PAC. That, perhaps, is one reason why the unaffiliated PACs make considerably larger contributions to candidates than do the PACs with parents.[26] Nonconnected PACs averaged only twenty contributions of an average size of $1335 to Congressional candidates in 1982; the comparable figures for all of the PACs with parents were thirty-eight contributions and an average of $901. There are far fewer organizational cross-pressures to inhibit the vaunted "targeting" of the unaffiliated PACs.

Beyond voice, there is exit—"dropping out" in the parlance of the PACs. PAC managers believe that exit happens largely for nonpolitical reasons: death or

[24] Handler and Mulkern, 87.

[25] Ibid., 83; fewer than 25 percent of the corporate PAC representatives interviewed were satisfied with the volume of donor recommendations they were receiving.

[26] Eismeier and Pollock, 129, Table 4.1.

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TABLE FOUR

*Frequency of Contribution to PHIL-PAC by Philip Morris Employees: 1978–1982**

Frequency of Contribution	*Number*	*Percent*
4 or 5 years	129	11
2 or 3 years	326	28
one year	291	25
never	402	35
no answer	17	1
Total:	1,165	100

* Survey described in footnote 15

retirement, personal financial problems, departure from the profession or occupation. In the recession of the early 1980s the National Association of Realtors experienced a drop in membership from 720,000 to 600,000, largely the result of troubled times in the real estate business. The PAC of the Realtors suffered a 15 percent loss in contributors at the same time.[27]

There is a widespread belief, however, that PACs lose some smaller number of contributors for political reasons. The explanations of PAC administrators tend to fall into three categories. First, some donors are politicized by the PAC experience and move into "mainstream" politics by direct involvement with a candidate or a party. Second, some donors who favor other parties or candidates are unhappy with the politics of the PAC, contra the data from PHIL-PAC. Third, for some the novelty and excitement of monetary politics wear off, and they revert to political inactivity. These political explanations of exit differ from the nonpolitical ones, but the two sets are not mutually exclusive. They may simply describe different groups of former PAC contributors.

When one begins to look at the evidence on exit, it becomes clear that "exit" is not quite the right word or concept. The decision to contribute to a PAC is a much less permanent decision than the one to enter or leave a more conventional organization. One is really talking about a decision not to contribute, and it can be of three kinds: a decision not to begin giving, a decision not to give in this specific year, and a decision to stop giving permanently (that is, exit). This becomes clearer when one looks at the PHIL-PAC data (Table Four). There is a continuous range of donor activity, not the simple dichotomous categories that words such as "entry" and "exit" suggest. But two additional data are necessary for interpreting Table Four. Because participation in PHIL-PAC has been increasing, the giving of the sometime givers has been concentrated in recent years; the PAC, in fact, had a 58 percent participation rate in 1982. And of all the 1165 respondents only forty-one (4 percent) had contributed in 1978, 1979, or 1980

[27] Interview with Richard Thaxton.

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TABLE FIVE

*Tenure and Political Activity Levels by Frequency of Contribution to PHIL-PAC**

	Between 1978 and 1982, Gave to PAC:			
Tenure of Employment:	*4–5 yrs.*	*2–3 yrs.*	*1 yr.*	*Never*
Less than 5 yrs.	2%	24%	25%	47%
5-10 years	10	20	32	37
11-20 years	12	39	23	25
Over 20 years	30	31	14	24
*Political Activity***				
High	22%	33%	16%	29%
Medium	15	30	26	28
Low	6	25	27	40

* See footnote 15 for explanation of survey.

** The index was constructed on the basis of the number of listed political activities the respondent had participated in within the preceding two years.

and not after that. If one considers them the "exiters," the participatory problem at PHIL-PAC has clearly not been exit, but late-blooming and inconstant participation.[28]

The differences between nongivers (and rare givers) and the regular donors to PACs are as instructive as they are predictable. Invariably the faithful donors have been affiliated longer with the parent organization (Table Five); thus they are older and generally better paid. Second, donors also tend in the aggregate to be more political than nondonors (Table Five), although those differences are undoubtedly muted by the presence of very active contributors to parties and candidates among the nondonors. Finally, and not surprisingly, donors systematically have a more sympathetic view of PACs generally and of PHIL-PAC specifically.[29]

Thus, accountability in PACs with parent organizations does not flow in the way the usual democratic-participatory models suggest. There is only informal voice, and exit, while available, is largely a moot issue. The cohesion of the PAC derives from a community of interest and a shared set of values that join donor, PAC, and parent organization. Very often the interests of the parent organization are the occupational, professional, or wage-earning interests of the PAC donors. Ultimately, therefore, the donors are bound through common interests

[28] There were, of course, other exiters from PHIL-PAC: those who ended their contributions and were not in Philip Morris's group of possible donors in 1984 for whatever reason (for example, death, retirement, or resignation.)

[29] For other data on these points, see Handler and Mulkern, 36–38, 52–54. On Corporation A see the quotation several paragraphs hence.

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to the legislative program and the legislative strategy of the PAC. In the words of the internal report of corporation A:

> . . . contributors identify themselves more closely with the company and its concerns than do non-contributors; when asked to rate themselves as to the similarity of their beliefs on public issues to the company's, significantly more contributors than non-contributors said they are "very similar," or even "more conservative" than the company. The identification of contributors with [A's] interests is explained, in part, by their demographics: contributors are represented by a statistically significantly higher percentage of long-term . . . employees (more than 10 years with the company) than are non-contributors.[30]

Thus there is little basis for the kind of conflict that would lead to substantial exiting. Moreover, it is the parent organization that confers the nonpolitical benefits that attract donors to the PAC: the approval and the feelings of solidarity, especially. The relationship between the PAC and its donors approximates not the democratic model of accountability, but something closely resembling "virtual representation."

The major problem that PACs face, therefore, is the decision of employees or members not to contribute in the first place or not to contribute regularly and faithfully. PAC leadership must woo potential donors by playing on loyalties to the parent organization and on the benefits of organized activity, especially the reduced decision costs and greater effectiveness of joint action. Moreover, the PAC must demonstrate its efficacy; many PACs do so by pointing to their record of "winning," that is, the percentage of victors among the candidates it supported. This concern, of course, points the PAC toward support for incumbents, thus reinforcing what it would often prefer to do for reasons of legislative strategy. Finally, PAC leadership must anticipate to some degree the political perceptions and loyalties—and the desire to express them—of potential donors. So, by the needs of recruitment, "voice" speaks loudest even before the first contribution to the PAC.[31]

Exit does not, therefore, work quite in the way that Albert O. Hirschman anticipates. Nor in fact does "loyalty." "As a rule," he writes, "loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice."[32] Loyalty in this instance, however, means a considerable attachment to the interests of the parent organization and its PAC. So, while loyalty among PAC donors increases the chances of affiliation and decreases the chances of exit, it also generally reduces the demand for voice.

With mutuality and loyalty so strong and with exit and voice so relatively weak, the lines of accountabilty run from the PAC to the parent organization, and especially to the boards and executives who define the interests of that organization. The PAC must answer to the parent's officers, and at least indirectly

[30] Internal memorandum of Corporation A; see footnote 14.

[31] For similar views and data, see also Handler and Mulken, 94–96.

[32] Hirschman, 78.

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to its stockholders or members. The PAC must, moreover, honor the parent's interests and future, for the parent will live with whatever mistakes the PAC makes and with whatever influence the PAC achieves. Longevity of both political interests and the political symbol is the prime assurance of accountability in political parties and other political organizations. In the world of PACs it is the parent organizations that provide that stability of interest and symbol.

For the unconnected PACs, the PACs without a parent organization, there is no formal or informal voice as we have so far defined it. That is true in large measure because there is really no organizational life. But inherent in their fundraising by direct mail appeals is a strong quasivoice. Many independent PACs provide the prospective donor with a list of the candidates or campaigns the PAC will be involved in. Donors have no assurance, to be sure, that the list will not be altered, nor have they any control over size of contributions, the content of publicity, or the issues the PAC will raise. But they do at least give with some knowledge of the eventual allocation of their funds.[33] Moreover, that contract between PAC and donor is strengthened by the fact that donors to these PACs give largely or wholly out of political motives. Without the presence of a parent organization and the web of loyalties surrounding it, the donor-PAC relationship is usually political and uncommonly simple.

Exit in the PACs without parents is both similar and dissimilar to that in organizational PACs. It is similar in that PAC leaders must anticipate the political preferences of donors and seek the commonality of interest that will spur donation. On the other hand, exit means even less within them. There is no interaction among donors, and exit cannot be organized in any way. Levels of information about the past operations of the PAC are lower. Above all, PACs working with direct appeals expect a much greater exit or irregularity of contribution; a 30 percent return from a list of previous contributors is a success. Because their solicitations are not limited to membership or employees in the parent organization, their pool of possible replacements is also vastly greater.

Mechanisms of External Control

Some mechanisms of external control serve primarily to enforce the accountability of political organizations to their members or loyalists. Laws regulating their decision making are perhaps the best example. Some mechanisms, however, go beyond assuring accountability to activists and promote accountability to potential supporters or recruitees. We turn to the first variety first, always contrasting the mechanisms that limit the PACs with those at work on the political parties.

[33] A few independent PACs approximate a kind of earmarking. The Council for a Livable World (CLW), for example, endorses a group of candidates and invites supporters to contribute to one or more of their campaigns through earmarked gifts to CLW.

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Legislated Access. In guaranteeing the "membership" access to decision making in the parties, the states have had in mind not an enrolled member but a party loyalist who may or may not be a party activist. They have admitted these millions of partisans not only to the making of party nominations in the primaries, but in some states to the selection of party leaders and the taking of party positions as well. One need only mention states such as Iowa and Minnesota that guarantee the fullest participation in party caucuses for even the most casual party loyalists.

Within the PACs the contributors are not given entree or otherwise assisted by public policy. In the absence of legislated access of any kind, participation depends entirely on the norms of governance or the patterns of influence within the PAC and/or its parent organization. Some donors to PACs achieve some measure of influence in PAC decisions, but in no way does it match the access, and thus the power, that the states extend to party loyalists.

Organizational Competition. Party adherents or "members" may easily leave one major party for the other. The organizational ties are slight for most, and the two parties are viable options in most parts of the country since states of one-party domination are rarer now than at any time in the last century. But loyalty greatly constrains exit in a two-party system. The two parties represent different configurations of interests, even different ideologies, and only if one is loosely allied with one (or a centrist on the margins between them) is movement to the other feasible.

PAC contributors are not apt to have viable alternatives either. PACs, like the United Way, enjoy a monopoly of the workplace, the trade, the occupation, or whatever interest it is that brings people into the parent organization. One can think of competition among some independent PACs; there are a number of similar liberal and conservative PACs, for instance, although low levels of information about them may reduce the "reality" of the alternatives. The option of exiting from a PAC, therefore, is largely one of exiting to inactivity or to some other kind of political activity. As is the case within the parties, exit is weaker than it would be if there were competitors representing the same patterns of interests.

Electoral Choice. We begin to talk here not of accountability within the group, but of choice within the political marketplace. Accountability now is to all voters, whether they be adherents or enemies of the organization, or merely indifferent to it.

Political parties, by reason of their place on the ballot, are an integral part of electoral choice. Voters can support or reject the party by supporting or rejecting its candidates. True, they can never be entirely clear whether it is the candidates or the parties they are judging, and in view of the nature of American parties, it is really both. Voter control over PACs by electoral choice is less effective. Without the PAC name or symbol on the ballot, voters do not easily connect candidates with their PAC support. Moreover, most candidates receive money from many sources, only some of which are PACs. Even when voters connect a

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candidate and a PAC, their judgment usually is on the candidate rather than the PAC.

Only in a rare case of great celebrity and salience may a political action committee become the subject of a voter "referendum." One of the best known of them, the National Conservative PAC, became a campaign issue in 1982. Its intended victims reversed the independent "negative" campaigns of NCPAC and made NCPAC a major target of their campaigns. Only one of NCPAC's targeted candidates went down to defeat.[34] Certainly, NCPAC's independent campaigns failed; it is far more difficult to conclude that they contributed to the defeat of the candidates NCPAC wanted to win. But even so limited a control of the campaigns of PACs is likely only if a small number of very visible PACs are making the expenditures. In 1982 only seventy PACs made independent expenditures in campaigns for the House and Senate, and NCPAC alone spent 60 percent of that money.

Voters also use their power at the ballot box to hold candidates and parties accountable for the content of the campaign. If they disapprove of the quality of the campaign, if they think it violates law or ethical norms, they have the ready remedy of the ballot box. Only a hopeless Pollyanna would argue the full effectiveness of such a system of control, but it is not negligible. Similarly, when a PAC makes a contribution to a party or a candidate, the recipient spends the money in the campaign and assumes responsibility for how it is spent.

When, however, a PAC makes an independent expenditure on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate, the PAC alone is responsible for the content of that campaign. Voters find themselves in a quandary. If they are outraged by an independent campaign, who are they to blame? Can they expect the candidate "aided" by a negative campaign to renounce that kind of support? And what are they to do if the candidate renounces it and the campaign goes on? Worse, what if the candidate renounces it with a wink? What, too, of the candidate who is hurt in the campaign by a clumsy and maladroit independent campaign on his or her behalf? Merely to ask such questions is to suggest that there really are no satisfactory answers.

Publicity. Lawmakers prefer the word "disclosure" to publicity, perhaps because it suggests a grudging "coming clean" under legislative order. Regardless of the preferred noun, such legislation is an old tradition in American politics, a tradition that believes that disclosure leads to knowledge and that knowledge leads to corrective action. Under the banner of these assumptions, federal statutes and those of many states require that PACs register and report their activities to some public authority. In the case of the federal code that means reports on all receipts, on debts and cash on hand, and on all expenditures, whether in

[34] The defeat of Senator Howard Cannon of Nevada appears to be the single NCPAC "victory" in 1982. NCPAC's Terry Dolan disputes this scorekeeping in the press; see his exchanges with David Broder in the *Washington Post*, 7 and 10 November 1982.

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costs of operation, transfers to other PACs, contributions to parties or candidates, or independent expenditures.[35]

The Federal Election Commission sedulously collects the reports, checks and aggregates them, and makes them easily available—but to what effect? Most voters could not absorb the information on the flow of campaign dollars even if the mass media made it clearly known. It is a policy problem as old as the legislation "disclosing" the activities of lobbyists: disclosure has a political effect only to the extent that the information disclosed enters the political decision making of a large number of citizens.

Such statutes, however, work better in holding candidates accountable. The election campaign is candidate-centered, and voters vote for candidates. Their attention centers on the candidate-relevant aspects of campaign finance: on the sources of candidate funds and on the expectations that attach to the contributions. Those are ultimately questions of the relationship between campaign finance and the making of public policy. They are momentous and formidable questions, and they deserve public attention. But for all their importance, they get to the questions of the accountability of candidates rather than PACs.

The outcome of the kind of publicity we give PACs and their operations has been outrage and cynicism rather than accountability or control. The information about PACs that filters into the public consciousness is, for many reasons, very fragmentary. A case can be made that it is also negative and pejorative in tone.[36] But whatever the cause, the effect has been not accountability or control but a generalized disapproval. By 1981 and 1982 the American public was seeing PACs as a "bad thing" rather than a "good thing" by a margin of about two to one, and anti-PAC PACs were increasingly common by 1984.[37]

Publicity is not really a mechanism of control itself; it is at best a necessary

[35] The states vary enormously in the extent of the reporting they require and in the editing, auditing, aggregating, analysis, and availability of the reported data. Even in the most thorough states, however, the quantity and quality of the data available do not begin to match what are easily accessible from the FEC.

[36] I would like to think that the validity of this observation is clear to everyone who reads about and watches campaign finance. If specifics are necessary, see much of the reporting on the subject in the *Washington Post*; Elizabeth Drew, *Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption* (New York: Macmillan, 1983); the series of commentaries on PACs by Bill Moyers on CBS Television in late February 1982. The best general evidence on the point is the fact that the media have managed so well to keep the "secret" that individual contributors account for well over half of the receipts of candidates for Congress.

[37] S. Prakash Sethi and Nobuaki Namiki report results from a national survey executed for them in 1981 by Roper in "The Public Backlash against PACs," *California Management Review*, 25 (Spring 1983): 133-144. Virtually 18 percent of their sample thought PACs "a good thing," while 43 percent judged them "a bad thing." In December 1982 the Roper organization repeated the questions and found sentiment to be 41-23 percent "bad" over "good." The latter results are reported in William Schneider, "Campaign Financing: Curb Special-Interest Giving But Don't Go Public," *National Journal*, 26 February 1983, 472. On the organized campaigns against PACS, see *Time*, 20 August 1984, 29.

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condition, a necessary resource, for the operation of some other mechanism of control. But if one concedes the inefficacy of voter sanctions over PACs and the absence of competing alternatives to most of them, it is hard to imagine what that control mechanism might be. So, while one can document the public disapproval of PACs, disclosure in the past decade appears to have affected neither the operations nor the growth of PACs, individually or collectively.[38]

Conclusions

The debate over the accountability of political organizations begins with the very concept of accountability. Can the accountability of the organization for its actions best be achieved by its members or by the electorate in the wider political marketplace? The debate goes on as state legislatures ponder how to define party organization and how to structure their primary elections. It goes on within the national Democratic party, where a number of critics of recent reforms argue that the time has come to shift away from participation as the preferred mechanism of accountability. In truth, however, we have traditionally relied on both avenues of accountability for parties, and we have been able to do so for two special reasons that apply only to political parties: American elections incorporate the names and symbols of the parties, and state legislatures have enormous authority to regulate the parties' organization and activities.

For PAC accountability, neither mechanism is as feasible or useful as it is for the parties. Electoral choice, even when informed by disclosure, works as a control only in the most salient—even notorious—cases of PAC activity. At best it functions to create diffuse opinion about PACs that may lead more generally to legislative reform. As for access to internal decision making for PAC donors, it is nowhere guaranteed by statute and only rarely available by PAC rule. "Voice" for donors is limited to the kinds of indirect influence anticipated, accepted, or encouraged by the parent organization or by PAC entrepreneurs. It is also limited by the fact that, in giving money to a PAC rather than to a party or a candidate, donors have chosen a political act that has as one of its attractions a lack of responsibility for the final disposition of their contributions. They tend to be among the least active and involved of American political activists, and not surprisingly, they have chosen a course of political action that demands only a modest level of involvement.

[38] Some commentators have argued that NCPAC's misfortunes in 1982 testify to the efficacy of publicity and disclosure. I am not convinced. I think that NCPAC's wounds are largly self-inflicted. Its own executive director, Terry Dolan, has created the image of NCPAC's doctrinaire conservatism mixed with political machismo and a boastful destructiveness. Consider, for example, his acknowledgement at a conference of scholars and practitioners that ". . . there was case after case where we would deliberately say things that would be dangerous for an incumbent to say." Herbert E. Alexander and Brian A. Haggerty, *The Federal Election Campaign Act After a Decade of Political Reform* (Los Angeles: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1981) 86.

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It would be a grave mistake, however, to treat all PACs alike in assessing the chances for accountability. Most of them are responsible to their parent organizations and thus to their executives, bureaucrats, and ultimately to stockholders or members. They are at the service of the goals and interests, the image and symbols, of the parent organization. This restraint, based on what a broader public thinks, will vary from parent to parent; the position of the PAC of a fast food chain is clearly different from one founded by a supplier of heavy machinery to the steel industry. Since the donors to the PAC of the organization generally share goals and interests, there will be little disagreement with them. They enjoy at best a kind of "virtual" representation—representation "in which there is a communion of interests and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them."[39] Unlike citizens of a nation-state, individuals in this instance of virtual representation do have the option of not entering or of leaving the arrangement if they see no community of interests.

In the PACs without parent organizations, the avenues of accountability are fewer and narrower. There is no parent organization, and there is little or no organizational life in the PAC. Thus there is no voice of any kind and no organizational parent asserting its responsibiltiy for the PAC. The exit decision is relatively potent because it is exclusively political, but its potential for accountability is more than neutralized by the fact that the unaffiliated PACs have both the legal right and the computer technologies necessary to enlist any kindred soul in the American population. The very style of their fund raising conditions them to expect donor losses.

Accountability in PACs varies also with the kind of activity they engage in. Voters, the other agents of accountability, are less helpless in assessing responsibility for the use of campaign contributions than for independent expenditures. When the PAC contribution is spent ultimately by a candidate, the candidate becomes accountable at least for the impact of those dollars on the campaign. The very point of PAC money spent independently, on the other hand, is that the usual channel of final candidate responsibility does not apply.

Thus, if one plots these two governing variables in order to come to some conclusions about levels of accountability (Table Six), one sees easily that levels of accountability are greatest when PACs with parent organizations are making direct contributions to candidates or to intermediaries who will give them to candidates. (Happily, this case accounts for 82 percent of the PAC monies spent in the Congressional elections of 1982.) The degree of accountability is least in the instances of parentless PACs making independent expenditures on behalf of or

[39] This is the classic definition of virtual representation by Edmund Burke in his letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe (1792).

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TABLE SIX

A Matrix of Accountability for PAC Actions
(With Sums of PAC Expenditures, 1981–82)

	Contributions to Candidates	*Independent Expenditures*
PACs with parent organizations	greatest ($76,564,363)	intermediate ($885,334)
PACs without parent organizations	intermediate ($10,988,963)	least ($4,884,371)

in opposition to some candidate. To be sure, this case accounts for only 5 percent of PAC monies spent in 1982—a small portion of PAC activity, but a troubling one.

For better or for worse, a new political organization—the political action committee—has entered American electoral politics without the extensive mechanisms that have long held political parties accountable to their publics. Under similar circumstances in the past, Americans have looked for remedies in public policy. Aside from the requirements of disclosure under the FECA and some state legislation, however, public policy has put limits only on the direct contributions PACs make. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's attempt to limit their independent expenditures,[40] and no legislature has yet tried to legislate access to their internal processes. In short, there appears to be neither the political will nor the constitutional way for transferring even a portion of the regulation of political parties to political action committees.

To take the broadest possible view, we have in the growth of PACs a new and developing representational system, one based on specific occupational or issue loyalities. To some extent it supplements the system of the political parties. While the parties function in the local electoral constituency, the PACs work in a more national and functional constituency. Years ago the votes and the resources that elected a candidate came from the same place and the same people. They no longer do. All of this amounts to a major change in American electoral politics, and PACs are very close to the center of it. But their history is short, and we are very likely in the middle of their development. In the emergence of new forms of political organization, the mechanisms of accountability within and around them are probably the last elements to develop.

As PACs develop and mature, it remains to define a realistic and legitimate set of expectations for their accountability. It is clear that neither in constitutional law nor in public expectation are they the semipublic, permeable political

[40] *Buckley* v. *Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

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organizations that the parties are. Their role in electoral politics just as surely differs from that of the parties. There is, therefore, no reason why they should be held accountable in the same ways and to the same extent that the parties are. But if our expectations for their accountability are to be different, we have yet to define those differences.*

* This paper is a revision of a paper presented under a similar title at the September 1982 meetings of the American Political Science Association. I am especially grateful for the help of my research assistant, Stephen Ansolabehere, and my friend, Gerald Elliott.

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The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf

DENNIS ROSS

Much has happened in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in the early 1980s. Jordanian King Hussein's decision not to negotiate the future of the West Bank and the failure of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement on withdrawal are only the latest in a series of events that have shaped the choices and behaviors of local actors and affected the positions of the superpowers in the region. The Shah of Iran's fall and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a sense of imminent danger about the Soviet threat to U.S. vital interests in the Gulf, but the Iran-Iraq war, the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations, and the conflict in Lebanon reassured many Americans that indigenous factors in the area would constrain the Soviets and limit the threat they could pose. Hussein's decision and the Syrian undoing of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement are seen by many as further proof that local political realities have a way of frustrating superpower objectives.

But are the factors that constrain the Soviets real and enduring? Are those factors that so concerned the U.S. about the Soviet threat in the early 1980s no longer relevant or evident? Are the Soviets showing any less interest or determination in achieving their regional goals? Are they indicating in any way that they believe their strategy is not working and needs to be redefined or changed?

Notwithstanding a number of setbacks and related difficulties in the region, the Soviets remain determined to pursue their regional goals and also remain generally satisfied with the strategy they have adopted for achieving these goals. This does not mean that the Soviets would not like to be doing better, but it does mean that given regional trends, available options, asymmetries in U.S.-Soviet

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stakes, and the risks they are prepared to run, current Soviet strategy continues to make far more sense than any alternative.

Continuing Soviet Interest in the Area

Clearly, the view that the Soviets are generally satisfied with their strategy in the Gulf is not shared by some western observers of Soviet policy. In viewing Soviet passivity in response to events in Lebanon in the summer of 1982, Karen Dawisha suggested that the Soviets might be in "eclipse" in the region because they lack options or opportunities for making gains.

> Soviet immobilism over Lebanon can be attributed not only to a lack of opportunities provided by the Arab states for greater Soviet participation, it can also be *put down to a marked Soviet disinclination to get involved.* And this disinclination extends beyond the confines of the Lebanese conflict to encompass a more general malaise in Soviet policy toward the region."[1]

Dawisha and others identify the underlying causes for Soviet difficulties and limitations in the region as:

- The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its basic hostility to atheistic communism.
- The emergence of oil wealth and the means this provides states like Saudi Arabia to use their wealth to influence and moderate the politics of the Syrians, Palestine Liberation Organization, and others.
- The availability of Europeans as alternative suppliers of sophisticated arms to the Arabs, reducing dependencies on the Soviets for military hardware.
- Increasing emphasis on development and modernization among the oil-rich states, whether moderates or radical, and a realization that one must look to the West and not the East for necessary technologies and expertise.
- The absence of a charismatic leader like Gamal Abdel Nasser who mobilized mass support throughout Arab lands, defined the base lines of an Arab consensus, put pro-Western regimes on the defensive, and whose regional aims converged with at least certain Soviet interests.[2]

While there is a measure of truth in each of these factors, one needs to view them with some caution. Though much inherent hostility to communism exists in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, it is the West, not the East, that is generally seen "as the culturally disruptive power that challenged or undermined Islam in these societies."[3] Moreover, with a Muslim population that will reach seventy

[1] Karen Dawisha, "The USSR in the Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse?" *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1982): 446. (Emphasis added.)

[2] Ibid., 443–44.

[3] Shahram Chubin, "Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East, *International Security* (Spring 1982): 130.

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million by the turn of the century, the Soviets may find it easier to gain entry into the Islamic world than westerners might imagine. As Alexander Benningsen has noted, the Soviets adopted an "Islamic strategy" in the 1970s, using religious leaders from Central Asia to showcase the reconciliation of Islam and communist development, to initiate exchange with religious authorities from the Muslim world, and to establish ties with the clergy in states like Saudi Arabia where diplomatic relations do not exist. While Afghanistan has dealt this strategy a setback, Soviet Muslims should not be discounted as a potential bridging element to the Middle East and Persian Gulf.[4] Leonid Brezhnev's statement at the 26th Party Congress that "the liberation struggle can develop under the banner of Islam" was surely an attempt to highlight the possibilities for reconciliation. At the same time, the possibility that the outside appeal of Islam could yet be a disruptive factor within the Soviet Union is likely to induce Soviet caution in using their Muslim population as a bridge.

Similarly, though the oil states have sought to use financial incentives as a way to moderate the behavior of radical states like Syria, this has not actually altered or significantly influenced radical behaviors on important issues. If anything, the influence seems to work in the opposite direction, with the radicals taking money and extracting promises that bind the oil states more closely to radical positions. (In Lebanon, it was the Syrians who influenced the Saudis and not the reverse.)

While all the local states—with the possible exception of Iran—prefer Western/U.S. technology for development, there is no indication that those who currently depend on Soviet weaponry believe that the Europeans can replace the Soviets as their main suppliers. Augment their forces, yes; allow them to learn more about western technologies in order to combat the Israelis, yes; give them greater leverage against the Soviets, yes; but actually replace the Soviets as suppliers, *no*. Only the Soviets can supply arms in the quantity and quality and with the speed necessary to meet the needs and satisfy the appetites of the states that depend on the Soviets for arms.

Finally, while Gamal Abdel Nasser may be gone, two points are worth noting. First, he did not forge consensus in the Arab world; he helped foster, in the words of one observer, an "Arab Cold War."[5] Nasser's mass appeal and ability to put those leaders identified with the U.S. on the defensive was not sufficient to prevent the Saudis from inviting a U.S. squadron of F-100s in 1963 to deter Egyptian forces in Yemen from attacking Saudi territory. Second, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is a charismatic leader, whose appeal carries across borders and who has succeeded in making states in the Gulf defensive about their ties to the

[4] Alexander Bennigsen, "USSR & Islam," in *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World: Review and Preview*, ed. Walter Laqueur and others (Washington, D.C.: Unclassified study prepared for Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1982), Bennigsen chap. 7–25.

[5] Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nassir and His Rivals, 1958–1970*, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

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West. To the extent that he succeeds in undermining Western-oriented regimes in the Gulf, Khomeini will be serving Soviet interests. This is not to say that many local factors do not impede or inhibit the Soviets; they surely do. It is to say that these factors may not limit the Soviets as much as some may think or wish.

Before concluding that the Soviets are in eclipse in the region, several factors and potential regional developments must be considered. The Soviet decision in Fall 1982 to provide the Syrians with SAM-5s and other advanced air defense equipment is extremely significant in terms of what it reveals about Soviet attitudes and willingness to run risks in the area. The Soviets had never transferred this system outside the Soviet bloc, and, at least for some time to come, the Soviets will have to man the system and its related air defenses in Syria.[6] This suggests that, much like in Egypt in 1970, the Soviets have assumed responsibility for Syrian air defense. As Alvin Rubinstein has pointed out, this did not necessarily translate into great influence over Egyptian policy,[7] but it raised Soviet stakes in Egypt. Now it has raised Soviet stakes in Syria.

Though the Soviets undoubtedly hoped their presence would deter Israeli military moves against Syria—much as it deterred Israeli deep penetration raids in 1970—they knew when they made the decision that they were facing an Israeli leadership (particularly given Sharon's proclivities) that was quick to use force against perceived threats.

What made the Soviet decision risky and different from the 1970 case was the fact that the SAM-5s cover a significant amount of airspace over Israel itself. This, alone, made an Israeli preemption likely if a war seemed imminent. After all, no Israeli leadership, then or now, is going to permit a Soviet military presence in Syria to limit Israeli air attack options to the point that Israel is forced to fight a war on terms that favor Syria. Thus, the Soviets must have known when they made the decision that they faced the considerable risk of Israeli preemption.

The Soviet need to respond to an Israeli preemption—particularly a successful one with limited Israeli losses—makes the Soviet decision even more notable. For reasons relating mostly to Soviet sensitivity about their status and image as a superpower and the high costs for any Soviet leadership of being humiliated or of appearing weak, the Soviets are likely to feel compelled to respond—perhaps by increasing their ground force presence and operational responsibilities in Syria and by providing the Syrians with even more threatening equipment. While this might deter the Israelis and put greater pressure on the U.S. to constrain them,

[6] For discussion of the Soviet presence and responsibilities in Syria, the SAM-5 and related deployments to Syria, and Israeli reactions and concerns, see Hirsch Goodman, "The Fuss about the Sam-5s," *Jerusalem Post*, 9–15 January 1983, International edition; William Beecher, "Israel Is Keeping Jets Out of Range of Syrian Missiles," *Boston Globe*, 30 April 1983.

[7] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

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it might also create an escalatory cycle that is difficult to control and that requires the Soviets to up the ante further. Traditionally, the Soviets have been very reluctant to put themselves in this kind of a situation. Yet, this is precisely the situation the SAM-5 decision created in Syria.

If nothing else, this tells us that the Soviets were and are running significant risks, as they measure risks, in Syria. This indicates that there is *not* a "marked Soviet disinclination to get involved" in the region.[8] On the contrary, to be willing to run such risks, the Soviets must be quite determined to stay very much involved in the region and must regard their stakes in Syria as sufficiently high to warrant their taking these kinds of chances. Why are they so determined to stay involved and why is Syria so important to them to justify their running these kinds of risks?

First, the Soviets seem to believe that an essential condition for being regarded as an unquestioned superpower with global influence is to have presence and influence in the Middle East. To maintain this they seem willing to pay quite a lot and to take bold steps.

Second, the Soviets perceive Syria as the key to their position in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. So long as Syria opposes U.S.-backed negotiations or agreements, Syria provides the Soviets with assured entree to Arab-Israeli issues, a basis on which to claim that the Soviet Union must be a party to any attempts to resolve the conflict, and their best means for disrupting potential agreements and highlighting the futility of trying to exclude the Soviets from any peacemaking efforts. Syria is also important to the Soviets because it provides important pressure points on and potential access to the Gulf states. With a larger number of radical PLO groups increasingly under Syrian control, the Assad regime's ability to put pressure on the Saudis and other Gulf states is likely to grow. Continuing Syrian-Iraqi hostility and the extensive Soviet build-up in Syria give the Iraqis an additional incentive not to draw too much away from the Soviets. Syrian-Iranian ties may provide the Soviets a vehicle for influencing Iranian behavior.

Finally, Syria is also important to the Soviets for military reasons. Access to Syrian ports and airfields—which may now be upgraded along earlier Egyptian lines—gives the Soviets important military benefits with regard to operating in the eastern Mediterranean and countering U.S. naval forces. It also offers the Soviets the best means for countering U.S. military presence in the region; in fact, the Soviet need to demonstrate that the entry of U.S. forces into Lebanon would draw a similar Soviet response may be one of the reasons the Soviets have increased their military presence in Syria so much.[9] In short, Syria is very impor-

[8] Dawisha, 449.

[9] The Soviets have consistently emphasized since the early 1970s that one of the best indications that the correlation of forces has shifted in socialism's favor is that the U.S. could not again intervene in Lebanon unilaterally as it did in 1958. Though the U.S. introduced forces as part of the multi-

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tant to the Soviets who are not about to accept passively a decline in their regional position.

Notwithstanding the absence of obvious Soviet gains in the region since Afghanistan, those factors that originally triggered wide concern remain:

- While the oil market has clearly changed, the West's dependency on Gulf oil and vulnerability to its cutoff remain a potential source of real leverage for those hostile to the U.S.
- Geographic asymmetries that favor the Soviets and mean that they have significant force close to the region are an enduring fact.
- Soviet capabilities for intervention continue to improve as their power projection capabilities are upgraded.
- Western oriented regimes in the Gulf remain militarily weak and continue to feel very vulnerable.
- The potential for instability and radical change in the area remains strong and creates possible opportunities for Soviet meddling.

While the U.S. has taken a number of steps to improve its position in the Gulf, new shocks in the region would undoubtedly set off tremors in the West. And new shocks are possible, particularly in Iran. No one can predict with any confidence what will happen when Khomeini passes from the scene. In the words of Eric Rouleau, "the plethora of forces on the political scene, each one obeying its own internal and evolving dynamics, makes it impossible to hazard any valid prognosis for the medium or long term."[10]

While the mullahs recognize the problem of succession and have been working to institutionalize their rule, there are tremendous centrifugal forces at work in Iran. Even with Khomeini in power, the vestiges of Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Turkoman, Baluchi, and other grievances and desires for autonomy have been strongly felt. Without Khomeini's moral authority, ethnic separatism and the struggle for power among contending factions within the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the remnants of the left may be difficult to control. The fact that the Revolutionary Guard may also be split into different factions closely paralleling the divisions within the IRP can only increase the prospect of a serious struggle for power after Khomeini dies.

Even if this struggle does not turn into civil war, Iran is likely to be plunged into a period of internal turmoil in which the scope for covert Soviet action and

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national force and as peacekeepers, the Soviets have persistently referred to U.S. forces in Lebanon (and Sinai as well) as representing a U.S. military bridgehead in the region—and increasing their forces in Syria may, in part, represent a response to this. Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "International Review," *Pravda*, 27 March 1983, 1st edition. Under the heading of "Pseudopeacemakers," Ovchinnikov talks about the U.S. repeating the Sinai scenario in Lebanon of using its "role of 'mediator' in the Israeli-Arab conflict to secure another bridgehead for a direct U.S. military presence in the Near East."

[10] Eric Rouleau, "Khomeini's Iran," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1980):19.

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support for particular groups will increase. The more violent the struggle, the more the Soviets are likely to be involved—especially given their interest in anything that happens along their border and their ability to provide "communications, arms, training, and a sanctuary (through a porous frontier)"[11] to the sides they prefer. Though events may not unfold in this fashion, the scenario is plausible and should not be ignored. At a minimum, outcomes in the coming Iranian succession could rebound to the Soviet's benefit (particularly, if more radical or pro-Soviet factions emerge) and could, therefore, have a basic effect on the shape of the region.

In light of all this (the SAM-5s in Syria, objective realities in the region, and the coming succession in Iran) there is good reason not to jump to the conclusion that the Soviet position is in decline or that the Soviets perceive it to be in decline. Though there is often a tendency in the West to view events in a "freeze frame," (what is today must always be), Soviet leaders are most unlikely to share such an outlook. They have, after all, been socialized to take a longer view that history moves forward in zigs and zags, not in a straight line. (A formulation a Soviet commentator has used to describe the revolutionary situation in Iran today.[12]) Even while working hard to prevent or at least cope with setbacks, this Soviet view makes it possible to live with reverses.

In the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, the Soviets have few illusions about their friends and clients. Yet while trying to build their leverage and position within certain states, they tolerate a certain lack of control and even endure setbacks because the area is important to them in their global competition with the U.S.

Soviet Goals in the Persian Gulf

Soviet goals in the region reflect a variety of concerns and interests. To begin with, the Soviets see the Persian Gulf area—like any on its periphery—as being a potential launching point for intrigues and threats. Along all their borders, the Soviets favor weak states with regimes that are friendly and responsive to Soviet concerns and needs. In this way the Soviets can minimize the threats they face and in real terms meet a traditional and abiding Soviet objective: the pushing of threats farther and farther away from the Soviet homeland.

But what does this require? It requires that the only foreign ties or presence permissible in these areas are those sanctioned by the Soviets, and it, therefore, requires ongoing efforts to undermine these ties and erode the presence of hostile powers (especially the U.S.) in contiguous areas like the Persian Gulf. Largely for defensive reasons, the Soviets seek to impose a kind of limited sovereignty on the states along their periphery.

[11] Chubin, "Gains for Soviet Policy," 143.

[12] D. Volskiy, "Iran at the Cross-Roads," *Novoye Vrema*, 7 January 1983, 13.

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This impulse has certainly found historical expression in Soviet policies and attitudes toward Iran. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Russians protested against internal developments in Iran such as building railroads, which might have military utility. Subsequently, Soviet concern about the use of Iranian territory for attacks on the USSR led to the conclusion in 1921 of a treaty that in Articles 5 and 6 gave the Soviets the right to send troops into Iran if a third party intervened militarily or used Iranian territory as a base for an attack on Soviet territory. The 1921 treaty was used to justify the Soviet seizure of Northern Iran in 1941. Though Iranian governments have renounced the treaty as unfair,[13] the Soviets continue to insist on its validity.[14] While, in reality, the Soviets have not succeeded in imposing "limited sovereignty" on Iran or the other Gulf states over the last two decades, they probably see the revolutionary situation in Iran as making this goal more achievable in time. Given the general weakening of the northern tier states, the Soviets probably see progress having been made toward the goal of removing barriers to their influence in the Gulf.[15]

The desire to remove or prevent the emergence of possible barriers to the southern expansion of Soviet influence also seems to be a driving impulse in Soviet behavior. Though it goes beyond the main Soviet defensive concern about the Gulf, which emphasizes the need to minimize potential threats to the Soviet Union and push them farther and farther away, it responds to traditional Soviet fears of Western encirclement. Breaking Western-inspired containment has been seen by the Soviets as critical to their global competition with the U.S. and also critical to their achievement of full-fledged and universally recognized superpower status, something for which they are prepared to pay quite a bit to achieve.

Breaking the northern tier barrier is important precisely because it is seen as allowing the Soviets to establish a presence in the Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf area and from there to project their power internationally. Because this whole region amounts to being a land bridge to Africa and the Indian Ocean basin, establishing a secure foothold is critical to the improvement of Soviet strategic power. Even without the oil resources, the area's proximity and geopolitical centrality were bound to trigger great Soviet interest in establishing meaningful presence and the kind of dominion or arbiter status that the British once enjoyed in the area—both because of the impact this would have on the perception of Soviet international standing and because being ensconced in this strategic passageway would facilitate Soviet power projection and impede or check that of its adversaries.

It is clear that the Middle East and Persian Gulf area would be of significant

[13] The Iranians renounced it in 1959 and then again in October 1979. There was, however, a clause that precluded unilateral abrogation.

[14] Shahram Chubin, "Soviet Policy Toward Iran and the Gulf," *Adelphi Papers* 157, International Institute of Strategic Studies (Spring 1981): 11.

[15] For an interesting discussion of this see Alvin Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, & Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), vii.

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interest to the Soviets even if the Western world was not dependent on the region's oil. The fact that it is, however, builds the Soviet interest in establishing presence and leverage within and among the countries of the region. Establishing such leverage and the appearance of being able to effect, or potentially even disrupt, the flow of oil promise the Soviets big payoffs. At the very least, if the Soviets could achieve some leverage over the flow of oil, they could manipulate European and Japanese dependency and erode the cohesion of the Western Alliance and also make U.S. allies more responsive to Soviet interests. (If there is any doubt about this, note how the Europeans have failed to support Washington's Middle East policy, including resupply for Israel during the 1973 war, out of fear of jeopardizing their oil supplies.) More overt Soviet control over Persian Gulf oil would, inevitably, have a much more fundamental effect on the U.S. global position and the overall balance of power.

This is not to say that the risks of seeking such control, particularly if done directly, are low. It is to say that the payoffs from Soviet gains—or U.S. losses—are very high. And the Soviets are not blind to these payoffs. They frequently refer to the strategic significance of the area and the West's dependency on the region's oil, even while they disclaim that they are any threat to it.[16]

Along with proposing a "Zone of Peace" and a dismantling of foreign bases, the Soviets have also called for a conference to resolve how the flow of regional oil might be guaranteed[17]—something that would put them in a position of having some say on the flow of oil from the region. This Soviet call, which was punctuated by hints that they too might be a user of Gulf oil, reflected not only the Soviet desire to gain a kind of arbiter status over the flow of Persian Gulf oil, but also the Soviet interest in gaining greater access to the oil.

Anticipated energy production problems may not make the Soviets a net oil importer, but they do make it difficult for the Soviets to continue to export oil for critical hard currency earnings and also meet the energy needs of their Eastern European allies, which are expected to grow by 250 percent by 1990.[18] Given the Soviet need to continue to import technology from the West and the need to avoid the politically worrisome implications of energy-induced economic problems in East Europe, the Soviets may have increasingly stronger incentives to gaining access to Persian Gulf oil at concessionary rates. This suggests that Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf may now be "fueled" not only by the proximity of the area, its geopolitical centrality, and Western dependency on the region's oil, but also by their own, or more likely their allies', increasing oil needs.

[16] For a survey of Soviet statements reflecting this, see Ilya Zemstov, "Regional Stability and Soviet Interests in the Persian Gulf," *Crossroads* (Winter-Spring 1982).

[17] A good article laying out the Soviet Zone of Peace concept in the Gulf, Indian Ocean, and elsewhere is V. F. Petrovskiy, "Zone of Peace," *SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* 7(July 1982): 13–16.

[18] David Price, "Soviet Relations in the Gulf," in Laqueur and others.

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What tools or options do the Soviets have for achieving their near and longer-term goals in the Persian Gulf—reducing and eventually removing U.S. influence and presence in the region, building and formalizing their own, creating Soviet leverage to breed local responsiveness to Soviet needs and interests, and developing Soviet arbiter status over local decisions? The Soviets have a wide range of options for achieving at least some of these goals gradually and at relatively low risk, assuming they remain content to make progress gradually. The indirect nature of many Soviet options reduces the level of risk by posing threats that are ambiguous, deniable, or simply difficult to respond to. Moreover, in some cases Soviet options appear benign and conventional—gaining access to Persian Gulf energy and offering economic and technical assistance in return for oil and gas, something they have done with both Iraq and Iran. Trading arms for oil, which has been increasingly employed by the Soviets, is an option that might not be benign, but might be viewed by many in the West as understandable. This option involves not only radical oil states like Libya, Algeria, and Iraq, but also the more conservative regimes in the Gulf that from time to time have paid for Syrian and Iraqi arms purchases with oil. Similarly, Soviet propaganda targeted on and against Gulf states, is generally taken as a given, even if it is clearly not benign.

Soviet propaganda plays on themes designed to put U.S. friends on the defensive:

- The U.S., through the rapid deployment force (RDF), seeks to seize Arab oil or at least cow the Arabs into surrendering their resources to avaricious capitalist appetites.
- Those, especially oil states, in the region who support U.S. military plans or identify in any way with the U.S. are corrupt quislings, eager to sacrifice the natural resources of their country and willing accomplices to neo-colonialist exploitation.
- Notwithstanding rhetorical disagreements, the U.S. supports Israeli expansionism and through Israel builds its own military presence and outposts in the region, seeks to impose a diktat on the Arabs and deprives the Arabs of justice and control of their own destiny.[19]

While such propaganda may have a limited effect, and even the Soviets are likely to regard it very cynically, several points need to be kept in mind. First, such propaganda strikes a responsive chord among many in the area, where defiance of the West responds to basic instincts and a continuing sense of grievance. Second, it is not simply articulated by the Soviets, but repeated over and over again and conveyed through and accepted by local front groups and leftist par-

[19] For a number of Soviet articles that repeat these continuing themes, see Vladimir Bogachev, "If It So Seems to the Pentagon," *Tass*, 6 January 1983; Boris Rachkov, "Damage to OPEC by Capitalism," *Moscow in Arabic*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 29 December 1982, H-3; Vladimir Peresada, "Billions for the Aggressor," *Pravda*, 25 December 1982, 2nd edition.

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ties giving it some local currency. Third, for regimes that lack a popular base and feel vulnerable, such charges are bound to be a source of real concern and fear, particularly because they play on the political culture and mass psychology of the area. At a minimum, such propaganda raises the costs of association with U.S. plans and initiatives.

Though the effect on regimes that feel weak and vulnerable to such charges should not be discounted, the Soviets clearly have other more direct and significant means for raising the costs of association with the U.S. and giving local regimes an incentive to be more responsive, or at least sensitive, to Soviet interests. These means are coercive in character and grow out of the Soviet ability to make life difficult for those who are seen as being hostile to their interests: providing an umbrella of protection to make it easier for a state like Syria to engage in troublemaking; covertly supporting an increase of terrorism by radical Palestinian groups against moderate Gulf regimes; facilitating and supporting provocative People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) behavior along the Saudi or Omani borders (or if North Yemen again begins to stray toward the U.S., against the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR); providing major new arms shipments or visibly increasing Soviet proxy presence in the PDRY, Ethiopia, or Libya which threaten the Gulf or Red Sea states; supporting secessionist groups in Iraq or Iran with arms, materiel, and even advisers.

The more vulnerable the local states feel to threats of subversion, cross-border raids, and more overt state to state conflict, the more they may feel compelled to avoid offending the Soviets or taking actions the Soviets regard as hostile. *Then* Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia stated:

> We do not compete with the Soviet Union in any way. Nobody can use us as a tool. In the circumstances we can not but admit that the Soviet Union is a major power and that we want no problems with it.[20]

This seems to reflect his appreciation of the high cost of opposing the Soviets. Similarly, the emphasis on nonalignment in the area responds not only to the political heritage of the region, (and the costs of association with the U.S. given this history and the Arab-Israeli issue), but also to an understanding that openly being arrayed against the Soviets may prove costly.

This is an understanding most keenly felt by regimes with a general western orientation that see themselves as being quite vulnerable to threats from neighbor states and to subversion and insurgencies supported from the outside. Nearly all the Gulf states perceive this vulnerability. But even erstwhile Soviet friends such as Iraq are likely to understand the Soviet ability to manipulate threats against them and to limit how far they go in angering the Soviets. President Saddam Hussein, who is normally reticent "about attacking the Soviets in

[20] William B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 70.

[21] Dawisha, 46.

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public,"[21] observed that a truly nonaligned position requiring a restoration of diplomatic ties with the United States was not possible once "the [Iran-Iraq] war broke out," presumably because this was not the time to do something the Soviets didn't like.[22]

The Soviets see the value of putting pressure on vulnerable Western-oriented states as was clearly implied by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in conversations with Yasir Arafat. In the documentation of one such meeting, which was captured by the Israelis in Lebanon and publicly released, Gromyko observed that Saudi behavior had been "much more positive" than expected in the Baghdad I and II summits following Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. He attributed this to:

> the atmosphere existing in . . . [both] conferences. The opinion of the Syrians is that there are several weak points in Saudi Arabian policy expressed in the feelings of some members of the Royal Family, who think their defense and support can only come from the Americans.
>
> It seems that the "Steadfastness Front" states have already gained some experience in handling Saudi Arabia and applying *pressure* on it.[23]

The Soviets are quite willing to apply pressure directly and are not particularly subtle about it. In one interview, King Hussein of Jordan reported that during his visit to Moscow in December 1982, Andropov took him aside and issued a warning on President Reagan's peace initiative: "I shall oppose the Reagan plan, and we will use *all our resources* to oppose it. With due respect, all the weight will be on your shoulders and they aren't broad enough to bear it."[24]

Besides seeing the value of applying pressure directly or through others against local states, the Soviets also appear to see the payoffs of *reminding* local leaders of their ability to manipulate threats against them. The Andropov warning to Hussein is one indication of this. The Soviet penchant for making broad sweeping proposals for the area which imply an offer of restraint in return for a certain responsiveness to Soviet interests may be another. Without this responsiveness, the Soviets typically imply that there is "simply no prospect of stability or restraint in the region."[25]

Their offers of "implied restraint" are manifested in sweeping proposals like the Portugalov proposal in February 1980 for an international conference to insure access to oil or Brezhnev's offer at the 26th Party Congress in April 1981 to link Afghanistan with broad security in the Gulf. They are also manifested

[22] Saddam Hussein interview with Congressman Stephen Solarz, reported by Iraqi News Agency, FBIS, *Middle East and Africa Daily Report*, 8 January 1983, E-7.

[23] "Protocol of Talks Between PLO and Soviet Delegations in Moscow," 13 November 1979. Among documents Israelis released in Jerusalem, June 1982, p. 16. (Emphasis added.)

[24] Reported in Karen Elliott House, "Hussein's Decision: King Had U.S. Pledges on Peace Talks but Met a Maze of Arab Foes," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 April 1983. (Emphasis added.)

[25] Chubin, "Soviet Policy Towards Iran," 132.

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in bilateral dealings with local states. As William Quandt notes, in regular meetings that occur between Saudi and Soviet diplomats, the Soviets persistently emphasize that they share the Saudi interest in regional stability and that the Saudis and the Soviets have much to talk about of mutual interest in this regard. This is something "the Saudis see as a not very subtle way of reminding them that South Yemen and other Soviet clients can make life unpleasant and that the Soviets could be helpful if the Saudis were to make some political concessions."[26]

The Soviet aim is to force an accommodation to the realities of their power and interests. How successful have the Soviets been? The answer depends on how one defines success. Shahram Chubin believes that local leaders do, in fact, understand that they must accommodate themselves to the realities created by Soviet power in order to reduce the prospect of Soviet mischief-making in periods of domestic upheaval, to counter Soviet criticism and related propaganda and disinformation, and to limit Soviet military support, including arms, advisers, and proxies for regional adversaries.[27]

But has this meant anything in terms of the actual behavior of regional states? The answer is a qualified yes. The Soviet strategy has succeeded in achieving, at least in part, some of the Soviet *negative* goals: the distancing of Gulf regimes from U.S. policies; the unwillingness to be seen supporting U.S. plans and initiatives; the more fervant espousal and adoption of nonalignment in international politics, etc. On the other hand, the Soviets have so far not experienced much success in achieving their *positive* goals: formalizing their own presence and control outside of places like the PDRY; establishing significant influence or leverage over local decisions; and gaining access to oil on concessionary terms, etc. Put another way, while local regimes are increasingly mindful of the costs of embracing the U.S., they have not yet seen the need to embrace the Soviets.

Whether the Soviets can use a strategy of intimidation and coercion to achieve more than limited negative goals, is not clear. The Soviets may well believe that this strategy has already achieved a lot, particularly because the Soviets view it as contributing to U.S. losses in a region where the stakes of the western world remain greater than theirs. This should alert the U.S. that the relevant criteria to use in evaluating whether the Soviets regard their strategy as satisfactory and successful are Soviet, and not American, criteria. The Soviets have reason, as Alvin Rubinstein has written, to be satisfied with the trends in the region.[28] So long as they are making at least incremental progress and see the prospect of continuing opportunities given regional rivalries, local instability, and local partners whose own aims converge with theirs, the Soviets are likely to remain satisfied

[26] Quandt, 71.

[27] Chubin, "Soviet Policy toward Iran," 132.

[28] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Perspectives from Three Capitals," in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 160.

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with their current strategy of intimidation that poses indirect threats to U.S. interests.

This seems especially true given the absence of available Soviet alternatives. A more benign policy offers them few partners, since the Soviets have little to offer outside of the military area. It would also require a basic change in the psychology of Soviet leaders, who have been socialized to take advantage of opportunities in their global competition with the U.S. Local circumstances will continue to breed dissatisfied actors and new opportunities to undermine the U.S. and its friends. Alternatively, a more directly threatening posture in an area of such vital importance to the U.S. could well trigger direct U.S. military responses and threaten all out war. A willingness to run this kind of risk in the Persian Gulf, without a fundamental change of circumstances, would also require a change in the psychology of Soviet leaders who, even if socialized to exploit opportunities, have also been traditionally admonished not to be adventuristic.

In short, one should expect from the Soviets in the area more of the same—a strategy of intimidation designed in the near-term to make it costly for Gulf states to identify with the U.S. The Soviets will surely work to improve their leverage and military presence with the aim of increasing their ability to intimidate and to narrow the choices available to local actors. In Soviet eyes, their increased presence in and support for Syria and growing Syrian leverage in the region, especially in the aftermath of what has been seen as a Syrian victory in Lebanon, work to achieve these ends. More direct threats are unlikely, but shouldn't be ruled out in all circumstances. Elsewhere, I have discussed the circumstances that might trigger more direct Soviet threats and military intervention,[29] and I will not repeat that discussion here except to say that the most likely Soviet threat of military intervention would be in response to a civil war in Iran. With instability and turmoil along their border and the possibility that pro-Western forces could prevail, the Soviets might well seize northern Iran once again.

Soviet Risk-taking Propensities

As a general principle, the Soviets will continue to avoid putting themselves in a situation that directly invites or inevitably threatens confrontation with the U.S. They view confrontation and war in cataclysmic terms. While threats to Soviet core values or the viability of the Socialist commonwealth have always been worth risking confrontation over—if for no other reason than the Soviet system and Communist party rule over it might be jeopardized otherwise—few other Soviets interests have been traditionally put in this category. Since the Soviets have seen confrontation as potentially jeopardizing everything they have achieved and since they believe time and the march of history are on their side,

[29] Dennis Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats in the Persian Gulf," *International Security* (Fall 1981): 159–180.

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few other interests have seemed important enough to warrant running significant risks of confrontation with the U.S.

What is difficult to know or predict is how the changing balance of power over the last decade and an emerging Soviet elite that has not experienced the devastation of World War I, civil war, purges, and World War II will change Soviet definitions of what constitutes a risk. Certainly, the Soviets have frequently spoken about the changed correlation of forces and the need for the American leadership to face up to the new realities of power.[30] While the Soviets have been more assertive around the globe, there have been few signs that they seem genuinely prepared to run much greater or qualitatively new risks in pursuit of potential opportunities.

Perhaps the Soviets will make no basic changes in risk-taking propensities, except insofar as they may be less willing to suffer strategic reversals that cast doubt on their superpower status or that reintroduce "threats" along the Soviet border. Their recent behavior in Syria may reflect the former and their potential reaction to Iranian contingencies the latter. On the whole, they are likely to continue to take a hard-headed look at a potentially threatening situation and *evaluate their overall interests, the balance of U.S.-Soviet stakes, the balance of power between the U.S. and its allies in the area*, and *the military options they have available.*[31]

Over the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (and, for that matter, the Syrians) in Lebanon, the Soviets made it quite clear that they were not prepared to run much risk.[32] In addition to their relatively low stakes in Lebanon and their other pressing political interests and preoccupations particularly in Europe, the Soviets saw themselves having few good military options. The relatively unfavorable military balance in the area given the U.S. and allied presence in the Mediterranean and the local Israeli superiority seems to have given the Soviets pause. For example, in response to a question on Hungarian television, Vadim Zagladin, a Soviet Central Committee member and First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department, stated:

[30] This has been a persistent theme of almost all articles dealing with international politics since the early 1970s. In the early 1970s at the height of détente, the changed correlation of forces and the U.S. need to face up to it was used to explain why Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), détente, etc., were possible. Since the late 1970s the theme has been that the cold warriors have tried to resist these changes and reimpose a "positions of strength" policy. See, G. Arbatov, "The Foreign Policy of the USA on the Threshold of the 1980's," *SSHA, Politika, Ideologiya, Ekonomika* 4 (April 1980). For an interesting article that repeats these themes but worries that the U.S. may not face up to these realities see, Alexander Bovin, "Political Observer's Opinion: Impasses at the Crossroads," *Izvestiya*, 20 January 1983.

[31] See Francis Fukuyama's discussion of some of these elements in "Nuclear Shadow Boxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East," *Orbis* (Fall 1981): esp. 595–7.

[32] Gromyko was quoted by Arab sources that a show of force (i.e., flying troops to Syria) in response to a PLO request was "out of the question" and that the Soviet Union would not go beyond its current diplomatic efforts and "would not budge one inch from its present Middle East policy." Quoted in Dawisha, 441.

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> What do you have in mind with this "permitted or not permitted?" Well, what has happened? There is a war between Israel and one of the Arab countries, aggression against an Arab country. Under these circumstances, what should the Soviet Union do? Should it attack Israel? This is a rather impossible situation.[33]

Impossible, one gathers, not simply because this could trigger a major confrontation with the U.S., but also because the relatively small Soviet forces that could be introduced quickly into the theater would be no match for the Israelis. Soviet sensitivity to the military balance and their lack of good military options in the Eastern Mediterranean and Arab-Israeli context have been used to explain inaction in both the 1956 and 1967 wars. During the Suez crisis, Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov told the visiting president of Syria: "How are we to go to the aid of Egypt? Tell me! Are we supposed to send our armies through Turkey, Iran and then into Syria and Iraq and on into Israel and so eventually attack the British and French forces?!"[34] Similarly, when an Arab delegation led by President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria visited Moscow after the 1967 war and castigated the Soviets for not intervening in the war to save the Egyptians or Syrians, Brezhnev told him that he and the Arabs must understand that "the communication line between us and you is very long" and to get to you we must "fly through pro-Western airspace."[35] Gromyko also referred in his 1979 meeting with Arafat to the great "physical distance between us" in implying that the Soviets could not do much, even while they sympathized with the PLO's struggle against the Israeli attack in southern Lebanon.[36]

While all these statements may be self-serving and designed to rationalize why the Soviets could not intervene, it is interesting that they all reflect a strong military logic. Even if useful for explaining Soviet behavior to the Arabs, one suspects that these statements reflected some basic Soviet judgments on whether they could risk intervening. If so, the Soviet military calculation may have an important, though not necessarily predominating, impact on Soviet willingness to intervene in a crisis situation.

The significance of this for the Gulf should not be missed. While U.S. stakes are high, the military balance and Soviet military options may look much more favorable in the Gulf than they do in the Middle East, particularly given shorter distances, the relative weakness of the local forces, limited U.S. presence in the immediate vicinity, and the much greater power the Soviets can bring quickly to bear. A favorable military balance will not suddenly induce Soviet adventurism, but it could make them feel more able to intimidate the U.S. and also to deter U.S. presence or intervention, at least in a place like Iran.

[33] Interview with Vadim Zagladin, Budapest Domestic Television, FBIS, 17 September 1982.

[34] Mohammed Heikal, *Cairo Documents* (London: New English Library, 1972), 142.

[35] Abd al-Majid Farid, who was Nasser's personal secretary, recounts this episode in his *Abd Al-Nasir's Secret Papers* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Publication Research Service 72223,) Translations on Near East and North Africa, 14 November 1978.

[36] "Protocol of Talks Between PLO and Soviet Delegation," 176.

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U.S. Responses to Soviet Strategies

How should the U.S. respond to the Soviet strategy which is designed to challenge with primarily indirect threats, apply pressure within the region directly and through local partners, and take advantage of the image of Soviet power and ability to provide all manner of military support to insurgent groups and other regional clients? There is no simple response to such a strategy. Not only must the U.S. use a multiplicity of instruments to counter the Soviets—military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence—but, in addition, it must employ these instruments with subtlety, at all times recognizing what is possible with the different regimes in the area and what is likely to make them more secure.

It is the sense of vulnerability and weakness that so many local states share that makes the U.S. task difficult and that makes a strategy of intimidation potentially effective. The U.S. can do much to deter direct external threats by the Soviets or their radical clients against regimes important to the U.S. But irridentist claims, disparities in and rivalries for power, the socially disruptive effects of modernization and the related resurgence of fundamentalism, ethnic diversity and loyalty to specific clans or tribes, and the absence of fully legitimate and recognized bases on which to rule contribute to the vulnerability of many Gulf states and cannot be easily addressed by the U.S. Many of the Gulf regimes that look to the U.S. for protection are, nonetheless, fearful of relying too openly on the U.S. for their own defense, except in extreme circumstances where the immediate survival of the regime is at stake.

That does not mean the U.S. should despair or is helpless in countering the Soviet strategy and reassuring local states against Soviet-inspired or supported coercion. Most of the Gulf states do, after all, still look to the U.S. for protection. It does mean, however, the U.S. should do as much as it can in the areas of infrastructure development, joint military exercises, and access to facilities with states that feel capable of cooperating openly. The U.S. should engage in discreet forms of security cooperation (joint threat assessment and joint planning, among others) with the other states. Even while recognizing the political constraints, the U.S. needs to be opportunistic in trying to expand the scope of cooperation and to establish precedents for greater U.S. security involvement with the western-oriented states in the area.

In general, three basic objectives ought to guide the U.S. response to the Soviet strategy:

- Within the limits of what is politically possible, develop military presence in and around the region and improve capability for bringing power to bear in the area.
- Bolster the capabilities of local states to deter and cope with local threats.
- Work with local states to manage the developmental process and to ameliorate regional conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The first objective is important basically because the Soviets must not think that the risk of making a military move into the Gulf is low. If the military bal-

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ance were to shift too much in the Soviet favor, their view of the risks of a military move might change, particularly if they believed it was possible to present the U.S. with a military *fait accompli* and preempt their involvement. By building regional presence and a capability to bring power to bear in a way that rules out any quick or easy military successes for the Soviets, the U.S. can make any such reevaluation unlikely. The U.S. can also remind the Soviets that stakes remain high in the area, that it means to defend them, and that the pursuit of a more threatening approach is too risky. This further adds to deterrence and militates against a Soviet view that the risk of a move into the Gulf may not be great.

Besides enhancing deterrence, developing a U.S. presence to the extent that is politically feasible is also important for countering or offsetting the shadow that Soviet power casts over the area; to cast a U.S. shadow, perhaps from "over or on the horizon,"is essential for offsetting the specter of Soviet coercion and for reassuring U.S. friends against threats manipulated from the outside. It is also important for reassuring against military threats from more powerful regional adversaries, something that could become even more important to Gulf states if there were a clear-cut winner or a resolution of the Iran-Iraq war.

Obviously, being able to reassure local states is the key to countering the Soviet strategy of intimidation and coercion. Building a U.S. presence in politically acceptable ways is one element in providing this reassurance. Another is provided by the second objective—bolstering the capabilities of regional friends. This provides reassurance by making local states more confident about their own ability to cope with local threats and more confident in the U.S. as a reliable security partner. This can not be done indiscriminately; it must take account of the absorptive capacities of these states, the actual threats they confront and the weapons that would be most useful in countering them, and the affect that certain kinds of arms transfers are likely to have on the Arab-Israeli and Pakistan-India balances and prospects for peace.

Managing the developmental process and ameliorating local conflicts is important for minimizing Soviet opportunities to exert leverage. At one level, working with local states to manage the process of modernization intelligently is difficult, but surely necessary. The grinding poverty in some of the regional states, as well as the social dislocation caused by rapid modernization in the wealthier oil states, both provide fertile breeding grounds for dissatisfaction and turmoil. The U.S. should focus on developing a strategy for managing these socio-economic problems—particularly at a time when declining oil revenues will affect both the rich and poor states in the region—even more than on developing a strategy for coping with the military problems in the area.

Making progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement would be very important, not because the sources of instability and conflict will disappear in the Gulf if there is Arab-Israeli peace; they surely will not. Nor because friends in the Gulf will suddenly invite in an American military presence if Palestinian grievances disappear; this won't happen for a number of reasons including fear

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of fundamentalist reaction to such a posture. But rather making progress toward Arab-Israeli peace will deny the radicals a "stick" to use against American Gulf friends; it will make some of these regimes less defensive about association with the U.S. and will facilitate security cooperation with both the Arabs and Israelis. Thus, while ameliorating the Arab-Israeli conflict will not solve U.S. problems in the Gulf or remove the various Soviet means of leverage, it would make it somewhat easier to respond to these problems and the Soviet strategy.

American strategy of the last few years has embodied many of the broad principles and objectives outlined above. How have the Soviets responded to this American strategy? Principally, they have waged an increasing propaganda campaign against the buildup of American military forces in the area, suggesting that this buildup constitutes the real threat to the area and juxtaposing it against their sweeping proposals for a zone of peace. They have also charged that U.S. arms transfers to the Saudis, Pakistanis, and others represent a threat to peace and serve only imperialist aims. Camp David, Egyptian-Israeli peace, the Reagan plan, and the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, they say, reflect a U.S./Israeli attempt to impose a capitulationist course on the Arabs.[37]

Little in this propaganda is new, though its intensity and the prominence the Soviets give their own proposals on regional peace and security does suggest some increased concern and awareness of the growing importance of the region. But, otherwise, Soviet behavior has not varied a great deal; perhaps, this reveals that the Soviets are generally satisfied with regional trends and also lack viable alternatives to their present course.

How might a change in the character of the U.S. approach affect the Soviets? For example, how might they react to approaches that were either more accommodating or, alternatively, more offensive in putting pressure on Soviet positions and friends in the region? The rationale for the former would be that if the Soviets are invited to be a regional arbiter and their security concerns are met, they will accept the arrangement and support regional stability. For the latter, the rationale would be that if they are going to exercise coercion against American friends and position in the area, the U.S. ought to do the same in return, thereby building the Soviet incentive for restraint.

Would the Soviets react in the desired manner to either of these approaches? The accommodating route assumes the Soviets will alter their broad interests in the region, forsake trying to erode and supplant U.S. influence and presence, and be content to have a kind of equal status in the region that also limits the regional U.S. military capability. While it is quite possible that the Soviets would accept such an arrangement for a time—particularly because it would confer on them the kind of status that they would like to have in the region, support their

[37] Articles that repeat these themes include Oleg Fomin, "International Review: Key to a Settlement," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 4 December 1982; V. Vinograadov, "Dangerous Progress," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 14 December 1982, 3; P. Demchenko, "Under Pressure from Washington: What Lies Behind the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement," *Pravda*, 20 May 1983, 1st edition.

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broad international objectives, and perhaps also reduce the burdens of supporting some of their regional clients—it is difficult to see the Soviets resisting the temptation to take advantage of opportunities to damage the U.S. regional position that would be bound to occur sooner or later. Strategic détente would give the Soviets a stake in stability and limit their trouble-making tendencies in the Third World. But the accommodating approach banks on the Soviets foresaking opportunities in the Middle East and Gulf area in return for regional détente and a certain regional standing.

One would feel more hopeful about the whole accommodating approach if one could see a sign of some change in Soviet attitudes toward competition and struggle with the U.S. Until one sees some evidence that the Soviets genuinely understand that they can not consistently work to undermine American interests and still expect the U.S. to be responsive and sensitive to theirs, there is not much hope for accommodating approaches working in a place like the Persian Gulf.

There is no better example of the Soviet impulse to seize perceived opportunities in the area, regardless of the costs to potential understandings with the U.S., than their behavior during the Iranian hostage crisis. Aside from generally excusing seizure of the hostages by saying it was "understandable," the Soviets did all they could to prevent a resolution of the issue by warning of U.S. tricks and an imminent U.S. invasion even during the final delicate negotiations for release of the hostages.[38]

It is worth noting that the most striking evidence of a Soviet change of heart might not even occur in the region. For example, signs that the Soviets really were focusing attentions on solving internal problems and that they would no longer be content to have external success substitute for a lack of internal progress would be very significant, particularly as it would mean that one very strong Soviet impulse for taking advantage of opportunities would disappear. Whether this would translate into a further softening of Soviet attitudes toward the character of competition with the U.S. is difficult to know, but it would be a trend worth encouraging.

There is currently not much reason to believe that a purely accommodating approach would produce the desired Soviet response for any enduring period. This does not mean that accommodation on individual cases should be ruled out. There may be times when accommodation would serve U.S. interests. For example, if the Soviets were truly interested in a face-saving way to remove their military presence and get out of Afghanistan, it would be in U.S. interests to help them do so.

Is the pressure approach likely to be any more successful than the accommodating approach? The Soviets are bound, at least initially, to try to prove to the U.S. that such a posture will not deter them, and, in fact, is likely to harm the U.S. far more than them because of their greater ability to manipulate threats against American allies. This is not something the U.S. should take lightly.

[38] See, for example, *Pravda* editorial, 17 January 1981.

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Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where opportunities exist for American friends with appropriate support from the U.S. to put pressure on trouble-making Soviet clients. It may be important for the U.S. to make it clear that those who threaten its friends cannot do so with impunity. The U.S. can raise the costs of trouble-making for the Soviets and those who do their regional bidding.

Thus, much as in the accommodating approach, there may be cases where the circumstances in terms of provocation, opportunity, and limited costs to allies are right for the U.S. to pursue a more offensive approach. On the whole, however, both accommodation and pressure should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion

While the Soviets have not appeared to make much recent headway in the region, the U.S. has little reason either to be complacent about its security position or to conclude that the Soviets are a superpower in eclipse in the Gulf. Objective realities haven't changed, opportunities to improve the Soviet or undermine the U.S. position remain, and their determination to preserve their position is clear.

The Soviets have reason to think that over time their strategic position vis-à-vis the region has improved and that their strategy for eroding the U.S. position in the area has been succeeding. While doing better at achieving negative than positive goals, the Soviet strategy reflects their patience, the risks of threatening too directly, and the options available to them..

On the whole, the Soviets are likely to be satisfied with their strategy and what they have achieved in a region that remains more important to the U.S. than to them. If nothing else, the U.S. should evaluate Soviet success or failure in Soviet and not American terms.

The U.S. approach to countering the Soviet strategy requires sufficient local presence to militate against any change in the Soviet assessment of the risk of more direct military moves. The U.S. will also need to provide measured security assistance to reassure local states against extraregional and local coercion. Ameliorating local causes of instability and conflict is also important for denying the Soviets opportunities for leverage.

Finally, competition in this area, like competition more generally, will not be resolved overnight. The U.S. can neither force the Soviets into submission nor accommodate them in ways that end competition, though elements of pressure and accommodation make sense in appropriate circumstances. The challenge for the U.S. in the Gulf and elsewhere is to protect its interests, while avoiding conflict—a good prescription for any policy.

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Party Reform, Party Atrophy, and Constitutional Change: Some Reflections

DAVID B. TRUMAN

One measure of a revolution is the volume of commentary concerning causes and consequences that it generates. By that measure alone, the rapid changes since 1968 in the process of nominating candidates for President and the associated alterations in the party system merit being called "revolutionary." Participants in the "reform" movement, along with scholars and journalists, have produced a substantial literature on what has happened, why it has happened, and what consequences have resulted for the political activists, the party system, and the Republic.[1]

The definitive account of the politics of "reform" in the Democratic party, beginning with the changes introduced by the McGovern-Fraser Commission, and their reverberations among the Republicans, is appropriately entitled *Quiet Revolution*[2] Although the "reform" process continues up to the present and shows no sign of abating, the pivotal changes deserving the revolutionary label

[1] See, for example, Nelson W. Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) and the literature there cited.

[2] Bryon E. Shafer, *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983).

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are the ones that occurred among the Democrats between 1968 and 1972 under the general auspices of the commission headed successively by George McGovern, then senator from South Dakota, and Donald M. Fraser, then a representative from Minnesota.

It is no exaggeration to say that no changes in the party system comparable to these in scope and significance had taken place in the century and a half since the institution of the national nominating convention in the 1830s.[3] These changes essentially eliminated the representative method of nominating candidates for President and replaced it with a fluid participatory system from which the regular state party organizations and their leaders were effectively excluded. The nominating function of the national convention was reduced to no more than a ratifying action. By imposing these changes on the state Democratic parties, the McGovern-Fraser "reforms" destroyed almost all semblance of a federal national party and replaced it with a partially centralized one.[4] This was institutional upheaval and displacement of one set of elites by another set on an impressive scale.

The Problem of State Party Abdication

The most striking aspect of these revolutionary changes was that the McGovern-Fraser "guidelines" were developed and adopted without more than minor resistance from the regular Democratic party organizations in the states. Democratic state chairmen and their committees, almost without exception, dutifully—though sometimes reluctantly—cooperated in what turned out to be the elimination of their influence over the nomination of the presidential candidate. Chairmen or committee members from a few states—such as California, which has lacked a stable party system for most of this century—were sympathetic with the objectives of the "reforms." Those objectives were patently anti-party and favorable toward the increased leverage of non-party factions and intense ideological groupings. A few state committeemen, such as Will Davis of Texas, a member of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, dissented from the more arrogant pretensions of the commission staff. John Bailey, long-term Connecticut chairman, saw the threat when the resolution calling for the establishment of the commission was being voted upon at the 1968 convention. These were exceptions, however. The McGovern-Fraser Commission staff deliberately tried to insulate the leaders of real party organizations in the states from the commission's deliberations. They succeeded in part because most state party chiefs failed to use the opportunities that they had to oppose the commission and its recommendations. Thus Pennsylvania was "fairly typical" of most states when it was found

[3] Ibid., 6.

[4] Ibid., chaps. 7, 14–16, and passim. See also James W. Ceaser, *Reforming The Reforms: A Critical Analysis of the Presidential Selection Process* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1982), 1 and passim.

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to be out of compliance with ten of the eighteen commission "guidelines," indicating the scale of the changes that the state parties were called upon to make. Yet resistance to the commission's edicts was minimal.[5]

Just a few years earlier, state party organizations had been strong enough to tell leading presidential aspirants, either directly or from behind the screen of a favorite-son candidate, to stay out of their states—and get away with it. As late as the 1950s, moreover, state leaders had been able to ignore such winners of the largest number of preference primaries as Robert A. Taft and Estes Kefauver in picking the nominees for President. Yet between 1968 and 1972 the state Democratic organizations collectively yielded, without a serious fight, any hope of control over the awarding of what had been "the most valuable prize in their possession—their party's presidential nomination."[6] Why? What were the reasons for this suicidal collective abdication?

The answer certainly does not lie in the intrinsic political strength and shrewdness of the McGovern Commission. The intricate maneuvers that led to McGovern's appointment as chairman and to the selection of the commission members need not be reviewed here, but they did not produce, especially after the AFL-CIO decided not to participate, a commission that drew significantly upon the muscle of the regular party. Its make-up was, in fact, essentially factional, a stacked deck of "reform" cards.[7]

Nor is the answer to be found in the political talents of the commission staff, which was completely dominated by reformist zealots, some of whom came from the group of Eugene McCarthy supporters who had put in train the efforts that led to the establishment of the McGovern Commission.[8] Its key members more committed to "reform" politics then to presidential politics, the staff engaged in highly skilled manipulation. They outmaneuvered National Chairman Fred Harris, no great feat in itself, insulated the commission from party regulars, controlled its agenda, sold their ideological line for the most part to the Democratic National Committee, and coaxed or coerced the state party organizations into compliance with the commission's dictates. These were not trivial political achievements, yet they certainly could not have been accomplished over the opposition of alert and vigorous state parties. The commission staff exploited the limitations and weaknesses of the state parties; they did not cause them.

[5] The data in this paragraph were drawn from Shafer, *Quiet Revolution*, chaps. 1, 3, 4, 7. The commission's eighteen guidelines are reproduced in Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform*, 40–52. Since, as both Shafer and Polsby demonstrate, their significance lay not so much in their apparent content as in their implied intent and cumulative impact, no useful purpose would be served by summarizing them here.

[6] The phrase is Anthony King's. See Anthony King, editor, *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 375.

[7] Shafer, *Quiet Revolution*, 76, 100.

[8] McCarthy played no part in commission politics. He had already joined his fellow Minnesotan, Harold Stassen, in that backwater pantheon of diminished figures whose careers have moved from high drama to low comedy as they search the country for followers whom they can presume to lead. McCarthy was an occasion, not a cause.

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On another level, it is also insufficient to claim for the media, especially television news, responsibility for the abdication of the state parties. Assertions of such a causal connection by otherwise responsible observers are specious.[9] That developments in the media and in the Washington press corps have affected politics is unquestionable. That the availability of television advertising and the presence of television news have altered campaign strategies is undeniable. But the reactions of the state parties to the McGovern Commission "reforms" involve the profound alteration, even the disintegration, of a major institution—the federalized political party system. That degree of change in an institution that has lasted for a century and a half is a matter of power, its organization, distribution, and exercise. The news media, as Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan argue, produce consequences but do not have power.[10] Television news, in particular, is essentially a branch of show business. Nielsen ratings are not an index of political power. In knowing hands, television is one of several means to political power, not in itself a force capable of restructuring the party system.

Clearly, the abdication of the state Democratic party leaders before the demands of the McGovern-Fraser "guidelines" is an event that, like most political occurrences of any consequence, has complex causes. The practical politics of the 1968–1972 period can explain some of what happened, as can the precipitating initial crisis of the 1968 Democratic Convention, as well as the continuing turmoil in the country over the Vietnam War. There is some significance in the focus of middle-class activists, in alliance with liberal interest groups and new feminist organizations, upon the "reform" issue and their detachment from the regular party in their home areas.[11] Byron E. Shafer discerns the "fundamental pattern," the "key" to the "puzzle of self-liquidation" in a set of "continuing traditions" in American party politics, namely, the combination of "a coalitional approach to party affairs and a brokerage approach to political leadership." These traditions disposed the regular party leaders toward accommodation of "reform" demands without the state leaders realizing that accommodation in this instance meant replacing one set of rules with another set that essentially eliminated "the regular party from the mechanics of presidential selection" in the future.[12]

Long-Term Causes: The Nationalization of Legislative Power

It is no criticism of Shafer's perceptive analysis to propose that the proximate causes of party default that he so skillfully identifies must, for their full effect,

[9] For example, "For some time, the political parties have been in the twilight of their power as television challenged their role as main mediator between voters and Presidential candidates." Howell Raines, "John Glenn: The Hero as Candidate," *New York Times Magazine*, 13 November 1983, 72.

[10] Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan, *Over the Wire and On TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 297ff.

[11] See Shafer, *Quiet Revolution*, passim and especially his concluding chapter.

[12] Ibid., 527–529.

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have been fostered by contextual causes of longer duration that make the application of standard patterns of accommodating dissenting factions profoundly counterproductive. Such causes must have provided the setting for the decay of the Democratic state parties and their federation. The disintegration of the party became apparent rather suddenly in the early 1970s, but its causes could not have been restricted in time. To assert the contrary would be to fall victim to the spot news compulsion of most journalists, and even a good many political scientists, who assume that all events have an immediate and only an immediate cause and that long-term developments are irrelevant because they cannot be translated into spot news. If institutional change of historic proportions occurred between 1968 and 1972, if the state Democratic parties caved in before the machinations of the McGovern-Fraser staff, the parties must have been changing—as nationally significant components, weakening—for some time. The events of the 1968–1972 period revealed profound changes in the party system, but the period was too brief for these events alone to have produced the changes.

Causal factors significant enough to account for the collapse of the state parties and to provide the context for precipitating events between 1968 and 1972 must not only be long-term but also must involve or reflect a shift over time in the stakes of state party leaders and organizations in presidential nominations. Even though state chairmen displayed some anxiety about the effects of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines, they made certain that their accommodations would not result in contamination of their ways of doing state and local political business. They accomplished this in most cases by choosing from the options permitted under the guidelines for selecting national convention delegates the device of the candidate preference primary. They appear to have said, in effect, that they had more important fish to fry at the state level than they saw for themselves in the squabbles over presidential nominations and the credentials of convention delegates. They thus risked significantly changing their role in the presidential nominating game, even if they did not see that they were dealing themselves out of it. For the state party leaders to have altered or abandoned their traditional roles as brokers of presidential nominations had to mean that their stakes had changed. They were somehow playing a game that differed sharply from the one they had played by tradition. Ratification of the McGovern-Fraser changes implied that the state party chiefs, at least unconsciously, recognized that they were playing a different game nationally, not *because* of the proposed changes but as a *precondition* for the imposition of such changes.

Two long-term cumulative influences could account in substantial measure for the apparent abdication of the state party leaders. One of these is the nationalization of legislative power within the federal system that was consecrated by the Supreme Court in the 1936–1938 period, part of what I have elsewhere referred to as "the unacknowledged revolution."[13] The prospect and need for such nation-

[13] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, "Introduction to the Second Edition" (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), xlvii and xlviii.

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alization, with the Court's blessing, were examined by Edward S. Corwin in his Storrs Lectures at Yale, published in 1934 under the title *The Twilight of the Supreme Court.*[14] That title, regretfully selected by Corwin, referred to the consequences for the Court of the political-constitutional changes growing out of the New Deal. He was concerned in particular with two prospective constitutional shifts. The first of these was the likely acknowledgment by the Court that national power is commensurate with the national scope of the economy. That shift would entail the abandonment of the doctrine of Dual Federalism, which for most of a century had limited the powers of the federal government, notably to regulate interstate commerce, by the powers reserved under the Tenth Amendment. The second shift was the definitive acceptance by the federal government, including the Court, of the view that the power of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare is a separate grant of power, distinct from the other enumerated powers and not limited by them. For the constitutional system, these shifts meant the establishment of an essentially centralized polity. For the Supreme Court, whose classic role had been as arbiter of the federal system, the changes Corwin anticipated and in substantial degree feared meant that the Court was about to enter a period of irreversible decline.

The second and equally important long-term influence is the extension and institutionalization in the past seventy-five years of the direct primary system of nomination for political office. The cumulative effects of these two long-term influences have been to change the stakes for which the state party leaders are playing and to weaken the state parties as organizations.

A history of the United States in the Constitution's first century and a half could be written around the two themes of Dual Federalism and of the constitutional meaning of the words, "provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States," in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, known as "the spending power."

Dual Federalism as a concept (the term was coined by Corwin in the Storrs Lectures) goes back to the debates over ratification of the Constitution. It stemmed from the restricted view of national power derived from the Madisonian doctrine that the Constitution was a compact among pre-existing, sovereign states and not directly among the people. This view meant that, in Corwin's words, the existence of the states was "a criterion of national power" and a limitation upon it.[15] The contrary, national-supremacy view, associated with Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists and enshrined in the constitutional canon by John Marshall, derived from the proposition that the Constitution was a national act, directly by the people, and its granted powers were supreme and unlimited except by its own terms. The Taney Court (1836–64) wove a contrary Madisonian theme into the constitutional fabric. The resulting "depleted condition" of national power by 1861 was demonstrated by Abraham Lincoln's reli-

[14] Edward S. Corwin, *The Twilight of the Supreme Court* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934).

[15] Ibid., 10.

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ance upon the President's untested powers as commander-in-chief rather than upon the powers of Congress.[16] The limited status of national power was also congenial in the predominantly laissez faire environment of the post-Civil War years. By about 1885 the Court was in a position to choose, without appearing to abandon its judicial role, between "two widely divergent although equally well matured traditions regarding national power."[17] Although it was less than consistent, for almost fifty years after 1885 the Court favored the Madisonian, dual federalism tradition, especially in defining "commerce" and in stating the limits upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. This view reached something of a peak in 1935 in the case declaring the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) unconstitutional. Such was the strength of the political forces generated by the Depression and reflected in the New Deal, however, that the Court within two years reversed direction (as Corwin anticipated in 1934) and embraced the national supremacy interpretation, a position from which it has not subsequently withdrawn.[18]

For the century between Marshall's death in 1835 and the decisions of the Court in the New Deal cases, the justices generally favored a conception of the federal relationship as competitive, one between jealous rivals. The period after 1937 has been referred to by Corwin and others as "cooperative federalism," a euphemism. As Corwin acknowledged in 1953, the term is "a short expression for a constantly increasing concentration of power at Washington in the stimulation and supervision of local policies."[19] As it affects the definition of "commerce" and the regulation of interstate commerce, this has meant that no corner of the nation's economy, including the employer-employee relationship, is beyond the reach of the federal government. It is not what Congress *may* do, but what it *chooses* to do that sets the limits of policy. What has come about is the situation that Mr. Justice Cardozo feared in his *concurring* opinion in the NRA case: "If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal system."[20]

Controversy over the spending power also dates from the period of the ratification of the Constitution, and it emerged in the divergent views of Hamilton and Madison expressed first in the pages of *The Federalist*. Madison, of course, took the position that the power to tax and spend was merely instrumental to the other specified powers,[21] while Hamilton, though not explicitly contradicting Madison's view, at least until his 1791 "Report on Manufactures," argued for a

[16] Ibid., 13-14.

[17] Ibid., 15, 48.

[18] A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

[19] Edward S. Corwin, editor, *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), xiv.

[20] Schechter v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

[21] *The Federalist*, no. 41; See Corwin, *Twilight of the Supreme Court*, 152ff. and *The Constitution*, 113f.

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broad meaning of the clause.[22] Over the years the constitutional interpretation of the spending power was less a reflection of decisions by the Court than of conflicting or divergent positions taken by most Presidents and majorities in Congress. Madison, consistent with his views in the ratification debates, in 1816 vetoed the "Bonus Bill" for internal improvements. John C. Calhoun, then a nationalist, argued against Madison that if the framers had wanted to restrict the spending power by the enumerated powers, they could easily have said so clearly.[23] With conspicuous exceptions Presidents and Congresses divided similarly for a century or more. As late as 1887, Grover Cleveland successfully vetoed an appropriation in aid of drought-stricken farmers on the grounds that he saw no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution.[24] In the early years of this century, Presidents and Congresses gave no indication of an awareness of a constitutional issue, and the Court avoided the controversy, usually by subsuming challenged actions under one or more of the enumerated powers. In 1923 it edged toward the Hamiltonian position by denying to a state or an individual citizen the standing to challenge an appropriation of national funds as unconstitutional.[25] It was not until 1936, however, that the Court gave unqualified endorsement to Hamilton's position.[26] As Corwin correctly anticipated in 1934, the scale and the variety of the appropriations sponsored by the New Deal were bound to settle the issue, leading him to entitle his chapter on the spending power "The Breakdown of Constitutional Limitations."[27] He saw in these appropriations a changed politics, a changed view of the national government's functions. The wisdom of spending proposals has been at issue subsequently between Presidents and Congresses, but not their constitutionality.

The inevitable obverse of the restraints upon national power deriving from the doctrine of Dual Federalism and from the tendency of Presidents to take the instrumental, Madisonian view of the spending power was that the states had a high degree of autonomy, especially in matters of economic policy. Politically this meant that during that period of competition between the federal and the state levels from 1836 to 1937, the state party leaders had things of value and of national importance to grant and to withhold. The nominating system, especially the system of nominating Presidents, gave the state chieftains the means to protect and enhance their capacities as benefactors or punishers, as brokers or dealers in public policy with national implications.

The end to our federal system that Mr. Justice Cardozo feared and that Edward S. Corwin looked back upon in 1953, seeing "a constantly increasing concentration of power at Washington," created the circumstances for undermining

[22] *The Federalist*, no. 34; Corwin as cited in note 21.
[23] Corwin, *Twilight of the Supreme Court*, 158–60.
[24] Ibid., 149.
[25] Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
[26] U.S. v. Butler 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
[27] Corwin, *Twilight of the Supreme Court*, chap. 4.

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the power of the state political leaders. This meant that, in straight political terms, the locus of the stakes had shifted from the states to the federal government, from divided policy responsibility in which the states could be major actors to a pattern in which the national authority was not just the dominant partner but essentially the sole proprietor. A whole new game had been started, and it was playing out of Washington, not primarily, or even significantly, out of the state capitals.

The game at the state level was and is still important, but it is different. It would be idle and misguided to argue against those who see today's governors as more important actors than they used to be, *within the states.*[28] That should be conceded. But they are not as important in the national picture as they once were, particularly those from large states in a period when the state and the federal games were more nearly comparable in consequence and importance. On the national scene governors are petitioners, often eloquent and formidable ones, but petitioners where once they were competitors.[29]

The change in the state game meant that the things that the state chieftains had to grant and to withhold were of less consequence on the national political scene than they had been previously. State policies no longer could be an obstacle or an alternative to national economic policies. More and more of the crucial decisions on spending, taxing, and regulating—on grants, exceptions, and constraints—were being taken in Washington in a kind of continuous auction in which the bidders might occasionally include the state chieftains but were also likely to include an increasing number of others who were not subject to state party control or influence. These others included, of course, executive officials and interest group leaders, but also, and most importantly, senators and representatives who rarely had been controlled by the state party chieftains, even in an earlier day, and who were capable of articulating state interests in Washington without intervention from a state party organization.

The major resources of the state leaders on the national scene always had been their control of delegation votes at the national nominating conventions and their ability to grant or deny assistance within their states in the election campaign.[30] Into the 1960s they continued to hold these resources, although with the development of increasingly national presidential campaigns, the provision or denial of state electioneering facilities was a wasting resource of declining importance. Control of convention votes could readily be converted into access, pa-

[28] See, for example, Leon D. Epstein, "The Old States in a New System," in King, ed., *The New American Political System*, 338ff.; Larry Sabato, *Goodbye to Good-time Charlie: The American Governorship Transformed*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983).

[29] The appearance in Washington in recent years of a substantial number of lobbyists representing states and cities provides one index of this altered status.

[30] It is worth remembering that FDR encouraged the formation of the American Labor Party by Labor's Non-Partisan League (CIO) in 1936 in order to have a campaign mechanism more reliable than the doubtfully loyal New York Democratic Party, especially its New York City component.

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tronage, and other political goods. When the Washington game was relatively small, the effects of such control could be substantial, but when the game was much enlarged, these effects diminished. They could have been maintained proportionately only if the play of the game had been like that of the classic convention, bargaining to put together a coalition that, once made, was good at least in some measure until the next quadrennial meeting of the party.

The new Washington game, however, was a continuous one, and there were a lot more players at the table. The visibility of these increased numbers has increased since the "reforms" of 1968–72, which, as Nelson W. Polsby has pointed out, place a premium in the presidential nominating process not on building coalitions but on mobilizing factions.[31] The diminishing effect of those larger numbers upon the power of the state chieftains might have been contained if the coalition building and coalition maintenance that occurred primarily in Washington could have been in more nearly continuous operation and under the same managers, the state chieftains primarily. That did not happen. The state-level brokers did not remain in session. A few of them individually were able to reach and manage, or at least influence, the representatives and senators from their states who were in the thick of the new game. Such carry-overs from an earlier day were few, however. In any event, members of Congress at both ends of the Capitol had a long record of setting up in business for themselves, and they now had every opportunity to strengthen that record. The new game was not perfectly theirs, of course, but it certainly did not belong to the state chieftains. Given the slowness with which the effects of the kind of change that we are examining diffuse through the system, it is not astonishing that for some years after the shift of the 1930s the state leaders continued to play the broker game in connection with presidential nominations. No marked change was clearly evident in the 1960s.[32] But it is apparent that increasingly the state chieftains concerned themselves with the relatively smaller stakes of the state game, if they played any game at all, and the play at the state level either was unaffected by or could be insulated from the McGovern-Fraser "reforms."

Additional evidence that the state chieftains had been largely dealt out of the new Washington game, or had dealt themselves out, was the Democratic leaders' choice among the options for selecting delegates to the national convention under the McGovern-Fraser "guidelines." In almost every case where a change was made from a previous method of delegate selection, the choice was for the candidate preference primary—the means least likely to be amenable to control by state leaders. To be sure, the complexity of giving effect to the "guideline" requirements of openness and proportional representation—or quotas—for women, ethnic minorities, and youth pushed the state parties toward the candi-

[31] Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform*, 64ff.

[32] Note that the account of Presidential nominations in the last, posthumously published edition of V.O. Key's classic text, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), is not materially different from that in his earlier editions.

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date preference primary. The important point is that the state parties did not effectively resist the push toward a practice that minimized their influence. Given a chance, the state chieftains bowed out of the presidential nominating game, first on the Democratic side, but by 1976 among the Republicans as well. Thus, among the Democrats the proportion of delegates chosen in primaries rose from forty-nine percent in 1968 to sixty-six percent in 1972, and seventy-five percent in 1976. Among the Republicans the two-thirds proportion was not reached until 1976.[33]

Long-Term Causes: The Direct Primary System

Turning to the second long-term influence on the political process, the extension and institutionalization in the past seventy-five years of the direct primary system of nomination for political office, we are examining a force that has not immediately shifted the stakes for which the party leaders play, as in the centralization thrust already discussed. Instead, direct primaries have diminished the stakes that once promoted cohesion and effectiveness within the state parties. The stakes at times and in some areas were large or crucial enough to rival or surpass those on the national scene. They were the prizes that were essential to organizational or factional survival and prosperity: the governorships in many states; the elective judgeships, especially judges of the Surrogate's Court in New York; and a number of Chicago and Cook County positions, beginning with the mayor's office, in Illinois. If one needed to insulate one's control of such prizes from disruption emanating from presidential nominating politics, it would not be astonishing if the decision were made to leave the choice of national convention delegates to the candidate preference primary, where control of the outcome by the state party organization was neither likely nor necessary to continue domination of important local stakes.

A degree of protective action assumes, however, that the state party organizations typically were vigorous and alert enough to protect their crucial prizes, an assumption that more often than not lacks warrant in the facts. It may be an exaggeration to say, as does Anthony King, that the state and local parties "lack continuity of personnel . . . [and] therefore increasingly lack even the possibility of strong, stable leadership."[34] But there are reasons to conclude that he is not far off the mark. Those reasons are associated with the long-term effects of the mode of nomination by direct primary, which disintegrate party organization.

From the beginning, the thrust of the movement toward the direct primary was

[33] See Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform*, 64. In 1984 the Republicans will have had thirty-five primaries, selecting seventy-eight percent of their delegates; the Democrats, following the latest efforts to reform the "reforms,' will have held only twenty-six primaries, which will select sixty-three percent of their delegates. See Byron E. Shafer, "Continuity and Change, Predictability and Chance, in the Politics of Presidential Selection," *PS* (Fall, 1983): 649.

[34] King, *The New American Political System*, 375.

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against the organized party. Promoted, of course, in the name of "the people" and "democracy," it was in fact a device employed by a losing faction—such as that led in the early 1900s by Robert M. LaFollette in the Republican party in Wisconsin—to defeat a dominant faction. Control by "the people" is a persistent myth. As Henry Jones Ford wrote in 1909, "One continually hears the declaration that the direct primary will take power from the politicians and give it to the people. This is pure nonsense. . . . The direct primary may take advantage and opportunity from one set of politicians and confer them upon another set, but politicians there will always be so long as there is politics."[35]

The convention system of nomination was subject to corruption and abuse, especially in the last decades of the nineteenth century in the polyglot large cities. But as a system it had functional values that have been in danger of displacement and erosion under the prevailing system in this century. In the first place, it provided an integrated and disciplined method of activating and guiding individual ambitions. In performing this recruitment function, moreover, it frequently provided, in the much maligned balanced ticket, a means of recognition and opportunity for geographic, ethnic, and religious minorities, something the direct primary systematically discourages.[36] Second, sometimes an institutionalized *cursus honorum* specified the succession of offices an individual could aspire to; or more often a process of factional bargaining provided for nominations. The convention process required that, even in areas of the state where the party was in a minority, the party was organized to provide delegates to the convention and to serve as a channel for patronage after a successful election.[37] Third, especially in the days before radio and television, the party organization provided the people needed to spread the gospel and to mobilize the faithful. Finally, in addition to handling the rewards of patronage and the other benefits of success, the party organization provided the chief, if not the only, channel of access to the government for interest groups, organized or not. Not all state parties under this system performed all of these functions or performed them equally well, but the norm was close to this. It was the functions associated with this system that the direct primary tended to fragment. The functions remained, in their root character, but integration and coherence were threatened and, in most instances, basically undermined.

In some jurisdictions after the introduction of the direct primary, notably in some of the big cities, the winning faction was able to consolidate its position and to insure most of its choices against effective challenge in subsequent primaries. Thus, if the crucial element in the definition of a party organization

[35] Quoted in Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 394–95.

[36] V. O. Key, *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), chap. 5.

[37] Note the parallel with the national level, where Democratic parties in Republican New England and Republican parties in the solid South provided delegates to national conventions and handled patronage when the party was in power.

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is its ability to select the nominee, then such organizations, even under the direct primary system, fully met the requirements of the definition. Even where such factional coherence could be maintained, however, the cumulative effect of the direct primary is in the direction of organizational atrophy. The direct primary has been the most potent in a complex of forces pushing toward the disintegration of the party.

In both majority and minority parties, the necessity for aspirants for the nomination to cultivate rank-and-file party voters handicaps any effort to "maintain an organizational core dedicated to the party as such; instead, leadership energies operate to construct activist clusters devoted to the interests of particular individuals."[38]

As did the convention system, the direct primary produced almost as many patterns over time as there are states. Nevertheless, one can sketch in abstract terms the essential scenario of party disintegration under the direct primary. First and most drastically affected is the minority party in a normally competitive state. The minority or second major party is not destroyed by electoral defeat if, and this is the crucial point, it retains a monopoly of the opposition to the party that is usually in power. That monopoly assures the minority party eventual success at the ballot box. When the actual choice of the successful candidates shifts to the primary of the majority or first major party, the prospect of eventual success for the minority party disappears with its loss of the monopoly of opposition, which it now must share with a faction within the majority, to which an indeterminate portion of the role of opposer shifts.[39] That shift leaves the minority party activists with little or nothing to do. Their prospects of succession have dwindled and with them the outlook for patronage. Even the function at the local level of supplying delegates to a state convention has either disappeared or been rendered inconsequential. Gradually more and more grassroots offices, such as state legislative seats, are won by default, essentially in the primary of the majority party. Such default reflects the atrophy of the minority organization, and it induces further disintegration. In the majority party, meanwhile, the direct primary encourages and legitimizes factional challenges that no longer can or need be contained within the bargaining mechanism of a state convention. Such challenges, especially as they become successful, also contribute to party disintegration. As the "regular" organization's endorsement before a primary becomes meaningless, organization clusters around individual candidates, and the continuing interpersonal relationships that constitute party structure are weakened or eliminated, except as a formality. Primary challenges reduce the possibility that the nominees of the party will be chosen by one group of leaders or in any continuing, integrated and coherent fashion.

[38] Key, *American State Politics*, 386.

[39] More than forty years ago Schattschneider identified the monopoly of opposition as the most important asset of the second major party in a two-party system. E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), 82.

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In both the majority and the minority parties, finally, the replacement of state conventions with primaries for nominations to statewide office tends to modify and to atomize the structure of leadership relations by eliminating the need to maintain at least the rudiments of a statewide organization. The " . . . atrophy of local or district party cliques derives not solely from local factors but more significantly from the erosion of the organizational superstructure that once linked local minorities to central points of power within the state."[40]

Even in those states using a closed primary and some reasonably restrictive form of enrollment to qualify as a voter in the primary, the thrust of the direct primary is disintegrative. In states that have embraced the full spirit of the direct primary by providing for an open system in one or another of its forms, where in effect anyone can wander in off the street to vote in the primary election of any party or where any organized interest group can colonize any party, the likelihood of any organization controlling nominations on a continuing basis is small.

It is important to emphasize that the atrophy-producing effects of the direct primary are long-term effects. They would not be evident immediately upon adoption of the device. Institutions, even ones as informal as many effective party organizations, do not collapse over night; they may in fact persist considerably longer than the realities of function would warrant. As V. O. Key observed, "If consequences for informal practices flow from the primary, the chances are that they accumulate so gradually that they would be beyond capture by field observation unless it were prolonged for a generation."[41] Over time, however, it is unlikely that party organization can exist and perform its classic functions if it must operate through the direct primary, at least in its pure form. States, such as Connecticut, that retain the convention as the instrument for nomination to statewide office, subject to a challenge primary which requires that an aspirant receive a substantial vote in the convention in order to appear on the primary ballot, tend to retain comparatively strong party organizations that are able to perform the classic functions of the political party—recruitment, nomination, and campaigning.[42]

[40] Key, *American State Politics*, 188. This paragraph, stated in stronger terms than Key allowed himself, is based largely upon chapter 6 of this book. For additional confirming evidence see Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), 135–37 and passim; Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 55–56 and passim.

[41] Key, *American State Politics*, 182. Inferential evidence of the slowness of the direct primary's effects and of the resistance of established institutions to sharp change may be provided by the early history of attempts to apply the direct primary device to the selection of national convention delegates. By 1916 half the states had such laws, but in the decade after World War I at least a third of these were repealed. Apparently party organizations in the latter states were still strong enough to eliminate a handicap to their influence in a convention in which a major fraction of the delegates were responsive to organization preferences and directions.

[42] It is worth remembering that when John F. Kennedy was preparing his bid for the Presidency in 1960, he turned not to the weak and faction-ridden Massachusetts party to provide a base, but rather to the strong Connecticut party and its chairman, John M. Bailey.

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Prospects for the National Parties

Cumulatively and over time, the effects of the new "centralized federalism" and of the direct primary system of nomination were complementary, although the two influences were independent of one another. The former irrevocably shifted the locus of the national political game to Washington, a centralizing shift that took cards from the hands of the state political leaders and made it likely, if not certain. that in due course a move would also be made to centralize the nominating process. That much was evident in 1954 when an essay on "Federalism and the Party System" noted: "Perhaps the most significant . . . change [in party practices] in recent years, a change which may account for some of the recent criticism of the national convention, is that the electioneering functions of the presidential party have become increasingly centralized while the power over nominations remains decentralized."[43] The convention system of nomination for the Presidency was in substantial measure the creature of the original federalism and of political sectionalism. When that federalism was fundamentally altered, the nominating system was ripe for change. Once the constraints of Dual Federalism were removed, the stakes in the nominating game changed, and it became likely that the decentralized control of presidential nominations would be challenged. The New Deal, given constitutional legitimacy, doomed the national nominating convention as it had been known. It could not long survive the centralizing consequences of the political revolution of the 1930s. It could not long continue to perform in significant degree the classic function of providing "a means for the contending candidates, factions, and interests within a party to consult and agree upon the terms on which they will work together in the presidential campaign."[44] As policy making shifted to Washington, the capital became the scene of continuous coalition making in place of the quadrennial conclave of state party chieftains.

The complement of "centralized federalism" was the direct primary system, since its effect of weakening the state parties made it all but certain that when a serious attempt was made at displacing the national convention and its state functionaries with a nominating system having a more centralized component, the state parties would be too feeble to resist the attack or, as it turned out, fully to recognize it for what it was. The state chieftains continued to play their standard role almost unmodified through the 1960s, but in the sixty-five years since LaFollette's triumph over the Republican regulars in Wisconsin in 1903, they had changed. State leaders could not play the old game to its full, and they no longer had the strength to prevent others from changing the rules that had favored them.[45]

[43] David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in Arthur Macmahon, ed., *Federalism: Mature and Emergent* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 119-20.

[44] Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 431.

[45] The growing weakness of the state party leadership was not only institutional but also personal. As the influence of the party organization declined, the abilities represented in the party leadership

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To suggest that only constitutional centralization and the direct primary were affecting the shape of the nominating process at the national level would be to indulge in indefensible oversimplification. Centralization itself was a reflection of basic economic and social changes in the country. Its instrumentation and the early and ominous alterations in presidential electioneering were accomplished in large measure through changes in the speed of transportation and in the reach of communications. When Franklin D. Roosevelt flew to Chicago to accept the nomination in 1932, and when he subsequently demonstrated the potential of radio for campaigning and for governing, a new pattern of politics was beginning to emerge. Jet travel and television have altered rates but have not changed a pattern that began to appear more than fifty years ago.

In identifying the two long-term influences of centralization and the direct primary, however, we underscore two indispensable factors that provided the context within which the events of 1968 through 1972 could run their course. Unquestionably, the trauma of the events at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, reflecting the wrenching impact of the Vietnam War and including the defeat of the Democratic presidential nominee in 1968, provided the immediate occasion for devising and adopting the McGovern-Fraser changes in the party rules. Without those events the initiative for an assault on the old rules would not have come until later. Without the McGovern-Fraser changes in the Democratic rules and the response to them in state legislation applicable to both parties, the new patterns would not have spread so rapidly to the Republicans. Without, finally, the cast of characters and the convoluted maneuvering that is the history of the "reforms," the precipitating events might not have been exploited so effectively.

Looking to the future, it seems clear that the challenge of adapting the national party structures to the governmental and political changes that have taken place over the past fifty years is one that has not been met. In consequence, one may reasonably presume that our national party institutions are in a period of transition. Such a period, however, may last for a considerable number of years, possibly indefinitely. The elements of the party institution are fragmented and inherently unruly. They can be modified and influenced by planned, central action, such as the McGovern-Fraser changes, but, like any basic institution, the elements evolve in their own way and at their own rate, rather than in direct response to some preset design. The way may be essentially unpredictable, and the rate may be glacially slow. Still, it is possible to discern certain tendencies that may foreshadow the pattern of transition.

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also presumably diminished. Direct evidence on this score is unavailable, but it is difficult to explain on any other grounds why incumbent state leaders did not fight to remain a part of the new national game or why as individuals they essentially uniformly failed to calculate correctly the consequences of the McGovern-Fraser "reforms." Admittedly such calculations are extremely difficult; nevertheless, it could be expected that in a population of high political ability at least a minority would see the implications of such a set of proposals.

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Part of the framework for a nationalizing evolution of the national parties has been provided by the Supreme Court through its decisions affirming the constitutionality of rule-making actions by the national party that contravene state legislation.[46] Among the ideologically homogeneous Republican activists, little or no enthusiasm exists for elaborate and uniform national rules. Even among the divided Democrats, whose succession of "reform" commissions has been the object of considerable factional maneuvering, the application and, therefore, the interpretation of the rules have become largely a function of the staff of the Democratic National Committee.[47] The exercise or neglect of this formal authority is one of several indications that substantial fragments of power are lying about, underutilized or unexploited, in national party precincts. These are both a reflection and potentially a source of institutional instability, since either the neglect or the random exercise of such powers can affect election outcomes. Those outcomes involve more political fortunes than those of presidential aspirants. In consequence, this loose institutionalization of the parties seems likely to invite efforts to consolidate these fragments of power and to institutionalize their exercise on a basis more predictable than the ad hoc, temporary arrangements that are currently typical, especially of the Democrats. Such institutionalization seems unlikely to be based on the collection of professional campaign consultants and media advisers that cluster around candidates and political aspirants. Theirs is a commercial relationship, tempered by policy inclinations, essentially temporary and, therefore, unstable. The institutionalization is at least as unlikely to be based on the state party leadership, for reasons developed in this essay. Individual state leaders and groups may from time to time play an influential national role, but the day when the national party could be based on them is past.

The functional basis for an evolved new party structure is likely to be a continuing campaign organization, equipped to identify, groom, and guide candidates for the House and Senate and serving to complement rather than to rival the campaign organization of the nominees for President. The muscle for the institution would be supplied by those with the largest stake in the national fortunes of the party label, namely, members of the House and Senate, as well as governors and other major state elected officials. The party members in Congress, especially the veterans, are at the center of the Washington scene. They have the strongest motivation for strengthening ties that already exist in order to develop and control a continuing campaign organization. The means for performing this function, as the recent effectiveness of the Republican party indicates, is likely to be strong patterns of financing. Despite the essentially anti-

[46] Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 417 (1975); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. LaFollette, 67 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981). Centralized rule making may not be convertible fully into enforceable authority, as is illustrated by the success of the Iowa and New Hampshire Democratic parties in defying the rule makers on the timing of their 1984 presidential caucuses and primary.

[47] Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform*, 78.

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party provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),[48] the Republicans have demonstrated that effective fund raising, tied in with careful grooming of candidates, can improve party effectiveness even when such usual trends as the normally expected losses for the mid-term Congressional elections for the party that controls the White House are working in the other direction. If the antiparty provisions of the FECA were eliminated, the development of stronger patterns of central financing would be further assisted, but it is not dependent on such repeal, as the Republicans have shown.

A direct tie-in of a strongly financed and continuing campaign organization to the process of selecting the presidential nominee is harder to envisage. It is well to remember, however, that, except in the case of an incumbent President seeking renomination, the national party machinery has always been neutral among the aspirants and has done little more than to provide the setting for choosing the nominee. That it can continue to do, through regulation of the primaries and caucuses, if not through revitalizing the convention as a peer-reviewing, deliberative body, which seems unlikely. Some movement in the direction of a peer-review convention may occur, however, through the extension of the Democrats' new policy of guaranteeing to party office holders some proportion, desirably a growing one, of the uncommitted convention votes.

At the 1984 Democratic convention these nominally uncommitted *ex officio* delegates apparently played no important role in selecting the nominee. As an element in every state delegation, however, they seem to have had a steadying, even restraining, influence in arguments over the platform. In the three preceding conventions these arguments had been marked by politically reckless efforts of zealous delegates who seemed to be more interested in issue politics than in presidential politics. The 1984 conclave was in sharp contrast, in part because of the *ex officio* delegates.[49] An important issue before the rules commission that, inevitably, was set up by the 1984 convention will be whether to keep these places or whether, as some factions in the party demand, to reduce or eliminate them. What the commission decides on this question may rather clearly foreshadow the direction in which the party will evolve.

None of these developments may occur. Wholly different trends, now unforeseen, may emerge from the instability and the uncertainty of the post-"reform" period, such as those that might result from the adoption of a system of national primaries. These are not exactly an unforeseen possibility, but their consequences are not readily calculable. Under the most likely circumstances, the national primary probably would lead to further fragmentation. It certainly

[48] The anti-party aspect of FECA derives from its provisions limiting contributions to and expenditures by the national parties that in some respects are not only as severe as but more severe than those affecting nonparty organizations. See Herbert E. Alexander and Brian A. Haggerty, *The Federal Election Campaign Act After a Decade of Political Reform* (Los Angeles: Citizens Research Foundation, University of Southern California, 1981), chap. 6.

[49] I am indebted to Byron E. Shafer for this observation.

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would spell the final demise of the national convention. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that a truly national party organization, one with some degree of institutional stability and some continuity of leadership, would be able to dominate a national primary system. The only development that seems certain, whatever its precise form, is that a stable, national party institution will evolve to match the centralized federalism of our governmental system. It may take a good many years for such development to reach fruition, and it may occur in one party years before it is achieved by the other, but the chances are far better than even that it is coming.

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The Politics of Ethnicity in Southwest Asia: Political Development or Political Decay?

ZALMAY KHALILZAD

The discussion of ethnic politics has passed through many phases. Earlier works had the pronounced tendency of assuming that ethnicity was a problem that would be solved in the course of modernization. Fragmented loyalties were expected to decline as the nation-state became the focus of identity and authority. Ethnic nationalism, in other words, would simply wither away.[1] Over time it was realized that these expectations were extremely exaggerated. It was recognized that the climate of nationalism and social change could also serve to encourage ethnic nationalism, challenging the stability of multiethnic polities. According to Joseph Rothschild, "no society or political system is today immune from the burgeoning pressure of ethnic nationalism, with its possible legitimating or delegitimating effects. Communist and non-communist, old and new, advanced and developing, centralist and federalist states must all respond to the pressure of this ascendant ideology."[2]

[1] Donald L. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," *World Politics*, 23(1971); C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967); Kenneth Sherril, "The Attitudes of Modernity," *Comparative Politics*, 1(1969); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[2] Joseph Rothschild, "Observations on the Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 92(Fall 1977): 495; also see his *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

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Recently a number of analysts have pushed the notion of the politicization of ethnicity to its extreme, predicting the fragmentation of many multiethnic polities. This has been especially true of studies dealing with Southwest Asia.[3] While ethnic nationalism adds another dimension to and complicates many of the administrative and political dilemmas faced by multiethnic states, the fragmentation thesis nevertheless tends toward exaggeration and one-sidedness.

This article challenges the fragmentation thesis by examining the cases of three multiethnic Southwest Asian states: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The latter two have been the object of much of the recent speculation about disintegration. This article argues that the disintegrative potential of ethnicity is being overestimated. Moreover, if this is the case for the three countries under examination, which are regarded as very fragile, then it may be even more true with reference to other multiethnic states. This article has been divided into four parts. The first section identifies the major ethnic groups in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The second examines the problem of ethnic nationalism by focusing at the national level, assessing the success of state building in the three countries. A third section identifies conditions that would have to be met for ethnic nationalists to succeed in forming separate states of their own. The last section focuses on the role that local elites can play in affecting politics at the center, the dilemmas that regimes of multiethnic states face in developing a coherent policy towards minority areas, and the extent to which minority groups can be used by outside powers as a constant lever to destabilize a regime.

The central problem in studying the effects of ethnic nationalism on the survival of multiethnic states, as in other complex political phenomena, is deciding on the level of analysis. The choice of the most adequate focus is critical both for the analysis and the predictions. Many of the recent works dealing with ethnic nationalism in Southwest Asia have focused on the local level in the ethnic areas and on ethnic nationalists, producing a valuable description of local conditions and a useful record of local perceptions of goals, motivations, and capabilities. However, such a focus alone cannot explain and predict the relative seriousness of the threat that ethnic nationalism might pose to the territorial integrity of the states of Southwest Asia and of other multiethnic states. Focusing on the local level tends to exaggerate the relative gravity of the ethnic nationalist threat. In fact, local conditions will not determine the prospects for fragmentation of multiethnic states. That will depend more on developments at the national level. Therefore, as a corrective to the general analyses of ethnic politics, this article

[3] I would classify the following works in this category: Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation* (New York and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981); Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (New York: Praeger, 1980); Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building and State Breaking in Pakistan" (Paper presented to the Conference on Islam, Ethnicity and the State in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, Sterling Forest, N.Y., 11–13 November 1982); S. Enders Wimbush, *Iran's Ethnic Factors Threaten to Split the State* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, RAND—P. 6477, April 1980).

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Iran

Minority Group	*Number (in millions)*
Kurd	3.60
Lur	3.00
Bakhtiyari	0.46
Baluch	0.77
Arab	0.5 to 2.0
Aimaj	0.03
Azerbaijani	6.00
Qashqai	0.66
Afshar	0.33
Turkmen	0.60
Khamse Confederation	0.45
Shahsevea	0.20
Khalaj	0.02
Qara Gozlu	0.30
Armenian	0.26
Assyrian	0.13
Jewish	0.07
Parsi	0.03
Bahai	0.07

focuses attention on the national level, while taking local conditions into account. This modification will illustrate how the relative capability between the center and the ethnic minorities has changed. In general, this change has been in favor of the center, complicating the prospects for ethnic nationalists. Because of this change, secession is very unlikely except in a narrow and unlikely set of conditions. The change in favor of the center has been so significant that the political destiny of multiethnic polities will be decided at the center rather than at the periphery. This does not mean that there will be no ethnic problem—on the contrary, we can expect ethnic politics to become even more important as local elites grow in size and resources. But under normal conditions we do not expect secession.

Ethnic Groups in Southwest Asia

All three Southwest Asian states under consideration are multiethnic and have tribal and ethnic areas that have proven to be major obstacles to the extension of the power of the center in the past. Although there are many recent estimates of the relative numbers of various ethnic groups in Iran, a 1981 report of the German Orient Institute estimates the Iranian minorities as constituting as much as 53 percent of the population.[4]

[4] Erhard Franz, *Minderheiten in Iran* (Hamburg: German Orient Institute, Middle East Documentation, 1981), 23. For the number of Arabs and different estimates from those of the German Institute, see Lois Beck, "Revolutionary Iran and Its Tribal People," *MERIP Reports*, 87(1980):14–20;

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Afghanistan

Ethnic Groups	*Number (in millions)*
Pashtun	4.80
Tajik	3.60
Uzbek	1.20
Hazara	1.00
Aimaq	0.50
Turkmen	0.40
Baluch	0.20
Nuristani	0.07
Pashai	0.06
Other	0.17
Total	12.00

In Afghanistan there have been various estimates regarding the ethnic configuration of the country. One recent study provides the following estimates:[5] The Pashtuns are divided into many tribal confederations, with major intertribal rivalries, especially between Duranis and Ghelzais. Some, especially those living in or near major cities such as Kabul or Herat, have been Tajikized (Persianized), that is, their mother tongue has changed from Pashtu to Dari (Afghan Persian). The Pashtuns, whether Tajikized or not, produced the Afghan monarchs and dominated the military and the bureaucracy. However, despite their political domination, the language of the government and the *lingua franca* among the various communities was Dari. This dependence on Dari gave the Tajiks an advantage in the bureaucracy, where they were prominent. Of the various Afghan ethnic communities, it is generally agreed that the Hazaras were the most impoverished. They are Mongolian in origin, speak a dialect of Dari, adhere to Shiite Islam while the majority of Afghans are Sunnis, and were forcefully brought under central government control in the 1880s and 1890s.[6]

In Pakistan, too, ethnic identity is very strong. The dominant ethnic group are the Punjabis, who constitute 58 percent of the population and live on 28 percent of the land. They dominate the economic and political systems of the country. The Baluch are the smallest ethnic group; they constitute only around 5 percent of the population, while their province makes up 46 percent of the country's land

Eden Naby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities: the Kurds, the Assyrians, the Baluchs and Turkomen," in William McCagg, Jr. and Brian Silver, eds., *Soviet Asian Frontiers* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 83-144; Richard Nyrop, *Iran: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1978).

[5] Alfred Janata, "Notizen Zur Bevolkerungskarts Afghanistan," *Afghanistan Journal* 8 (1981): 94. For different estimates of the Afghan population and the various ethnic groups see Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[6] M. Hassan Kakar, "The Pacification of the Hazaras of Afghanistan," (New York: Asia Society, Afghanistan Council, Occasional Paper 4, 1973).

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area. The other two ethnic groups are the Sindhis and the Pashtuns.[7] In the non-Punjabi areas of Pakistan, resentment against Punjabi domination appears to be greatest in the case of the Baluch and the Sindhis.

Modernization and interaction with the outside world have had a paradoxical effect on problems of ethnic nationalism. At the local level, modernization has changed the character of ethnic nationalism and in many instances strengthened it multidirectionally. Modernization and interaction with the dominant groups have resulted in political fragmentation in the minority areas. A variety of centrist ethnic nationalist and even internationalist ideologies, individuals, and groups with many crosscutting interests and affiliations have emerged. This condition provides opportunities not only for conflict but also for cooperation between the center and groups in the minority areas, weakening the prospects for ethnic nationalists.

Modernization has increased the center's ability to influence developments in minority areas. The Southwest Asian states have experienced both development and decay at different times in regard to state building. Central institutions of each state have been at times very strong and at other times weak. However, despite occasional setbacks, state building has had major achievements and the center's leverage vis-à-vis the minority areas in all states of the region has increased. The enormous developments in road building and other infrastructural projects, the emergence of many national institutions, and the rise in the power of the center have extended the center's reach to more parts of the country and ended the isolation or semi-isolation of many areas by increasing their participation in the economy. Modernization has helped establish a national market that did not exist before. At the same time, these developments and centrally controlled educational programs have increased territorial possessiveness in the consciousness of the dominant ethnic groups vis-à-vis the outlying regions. Changes brought by modernization have increased the ability of the center to project more military and other types of power to the ethnic areas. Crises in minority areas have often provided the context, or pretext, for greater extension of the political, economic, and military power of the center.

The effect of modernization in Southwest Asia over the past several hundred years has been to decisively shift the relative power in favor of the center. Recent convulsions in Iran and Afghanistan have at least temporarily represented a setback for this process. By and large, however, the developments in minority areas

[7] Karl Von Vors, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Ralph Braibanti, "Pakistan's Experience in Political Development," *Asia*, Supplement no. 1 (Fall 1974): 25–43; Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan's Nationalities Dilemma: Domestic and International Implications," in Lawrence Ziring, ed., *The Subcontinent in World Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1978); Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 134–218; Yuri V. Gankovsky, *Natsional'nyi Vopros i Natsional'nyi Dvishenia v Pakistane* (The National Question and National Movement in Pakistan) (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1977).

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accompanying these convulsions, support the argument that substantial change has taken place; only at a superficial first glance do they seem to testify to the failure of centralization trends. In Iran and Afghanistan the change in favor of the center was most dramatic. In both countries, tribes were traditionally the king-makers. In Iran, from the Buyids (945–1055) through the Qajars (1796–1925), the rulers either originated in or were crucially supported by tribal armies. During this period, tribal leaders were well-armed; the governmental bureaucracy was small with cautiously circumscribed functions.

The chief purpose of the bureaucracy was to collect taxes and even here there was no uniformity. Effective power by the center seldom extended beyond the capital, and a national market system did not exist. Institutions such as "schools" or law courts, where they existed, were a local responsibility, usually under the control of local leaders and the clergy. The government resorted to indirect measures of rule such as dividing opposing forces, bribery, encouraging internal fights, and holding hostages from the powerful tribes. In Iran, the Qajars paid little attention to the establishment of a modern military force. By the late nineteenth century only a small Russian-officered Cossack brigade had become a modern and disciplined fighting force whose purpose was to protect the king and his court.

In Afghanistan the same was true from the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747–1772) the creator of modern Afghanistan, to the installation of the last Afghan dynasty under Nadir Shah (1929–1933), although there were periods of energetic state building. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901) initiated an energetic centralizing effort. He subjugated many tribal areas and extended administrative and judicial power from the center to many rural areas. He established a regular army and expanded the country's central bureaucracy.[8] He imposed taxes on imports and exports; income from taxation was thus increased substantially. He also extended the country's infrastructure by building roads and bridges. However, at the turn of the century the regular army was small when compared to the irregular tribal forces. As in the case of Qajars in Iran, the center depended on tribal levies for much of its armed forces, and whenever the state needed these tribal forces it allowed them "benefits," such as the freedom to loot and plunder.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan's ethnic problems have received greater scholarly attention than those of Iran and Afghanistan. This has been so much the case that there have been speculation and even anticipation of the demise of Pakistan as a state, largely

[8] Hasan K. Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abdal-Rahman Khan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 93–145; also M.G.M. Ghobar, *Afghanistan dar Masiri Tarikh* (Afghanistan in History's Path) (Kabul: Government Press, 1967).

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founded on analysis of this issue.[9] Many Pakistanis have even become pessimistic about the political future and survival of their country.[10] The Bangladesh experience was the most important factor contributing to this pessimism. However, the Bangladesh case had several special characteristics not applicable to the rest of Pakistan. First, the majority there was dominated by a minority, the Bengalis of East Pakistan being greater in number than the dominant Punjabis of the West. Second, East Pakistan was separated from the center by over one thousand miles of hostile Indian territory, an anomalous situation. Third, even with these two conditions and widespread opposition to Islamabad, it took a massive invasion by India to bring about the emergence of Bangladesh.

As far as the rest of Pakistan is concerned, while ethnic politics pose problems, their importance has been highly overestimated. Pakistan's future is as secure or insecure as that of many other multiethnic polities. And, as in the case of other multiethnic states, Pakistan's disintegration is extremely unlikely.

Like many other states of the area, Pakistan has experienced considerable success in state building, making it a lot harder for ethnic secessionists to succeed. The country has large armed forces, with more than 478,000 troops.[11] The many roads built or being built (70,424 km of roads, 8,565 km of railroads, 1,850 km of inland waterways) unite the various parts of the country. Pakistan also has more than 110 usable airfields. The state controls the twenty-seven radio and sixteen television broadcasting stations.[12] There is a substantial ongoing program for improving the state infrastructure, especially in the minority areas. The center has sought to increase minority representation in central institutions such as the civil service. It also controls considerable financial resources, providing it with significant leverage vis-à-vis the minority regions. Given these changes secession will be very difficult, but ethnic politics will remain as a source of weakness and a threat to the legitimacy of the state for the foreseeable future.

There have been significant changes in the pattern of interaction by the center with the minority areas. Administratively, after 1947 there was substantial structural and procedural carry-over from Britain to Pakistan in the central policy toward the minority areas. The system developed by the British had three administrative geographic components: four semiautonomous princely states made up the first of these; the centrally administered tribal agencies formed the second; and the locally administered settled districts were the third. For the first several

[9] I would classify the following works in this category: Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development;* Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow;* Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building and State Breaking in Pakistan."

[10] For a fascinating report on Pakistan as perceived by the Pakistanis, see Bashiruddin Ahmed, "Pakistani: An Unending Quest for Validation" (New Delhi: Center for the Study of Developing Societies, 1982).

[11] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: IISS, 1983), 97.

[12] Central Intelligence Agency, *National Basic Intelligence Factbook*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1979), 159.

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years, the Pakistan government maintained a low military profile in Pashtun and Baluch areas. In fact, some military forces were transferred to the Indian border. However, in 1955 the desire to decrease the prospects of manipulation of provincial rivalries in West Pakistan by East Pakistan led to the consolidation of the Western provinces into one province, known as the one unit system. This meant greater central control of the minority areas and met with increased opposition to the center.

Local nationalist leaders feared that their very identity and survival were threatened. This opposition was particularly intense among the Pashtuns and Baluchs. Prior to the establishment of Pakistan, Pashtun leaders such as Ghafar Khan had called for an independent Pashtun state.[13] Failing to achieve this goal, they advocated an autonomous Pashtun state (Pashtunistan) within Pakistan. The consolidation of West Pakistan into one province was perceived as a threat to local autonomy and, therefore, was energetically opposed.

The Baluch nationalists responded similarly. Some Baluch areas, especially Kalat, had been reluctant to join Pakistan in 1947. In fact, one day after Pakistan's creation, Kalat declared its independence. The Pakistanis used their armed forces to bring the region under their control. The abolition of the provinces in the West increased resentment against the center, causing demonstrations against the decision. A Baluch leader named Abdul Karim formed the People's Party and demanded the formation of a unified Baluchistan province. The chief of the Zehri tribe, Navos Khan, led a small revolt against the center but was quickly suppressed and arrested.

Greater integration of the Pashtun and Baluch areas into Pakistan and modernization had many structural consequences for both the minorities and the country as a whole. New military garrisons, roads, and schools were built in the minority areas, improving the center's access. The infrastructural developments also increased economic interaction between the various parts of the country. The minorities developed nationwide economic interests. These changes affected the political behavior of the people in the minority areas, encouraging political differentiation. Groups both sympathetic and hostile to the center emerged. For example, in the 1970 election, after the one unit system had been abolished, both centrist and ethnic nationalist groups won many seats in the minority areas. In the Pashtun area, twelve out of thirty-nine seats went to the National Awami Party (NAP). The Muslim League (Qayyum), a centrist party, won ten. Other centrist parties winning seats were Independents (six seats), Jamiatul-Ulema-Islam-Hazravi Group (four seats), the Pakistan People's Party (three seats), the Muslim League-Convention (two seats), the Jamaati-Islami (one seat) and the Muslim League Council (one seat). In the elections for the National Assembly, the votes in support of a weak center and local autonomy and those favoring a strong center were almost equally divided. In Sind, the strong center-oriented

[13] S. Rittenberg, "Contingencies in Borderland," in *The Transformation of a Political Order* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1977).

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Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by a Sindhi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, won an overwhelming victory.

The configuration of political forces that emerged in Pakistan after the 1970 election insured continued center-minority tension. However, subsequent events also demonstrated the substantial advantage enjoyed by the center. After the election and the loss of Bangladesh, a civilian government headed by Bhutto took over the center. In the Pashtun dominated Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan, NAP-dominated local governments emerged. Bhutto, who wanted ever greater center control over the provinces and lacked tolerance for opposition, made life difficult for local governments in these areas. The interaction between the center and the two provinces became increasingly hostile. Ultimately, Bhutto dismissed the Baluchistan government in 1973. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) government resigned in protest against the center's action in Baluchistan.

In February 1975, Islamabad banned NAP after the killing of a PPP leader, Hyat Mohammed Sherpao, in the NWFP in a bomb explosion at the NAP-dominated campus of the Peshawar University. Subsequently, NAP leaders were put on trial for high treason (the Hyderabad Trials) and accused of viewing Pakistan as being comprised of four nations rather than one, working with hostile outside powers (Afghanistan) to undermine Pakistani territorial integrity, and using terrorism.[14] All principal NAP leaders were jailed and NAP property and funds were confiscated. NAP charged that Bhutto's moves were motivated by a desire to eliminate the main opposition to his rule. A new party with similar ideology soon emerged under the name National Democratic Party (NDP) under Sher Baz Mazari's leadership. NDP joined the Pakistani National Alliance (PNA), the coalition of nine parties opposed to Bhutto in the 1977 elections.[15]

In Baluchistan the dismissal of the NAP-dominated government increased Baluch military activity against the center. However, the military operations were confined to a few areas, the Marri territories, Jhalawar, and Khuzdir. Although the conflict lasted from 1973 to 1976, the center got the upper hand in the conflict soon after the fighting had begun. The center used the military operations against the Baluch as an opportunity to further improve its relative position in the area. It constructed new military garrisons, roads, economic projects, and schools.

After the overthrow of the Bhutto regime, the new Pakistani government sought to follow a more moderate policy. It released several jailed Baluch and Pashtun (NAP) leaders, offered amnesty to the guerrillas, and reached an agreement with a number of Baluch leaders regarding a truce. However, Baluch nationalist leaders continue to oppose proportional representation, seek recogni-

[14] *The Pakistan Times*, 2 November 1975.

[15] The parties comprising the PNA were TI, JI, Pakistan Muslim League, NDP, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Khaksar Tehrik (KT), and Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC). The coordinating committees consisted of the leaders of the nine groups and Wali Khan's wife.

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tion by the center that the Baluch form a separate nation, and demand withdrawal of the military from the area. Baluch nationalist leaders, such as Khair B. Marri and Ataullah Mengal, left the country and formed the World Baluch Organization in London. The government of General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq has, with Western assistance, accelerated efforts to make Baluchistan accessible to the center with road building and economic development projects. While Baluchistan has been relatively quiet since 1977, the potential for conflict remains.

Since Bhutto's overthrow, the Sindhis have been one of the most active opposition groups. Their ethnic politics involve not only conflict between Sindhis and the center, but also between "old" Sindhis and "new" ones (Muhajira—those who emigrated from India—Punjabis, and Pashtuns). The old Sindhis became a minority within a minority. The Muhajira filled the void left behind by the departing Hindu elite. New Sindhi areas are more developed than old ones, intensifying the feeling of discrimination experienced by the old Sindhis. The Sindhis as a group are underrepresented in many areas such as higher education and the federal service, including the armed forces, but the old Sindhis are more underrepresented than the new. Therefore, their opposition to the center is more intense. As in the case of other ethnic groups, Sindhi political activity is likely to continue, but secession is extremely unlikely.

AFGHANISTAN

State building in Afghanistan has had periods of success and failure. The state and national building program of Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) was continued by his son Habibullah Khan (1901–1919), although less successfully. He opened the country's first large lycée, hoping to transmit the values of nationalism and modernization to Afghan youth. His successor, Amanulah (1919–1929), influenced by the policies of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Khan in Iran, pushed for much more energetic efforts at state and nation building. He extended state authority and even managed to collect more taxes. He made elementary education mandatory and opened two lycées and many technical schools. By 1927 the country had 51,000 students, 3,000 of which attended the lycées and other secondary schools;[16] some students were sent abroad. He established mandatory military service, did away with titles, and purchased substantial amounts of weapons. His policies ultimately led to a massive uprising by traditional forces, which forced him out of the country in 1929. A short period of decay and civil war followed. The relative power of the center declined; the armed forces weakened; income from taxes, especially land taxes, declined; and the number of schools and students decreased.

The dynasty that came to power in 1929 was satisfied with a much slower pace

[16] Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Planning, *Statistical Information of Afghanistan* (Kabul: Afghan Education Press, 1978).

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of development. Nevertheless, by 1978, when the Communist takeover took place, significant changes had taken place. Developments during this period (1929–1978) substantially increased the power of the center, ended the semi-isolation of some of the rural areas, and exposed many parts of the countryside to urban values. Although localism continued to persist, it was weakened. First, there was a significant change in the areas of transportation and communication. Until the late 1950s the country had no paved highways, but by 1973, 7,729 kilometers of asphalt-paved or concrete highways linked Kabul to many other parts of the country.[17] There were more than 15,000 kilometers of gravel and dirt roads.[18] These roads decreased the distance between various parts of the country, made possible the movement of seasonal agricultural workers from east and central Afghanistan to the north and northwest, and helped in bringing about a national market for goods, leveling the prices of such items as grains throughout the country. Farmers, rather than producing for local use, began to produce for others, not only in Afghanistan but also for export. Afghanistan began exporting fresh fruits to India, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan. The emergence of a national market encouraged specialization, thereby increasing the dependence of rural areas on other regions. Besides roads, other developments including airports, telephones, and telegraph connections also helped in making the periphery accessible to the center. By 1975, Afghanistan had thirty-five usable airfields.[19] At the beginning of the century, one-third of the Afghan population was nomadic and another one-third was seminomadic.[20] By the late 1970s, these groups had decreased to less than 20 percent of the population.

Afghanistan's regular army also grew significantly while the role of the tribal forces decreased. As late as 1956, the country had 44,000 armed forces and 20,000 police. These forces were very poorly equipped. By 1978, the regular armed forces were more than 105,000 strong and very well equipped. Additionally, the country had more than 30,000 police and gendarmerie. While in the past conscription caused rebellion and was erratic, by 1978 it was universal. In 1953 the size of the central bureaucracy was only about 10,000, but by 1978 it had reached almost 100,000,[21] and government representatives were present even in the most distant parts of the country.[22]

The financial power of the state also changed significantly. In the 1950s the state collected around $10 million in taxes. By 1978 the government collected $42 million from the sale of one item, natural gas, which it owned. Foreign aid also

[17] CIA, *National Basic Intelligence Factbook*, 159.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Naum Gurevich, "Problems of Agricultural Production in Afghanistan," in *Afghanistan: Past and Present* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Science, 1981), 158.

[21] Beverly Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan* (London: Croom Helm, 1982) 68–196.

[22] The data for this section are drawn from Central Statistics Office, *Statistical Information of Afghanistan, 1976–1977* (Kabul: Afghan Education Press, 1977).

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Iran

Year	No. of Schools	No. of Students	Teachers
1930	13	1,590	53
1952	55	105,885	129
1976	4,200	928,066	26,687

increased the state's financial power and base. For example, between 1955 and 1956 the Soviets provided Afghanistan with $552 million in aid. U.S. aid for the same period was $350 million. This enormous increase in the financial capacity of the state had a great effect on attitudes towards state power, making it appear as the source of benefits. In the Afghan parliament, representatives from various regimes called for "balanced regional development." For example, they complained that 84 percent of the country's doctors lived in Kabul and wanted the state to distribute them and other benefits equitably throughout the country.[23]

Increased state capability and improvement in the country's infrastructure also increased the center's ability for nation building. The army and bureaucracy were important socialization agents for inculcating values of nationalism. Schools were another such agent. The number of schools (elementary-high) in the country increased significantly.[24]

The total number of university graduates between 1933–1967 was 4,232. In 1970 alone, 893 graduated from the university and 2,904 entered the country's universities.[25]

The effects of these changes were paradoxical. They helped foster both Afghan nationalism and ethnic nationalism, especially among new leaders. The educated elite in the minority areas were fragmented. Some cooperated with the center, while others opposed it in varying degrees. Increased education made more people from the minority areas aware of the disparities between their own population and the dominant groups. For example, the Setam Melli (National Oppression) group which had split from the Soviet-oriented Communist group, the People's Democratic Party, had its base of support among non-Pashtun intellectuals. It stood for "the struggle" against the Pashtun domination of the state. Many non-Pashtuns objected to the adoption of Pashtu as the country's national language, even though Dari was the dominant language of the bureaucracy.

Since 1978, when a modernizing and centralizing group, the pro-Soviet Khalq, took over the state apparatus, the central government weakened and the control

[23] For a Soviet view of developmental problems in Afghanistan, see Ghulam Muradov, "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Second Stage of the April Revolution," *Afghanistan: Past and Present* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1981), 178–199. Also see *Republic of Afghanistan Annual, 1978* (Kabul: Afghanistan Government, 1978), 385–386.

[24] *Education in Afghanistan During the Last 50 Years* (Kabul: Afghanistan Government, 1968), 12–13. Also see G. Muradov, 179.

[25] *Educational Statistics, 1971* (Kabul: Afghanistan Government, 1971).

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of the center of tribal and minority areas declined. The practical consequences of the policies of the center were political decay. Khalq favored the establishment of a single party system and a single command with a centrally directed economy based on revolutionary objectives. Among its proposed reforms was a nationality policy, modeled after that of the Soviet Union. It began radio programs in Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi and Nuristani. It also published newspapers in three of these languages.[26] The Khalqis had ambitious plans for a fundamental change of the country. The state apparatus, however, was not strong enough, nor the Khalqis in sufficient control of the state to carry out their plans. To achieve their goals, they resorted to severe repression, which progressively narrowed their base of support.

Even before coming to power, Khalq was in conflict with several other urban based groups over the desired future of Afghanistan. This conflict continued and intensified after it came to power. However, a more important development was the activation of the rural population against the regime. As the rural conflict increased, the state apparatus began to fall apart. The most important was a slow disintegration of the army, with several mutinies and defections. Substantial areas of the country fell from government control. Local leaders, both ethnic and tribal, gained strength. Rural areas began to refuse to pay taxes; government offices, including schools, were closed down in a number of areas. The state income declined and road blockage disrupted the integrated market system which had emerged. The area under cultivation decreased by 9 percent and grain production declined by 19 percent. The per capita gross national product (GNP) went down 19 percent.[27] Shortages of goods in the cities led to substantial price increases. This situation has continued since the invasion, and the Soviet-installed government faces the task of reextending the authority of the center to rural areas. The weakness of the center provided opportunities for ethnic nationalists. However, ethnic politics played a minor role in the opposition against the center. The opposition across ethnic lines was modified by traditional values, especially religious ones. Opposition leaders roused their populations against the government by calling the new regime atheistic. No group or significant ethnic or tribal opposition leader was pushing for independence from the center; they wanted a change in leadership at the center.

Moscow has attempted to use Afghanistan's ethnic problem to gain support in the country. It has offered concessions to minority groups and tribes in return for their support, or at least their neutrality. For example, it offered to appoint citizens from minority areas as officials in those areas. It has made an effort to recruit more non-Pashtuns into the military and has established a handsomely paid rural militia consisting of the local population, including tribal members.

[26] Eden Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations," *Asian Survey* (March 1980):237–256.

[27] *Anis*, 28 February 1980; *Kabul New Times*, 28 February 1980.

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Most of the more than 2.5 million refugees who have left Afghanistan are Pashtuns and should they remain outside of the country, the ethnic balance of Afghanistan would change dramatically. Moscow's ethnic strategy has had a partial success. The National Oppression group is supporting the Babrak Karmal government, and some small minorities such as the Nuristanis and the Baluch have stayed out of the fighting. But in most minority areas of the country resistance to the Soviets continues. A number of tribes have sided with the resistance after taking money from the Soviets. Others have changed sides a number of times. The tribal structure itself is weakened with the emergence of new leaders with ideological ties to the resistance. Recent turmoil in the country has encouraged the growth of power centers in several minority areas, especially among the Hazaras and Tajiks. Several of the resistance groups have a distinct ethnic and regional identity. The relative power among ethnic groups has already begun to shift away from the Pashtuns. The demand for regional autonomy—that is, the establishment of a federal system with a weak center—is a component of the political goal structure of the minority-based resistance groups who are using the current situation to build up an autonomous infrastructure of leadership and identity. However, there is no indication that any of these groups are seeking ethnically-based independent states. All major ethnic groups agree on the desirability of regaining Afghanistan's independence.

However, ethnic politics is likely to remain a significant issue in Afghan politics. The relative importance of the problem will vary and will be affected by the character of the regime in Kabul. Should the current widespread war of resistance against the Soviet forces continue, Moscow is likely to continue to promote conflict among ethnic groups and offer concessions to minorities in order to weaken the resistance. Kabul's efforts to extend its control have not succeeded so far. The continuing conflict in Afghanistan has weakened several important institutions. The size of the Afghan armed forces is stalled at around 40,000. In part because of the belief that attending government schools signifies accepting the Soviet-installed regime, enrollment at the Kabul University fell from 4,000 in 1980 to 700 in 1981.[28] Other students have joined the resistance or departed for other countries. The government's ability to collect taxes from rural areas has been minimal. However, trying to change its weakness to an advantage, the Karmal government has reportedly offered to grant virtual exemption from taxation to rural areas in exchange for a cessation of hostility by the partisan groups. Some analysts have argued that such a decentralization of the country, with the Communists in charge in the cities and the partisans in the countryside, might offer a long-term solution for the current conflict in Afghanistan. This is unlikely to work because both pro-Soviet Communists and several major resistance groups are committed to a strong center. The central issue in the conflicts is control over the center. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

[28] Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Percham and Khalq* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).

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Should the Soviets and their allies defeat the Afghan resistance, Kabul's ethnic policy is likely to be similar to Moscow's nationality policy. The center will oppose any nationalistic activities in the minority area. Should the Soviets withdraw, ethnic politics could be a major cause of internal conflict. There is significant disagreement about the structure of a future Afghan political system. Several important resistance groups favor a strong center and will oppose ethnic nationalism. Conflict might also occur over the division of power between groups with a base of support in various ethnic groups.

IRAN

Iran followed broadly the same pattern as Afghanistan, although especially since 1925 it has become more developed and more centralized and the ethnic challenge has also been more energetic. As in the case of Afghanistan, state building has had periods of success and failure and the rate of change has varied over time. Under Reza Khan, who declared himself king in 1925, the center began a major effort at state building. A chief component of this effort was the establishment of a strong army and a conscription law with universal service for all young men. Reza Khan reformed and expanded the central bureaucracy and the infrastructure. A national market was developed. The Trans-Iran Railway was built, the road system was expanded, and the means of communication extended, including telegraph and telephone lines and the radio. In 1920, Iran had about 2,000 miles of usable road. By the 1930s this had been increased more than tenfold. In 1920 it reportedly took two months for goods from the southern ports to reach Teheran; by 1929 the same trip could be made in one to two weeks. The use of motor vehicles in the country increased from around 600 in 1928 to almost 25,000 in 1942.[29] A national bank was established[30] and fundamental legal and educational reforms were introduced, bringing about greater uniformity and increasing the interaction between the center and the rural areas.

All these changes contributed to the gradual consolidation of state power and the extension of the center's role over more of the country, ending the semi-isolation of some rural areas and thus weakening localism. Reza Khan was not reluctant to use the substantially increased powers of the center against those challenging the ever-expanding reach of central authority. His measures led to revolts by ethnic and tribal groups such as the Kurds, indicating that forceful and interventionist measures by the center increase local resistance. In response, Reza

[29] D.N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 143-44; Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 194ff.; H. Amirsadeqhi and R.W. Ferrier, eds., *Twentieth Century Iran* (London: Heinemann, 1977); Elwell Sutton, "Reza Shah the Great," in George Lenczowski, ed., *Iran Under the Pahlavis* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 1-50; Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran* (New York: New York University Press, 1981).

[30] The National Bank (Bank-i Melli) was established in 1927.

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Khan arrested several tribal leaders and crushed numerous tribal revolts. He also disarmed and settled the nomads and wanted the minorities to be Persianized.

One factor that contributed decisively to the shift of power in favor of the center was oil. The oil income increased Reza's ability to push his state and national building policies. Iran's oil production had increased from 3 million barrels in 1914, to 46 million in 1930, and 66 million in 1940.[31] Reza used oil revenues to build Iranian armed forces and increase the role of the state in the economy.[32]

Iran's occupation by the Allies during World War II led to a dramatic decline in the power of the central government. The Iranian armed forces were weakened, and the central government's control of the country's ethnic areas declined. The occupying forces supported local ethnic and tribal forces, hoping to gain influence over them. The British, who occupied southern Iran, supported tribal forces in the area. The Soviets, who were in northern Iran, encouraged the merger of demands for autonomy with leftist ideas. This contributed to the emergence of a strong Tudeh party in the area, in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The Tudeh was the dominant element of a coalition called the Democratic party, which stressed autonomy.[33] The Kurds declared an autonomous Kurdish Republic in December 1945. As in the case of Azerbaijan, this effort was supported by the Soviets, who prevented the Teheran government from imposing any military sanctions.

Although the Teheran government compromised with forces of the left, including those in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, as part of the negotiations preceding the Soviet withdrawal, this policy was soon abandoned after the Soviets had left. The government dispatched forces to both Azerbaijan and Kurdistan to reestablish central control. The autonomy movements in both areas were put down violently and quickly. Some of the opposition leaders were executed, others were jailed, and some succeeded in fleeing. The Azerbaijan and Kurdish examples illustrate how weak local nationalists are in resisting central control when outside support is withdrawn.

After the war, the relative power of the center further increased dramatically. The army and security forces were greatly expanded and the financial power of the state increased. During the first half of Mohammed Reza's rule, the growth of financial resources of the center was due, among other things, to large-scale infusions of Western, and especially U.S. aid. Immediately after Mohammed Mossadeq's overthrow in 1953, Iran received $45 million in emergency loans

[31] Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 199.

[32] Charles Issawi, "The Iranian Economy, 1925–1975," in George Lenczowski, *Iran Under the Pahlavis*, 129–66.

[33] Ervand Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran: the Tudeh and the Firqah-i-Dimukrat," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1 (1970): 291–318; Sepehr Zabih, *Communist Movement in Iran* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 3.

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from the U.S., the start of what would become a steady stream. The government's 1955 Seven-Year Plan envisaged an expenditure of $3.24 billion, 33 percent of which was to be spent on communication and transport in a further effort of state building. Increased government revenue from oil enhanced this effort. Annual income from oil after the price increases of 1973–74 was about $20 billion. The greater financial capability of the state reduced relative government dependence on taxes paid by the population. The increase of resources available to the state brought about dramatic changes. Not only did the state build a large armed force and bureaucracy but major infrastructural changes had also occurred. During the third (1962–68) and fourth (1968–73) five-year plans, Teheran spent $3.9 billion on the infrastructure. "Over 500 miles of rail track were laid, so that by the mid-1970s, the Trans-Iranian Railway fulfilled Reza Shah's dream of linking Teheran with Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashad as well as with the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf."[34] By 1978, Iran had more than 80,000 km of roads, more than 160 usable airfields, and an advanced internal and external communication system. The country had more than 800,000 telephones, thirty-seven radio stations, some four million radios, sixty-seven television stations, and over 1.7 million television sets.[35] Schools also expanded. Between 1963 and 1977, the enrollment in kindergartens increased from 13,296 to 221,896; the number of elementary school students grew from some 1.6 million to more than 4 million; secondary schools more than doubled their numbers (from 369,069 to 741,000); technical and vocational schools and teacher's schools increased their numbers of students from 14,240 to 227,497. The number of university students increased from 24,885 to 154,215.[36] The schools were used to disseminate the ideas of Iranian nationalism.

The enormous increase in the state's capability changed the attitude towards the center. Rather than opposing the extension of state authority, more and more people demanded a fair share of state financial resources and social services. Control over the state apparatus emerged as a major political issue. This does not mean that the struggle by ethnic minorities for greater autonomy ended, but rather that it became less important. The struggle for control of the center began to overshadow the more traditional mode—resistance against control by the center.

The clearest illustration of this was the 1979 revolt that led to the takeover of the state apparatus by Muslim fundamentalists who continued to extend the process of centralization. Like the Shah, the fundamentalists oppose ethnic nationalism. According to the ruling Islamic Republican Party (IRP), loyalty to Islam should be dominant over all other loyalties.[37] The official policy is that all

[34] E. Abrahamian, *Iran: Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 428.

[35] CIA, *National Basic Intelligence Factbook*, 98.

[36] Abrahamian, *Iran: Between Two Revolutions.*

[37] Islamic Republican Party, *Mavazihi-Ma*, 40.

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Muslims belong to one nation and ethnic nationalism weakens the unity of the Muslims and makes them vulnerable to external manipulation.[38]

While under the Shah, the basis of incorporation of ethnic minorities into Iran was Iranian nationalism; under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini it is Islam. The local councils are directed to officiate "in such a way as to preserve national unity, territorial integrity, the system of the Islamic Republic, and the primacy of the central government."[39]

Since the overthrow of the Shah, ethnic politics in Iran illustrate several important points. First, that the decline in power of the center was seen by ethnic nationalists as an opportunity to push for increased autonomy, indicating that a weaker center encouraged greater assertiveness on the part of ethnic nationalists. Second, that even with a weaker center, the rebelling groups have been unsuccessful in eliminating central control, thus indicating the substantial success in state building already achieved. Third, that the minority areas are fragmented in their loyalties, some supporting a strong center, some opposing it. Fourth, that both local and outside powers hostile to the regime have manipulated the ethnic opposition for their own ends, indicating a general belief that the center-minority relationship is or can be made into a major weakness and preoccupation of the regime.

Iran's Islamic Republican regime favors a strong center and is very hostile to ethnic dissidents. Should it consolidate the relative power between ethnic nationalists and the central government, it will further strengthen the center. Should the regime be overthrown, the character of the new regime, of course, will depend on which group inherits power at the center. There are many groups opposed to the current regime, some of which, at least for now, express greater willingness to tolerate ethnic nationalism. However, in general, all the principal political groups—the monarchists, the Mojahedin-dominated National Council of Resistance, and other leftist groups such as Tudeh—favor a strong center.

Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Balkanization

Given the substantial change in favor of the center, Balkanization or fragmentation of multiethnic states such as these in Southwest Asia could take place only under the most extreme circumstances. Under normal circumstances the political destiny of multiethnic polities will be decided at the center rather than at the periphery. For ethnic nationalists to succeed in forming separate states of their own, at least one of the following two conditions would have to be met: a total breakdown of the center accompanied by substantial nationalistic and anticenter activities in the minority areas; or a commitment by a superior external power

[38] Ibid.

[39] There were such councils under the Shah as well, but they never really performed their intended function. R. Nyrop, *Iran: A Country Study*, 193.

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on behalf of ethnic separatist groups without a countervailing response on the part of other major powers in support of the center.

Of the three states under consideration, Afghanistan has experienced the greatest degradation in the relative power of the center since the 1978 Communist takeover. However, the opposition to the center has taken on an antiforeign (anticolonial) character, rather than being a movement for ethnic independence from the center. To the opposition groups, the struggle against the center since 1978 has been perceived as a war against Soviet control. Moscow and its local allies have sought to use the ethnic differences in Afghanistan to fragment the opposition and to win allies. Although the recent turmoil in the country has encouraged the growth of centers of power in the minority areas, changing the relative balance of power away from the Pashtuns, there is no indication that any of the ethnically based partisan groups are seeking to establish independent states.

In the case of Iran and Pakistan, ethnically based nationalistic activities have been more widespread than in Afghanistan, but the disintegration of the center in both countries, nevertheless, appears extremely unlikely. In the case of Iran, a critical test for the regime's success at consolidation will come with Khomeini's death. His successor(s) might well be able to prevent a total breakdown at the center. Of course, should a post-Khomeini government fail in this regard, the relative prospects for ethnic nationalists will improve.

Only in one case (the Indian invasion of East Pakistan leading to the establishment of Bangladesh) has a superior power committed itself to the independence of an ethnic group. This does not mean that outside powers, whether superior or not, have not assisted ethnic nationalists against the center—they have. Ethnic problems in Southwest Asia have been made particularly complicated because ethnic minorities have been spread across international borders—the Pashtuns across the Afghan-Pakistani border, the Baluch across Pakistani-Afghan and Iranian borders, the Arabs across the Iranian-Iraqui borders, the Kurds across Iranian-Iraqui and Turkish borders, to name a few. This transnational character of ethnic groups at times has caused border disputes, as between Afghanistan and Pakistan, because of Afghan irredentist claims against Baluch and Pashtun areas of Pakistan. However, irredentism alone has not motivated support for ethnic nationalists by other powers. Rivals have on occasion supported nationalists to affect the domestic or foreign policy of the target country. However, the support has generally been very limited and cautious.

For example, in the early 1970s Iran and the United States supported the Iraqi Kurds against Baghdad. However, in 1975 when the Iraqi government agreed to Iranian conditions for settling problems in their mutual relations, Teheran dropped its support for the Iraqi Kurds. In fact, Iraq and Iran are opposed to the formation of an independent Kurdistan. Neither wants the Kurdish nationalists to become very strong, although at times they have provided limited support to each other's Kurds for tactical reasons and at other times they have taken joint action against the Kurds.

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Since the overthrow of the Shah, there have been several indications that outside powers have sought to support the ethnic nationalists in Iran, especially in the Kurdish areas. This support has been aimed at weakening the regime and decreasing its ability to export its revolution to other states. The Iranian regime has accused several powers, especially the Soviet Union, the United States, and Iraq of supporting the ethnic opposition to Teheran. For example, as early as 1979 deputy Premier Abbas Amir-Entezam complained to the American Embassy officials in Teheran that Soviet overflights were a real problem.[40] In one case, the government gave permission for overflights of Mazandaran, but restricted the altitude of Soviet flights to no less than 21,000 feet. Instead, Soviet planes flew over at 4,000 feet, and en route to the Persian Gulf dropped at least one large packet of supplies to dissident Kurds.[41] As Foreign Minister Sadiq Qotbzadeh complained in August 1980, "substantial amounts of Russian arms not used by the armed forces of neighboring countries had been found in Kurdistan."[42] He also accused Moscow of sending money and photographs of the Iranian military positions to the Kurds. As one example of the Soviet ties with the Kurdish nationalists, the Soviets criticized the banning of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in 1979 and later a pro-Soviet faction emerged in the KDP.[43] Recently, Iranians have discovered that captured documents at the American Embassy in Teheran indicates KDP leaders had travelled to Moscow in September 1979 to obtain assistance.[44] Indeed, some Soviet statements have been outright menacing about Iranian minorities. For example, Geydar Aliyev – a Soviet politburo member – repeatedly told journalists that he hoped Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan would be united in the future.[45]

While the extent of such Soviet support for the Kurds or Azerbaijanis is unclear, Moscow has not committed substantial resources to the cause. For whatever reason, Moscow has not seen fit to commit itself, at least so far, to establishing an independent Kurdistan or annex Azerbaijan. However, should the center in Iran disintegrate (an unlikely prospect), Moscow might move into Kurdistan and Azerbaijan to establish Soviet-oriented "independent" governments there. The Soviets might receive an "invitation" from some sympathetic local groups or they might justify their move on the grounds that they wanted law and order in areas close to their territory. A Soviet intervention in northern Iran

[40] John Stemple, Report after conversations with Amir-Entezam, contained in a telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy Tehran, no. 3941, August 1979. This report was one of the many documents captured and released by the Iranian students who occupied the U.S. Embassy.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Qotbzadeh's message was sent to Moscow on 11 August 1980. It was circulated by Muslim Student Association of the U.S. and Canada (the Persian Speaking Group), P.O. Box 6322, Albany, Calif., 94706.

[43] Sepehr Zabih, *Iran Since the Revolution* (Baltimore, Md.; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 89.

[44] *Kayhan International*, 2 June 1983, 2.

[45] *International Herald Tribune*, 30 November 1982.

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might lead to a Western move against southern parts of the country. Such a move could lead to a de facto division of Iran between two sides; mutual withdrawal; or a major war between the two sides with all the dangers of vertical and horizontal escalation. Even short of sending forces into Iran, the ethnic opposition to the center in Iran provides an opportunity for the Soviets to create problems for Teheran. However, support for ethnic dissidents involves the risk of causing relations with the Iranian government to deteriorate.

Another power that could affect the prospects for ethnic nationalists in Iran is Iraq. The revolution in Iran caused a substantial degradation in the capability of the Iranian armed forces, shifting the relative balance of power in favor of Iraq. At the same time the Baghdad government was concerned that the Iranian revolution might spread to Iraq. As part of its efforts to oppose the Iranian regime, Iraq assisted the Kurdish nationalists in Iran even before the eruption of the continuing war between the two countries. Iraq might have started the war against Iran believing itself to be the superior power. Even if Iraq's military efforts against Iran had succeeded, it is unlikely that Iraq would have allowed Kurdish nationalists to set up their own state. The Iraqi government is opposed to Kurdish nationalism because Iraq, too, has a significant Kurdish population. Like Iran in the 1970s, Iraq, after the Iranian revolution, wanted to use the Kurdish nationalists to weaken the government in Teheran. Since the war against Iran has not gone as well as the Iraqi regime wanted, Baghdad has been willing to cease assistance to the Iranian Kurds if Iran agrees to return to the status quo ante. Iran has rejected Iraqi offers and the future of the war remains uncertain.

In Afghanistan there is no indication that any of the outside powers have provided significant support for ethnic nationalists opposed to the center. However, the same cannot be said about Pakistan. Since 1947 the Baluch and Pashtun nationalists have received intermittent Afghan support. However, Afghanistan was too weak to bring about a change in Pakistan. The Soviet-installed regime in Kabul has offered to forego future support for Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in exchange for the Pakistani withdrawal of support from the Afghan partisans and recognition of the Kabul regime. The two sides have not yet reached an agreement. Should the Soviets consolidate in Afghanistan, they might support Baluch and Pashtun nationalists opposed to Pakistan as one of the levers for gaining influence there. They might do so, or threaten to do so, before consolidation in order to discourage Pakistan from providing substantial support for the Afghan positions.

In general, it appears that superior powers have avoided commitment to achievement of independence by ethnic nationalists in Southwest Asia. However, India did support Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan and invaded that area to establish Bangladesh. Whether superior powers would sponsor ethnic nationalist forces in the future is very difficult to determine. But without such sponsorship, successful secession appears very unlikely. Even without secession, however, ethnic politics will pose major policy dilemmas for governments in Southwest Asia.

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Dilemmas and Opportunities for the Center

Governments in Southwest Asia must make difficult choices in developing policy towards ethnic groups. Massive intervention in the minority areas to forcefully suppress any dissent and to increase central control carries the danger of alienating the local population. Instability in the minority areas has been more intense when the center has been highly interventionist. The internal reaction against the center when it is very interventionist is motivated by a fear that the very identity and survival of the local ethnic groups are threatened. The other extreme, a weak center that allows genuine self-government in the minority areas, risks separation and secession instead of integration. In other words, a very strong interventionist center may frighten the ethnic nationalists into a "last ditch stand"; a very weak center can give them the feeling that their moment has come and that rebellion has a real chance of success.

It appears that a middle course policy has the greatest prospect for success and stability. Such a strategy is characterized by moderate state building and a strong center willing to take measures against those threatening the integrity of the state, combined with flexibility in some issues important to the ethnic group—language, territory, political access, cultural heritage, local elites, and symbols of autonomy.

In following such a course, the center has many opportunities for cooperation with local leaders. Modernization and interaction with dominant groups have produced ideological fragmentation in the minority areas leading to the establishment of groups willing to cooperate with the center as well as groups and individuals that advocate ethnic nationalism and even independence. In the competitive elections in Pakistan those favoring a strong center and opposed to ethnic nationalism have done extremely well in minority provinces. Several principal figures in the procenter movements are from minority areas. In Iran, for example, both the Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Musavi and Chief Justice Musavi Ardebili are Azerbaijanis. In Pakistan several Baluch and Pashtuns are important figures in the central government, even though Pashtuns appear more integrated into the mainstream of Pakistani public life. For example, in 1959, of the twenty-four generals in the Pakistani army, eleven were Pashtuns.[46] A Baluch, Farouq Laghary, is the Secretary General of the center-oriented PPP in Punjab. Many Baluch leaders do not oppose state building efforts by the center.[47]

The center can encourage the growth of a cooperative local elite by allowing them to affect the politics of their country in important ways short of secession. These elites can play the role of mediators between the central government and

[46] Stephen P. Cohen, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, Report prepared for the Office of External Research, U.S. Department of State, Contract No. 1722-020167, September 1980, 40.

[47] Interview with Pakistan government political leaders including Laghary. Lahore, Pakistan, January 1982.

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the local population. They can influence the formulation and implementation of those policies of the center that relate to their regions by lobbying in the center, by effective bureaucratic politics, or by joining or forming coalitions with groups having substantial influence at the center. They can push for greater autonomy—more effective authority at the local level—or they can seek greater representation at the center.

Because of traditional rivalries and ideological fragmentation in the ethnic areas, the center has been able to find powerful local allies even when it has been highly interventionist. For example, in Pakistani Baluchistan, when Prime Minister Bhutto dismissed the nationalistic local government in 1973, an important Baluch leader, Akbar Bugti, agreed to serve as the center-appointed local governor. With a more accommodating policy, the center can gain even greater cooperation.

Even if the center follows a middle course policy, the ethnic issues will not go away. Ethnic nationalism will continue to remain a threat to the legitimacy of these and other multiethnic states. The relative seriousness of the problem will increase if the center-oriented opposition groups support ethnic nationalists or if they receive foreign assistance. However, without the disintegration of the center or the use of force by a superior foreign power, predictions of Balkanization are extremely exaggerated.*

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Belief Systems and Decision Making in the *Mayaguez* Crisis

CHRIS LAMB

On 12 May 1975, a Cambodian gunboat seized the SS *Mayaguez*, an American merchant ship in transit from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand.[1] The ship and forty-member crew were taken seven miles north to the Cambodian island of Poulo Wai where they remained throughout the night. On 13 May they were moved to Koh Tang, a heavily fortified island approximately thirty miles from the Cambodian mainland. The *Mayaguez*, from the time it left Poulo Wai, was under surveillance by U.S. P-3 aircraft sent on orders from Washington. The White House had been alerted by the U.S. embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, where SOS signals from the *Mayaguez* had been received. Soon U.S. attack planes from Thailand joined the reconnaissance aircraft and together they maintained a virtually constant U.S. aerial presence.

When a fishing boat carrying the *Mayaguez* crew set out from Koh Tang for the mainland, it quickly drew warning fire across its bow from U.S. attack planes. It refused to turn back and was able to proceed to the Cambodian mainland, although under constant harassment from the U.S. planes which gassed it with riot control agents and strafed the water fore and aft of the boat.

On that same day, in an attempt to rescue the crew still presumed to be on Tang Island, U.S. Marines invaded the island in a helicopter assault launched from Thailand. Simultaneously, a Marine boarding party from the destroyer escort USS *Holt* seized the *Mayaguez*. The Marines took the *Mayaguez* uncontested,

[1] Roy Rowan, *The Four Days of Mayaguez* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 223.

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but ran into stiff resistance on Koh Tang. Almost at the same time as the Marine offensive, the Cambodians broadcast by local radio their intention to free the *Mayaguez*. Washington responded to the broadcast with a White House press release that declared the U.S. had already secured the *Mayaguez* and promised prompt cessation of military operations if the crew were released immediately and unconditionally.

Meanwhile, the Marine invasion of Tang Island was quickly developing into a potential disaster. At the end of the invasion's first hour there were only sixty-eight Americans on the island, and fourteen of them were dead. At the end of the first planned assault wave, the number of Americans had climbed to 109, and eight out of the nine helicopters that participated in the assault had either been "shot down, ditched, or damaged so severely that they were out of action."[2] Approximately 140 well-armed and entrenched Khmer Rouge communist troops were on the island and it would be at least another four hours before the second assault wave of Marines could be landed. When the Marines were finally evacuated from the island, they had to fight off charging groups of Khmer soldiers who attempted to destroy the rescuing helicopters with hand grenades.

While the invasion of Tang was limping along, U.S. fighter-bombers from the *Coral Sea* attacked the Cambodian mainland. The first of two waves struck at the same moment that the crew of the *Mayaguez*, which by then had been released, were boarding an American destroyer, and the second wave struck approximately an hour later. With the recovery of the ship and crew, American military operations came to an end on 15 May when all the Marines were finally extricated from Tang Island. Eighteen fatal casualties on Koh Tang, along with twenty-three Americans who died in an accidental helicopter crash in Thailand, would not be made known to the public for some time. In retrospect, the rescue of the *Mayaguez* was a hasty, risky, ill-conceived action not commensurate with publicly stated objectives.

The first purpose of this article is to explain why, something not accomplished previously. The requirements for doing so are straightforward but not simple to fulfill. The explanation for American behavior must not just be an in-depth description that obfuscates the crucial variables and their interaction. Nor should it be so parsimonious that it is incongruent with or contradictory to important aspects of American behavior. Like all social science explanations, it must simplify reality without being simplistic.

The second purpose of this case study is to make a contribution to theory by demonstrating the relative utility of the Rational Actor, Bureaucratic Politics, and Belief System models in explaining the *Mayaguez* crisis. Of these three models, the Belief System produces the most compelling explanation of American behavior in the *Mayaguez* crisis. It explains precisely why the United States

[2] U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pt. 1, 7.

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reacted as it did, diplomatically and militarily, and leaves none of the inconsistencies between publicly stated objectives and actions unexplained. The general strategy and details of crisis behavior were the direct outgrowth of the beliefs and values held by four key decision makers: President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and Deputy of National Security Affairs General Brent Scowcroft.

The general desire to use force was perfectly predictable from common knowledge of the four key decision makers' belief systems. However, some details of each member's crisis behavior, which contributed to and even determined the nature of the U.S. military response, reflected beliefs not accessable to public observers prior to the crisis and could only be reconstructed in retrospect. The following section disregards these latent beliefs and provides a brief overview of the salient cognitive and affective concepts of the four key decision makers based on voting records, memoirs, interviews, personal observations from close associates of the decision makers, and case studies on individual belief systems. This eclectic methodology is widely recommended by scholars researching belief systems of specific decision makers.[3]

Precrisis Belief Systems

Several weeks prior to the *Mayaguez* crisis, Phnom Penh and Saigon fell to communist forces, marking an end to thirty years of determined efforts by successive U.S. presidents to keep Indochina noncommunist. In the months preceding the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam, Ford and Kissinger appealed repeatedly to Congress for enough aid to forestall the demise of these countries. Ford stated the case succinctly: ". . . we want our friends to know that we will stand by them and we want any potential adversaries to know that we will stand up to them."[4] Encouraging strong military resolve was consistent with the president's previous record of consistently supporting the use of American military force in Indochina. While in Congress, he habitually voted for defense spending, against the War Powers Resolution, and against ending the bombing of Cambodia in 1973. He categorically stated he believed there was a great deal of credibility to the domino theory and that events in the spring 1975 were validating that theory.[5] Ford was also concerned about an international perception of U.S.

[3] See Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (March 1977): 57; Jeffrey A. Hart, "Cognitive Maps of Three Latin American Policy Makers," *World Politics* 30 (October 1977): 117; and Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (June 1969): 221–22.

[4] *Department of State Bulletin*, 26 May 1975, 678.

[5] Ibid., 7 April 1975, 434; and 28 April 1975, 544.

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weakness, and was quoted as saying prior to the *Mayaguez* crisis: "I have to show some strength in order to help us . . . with our credibility in the world."[6]

Kissinger, for his part, was trying to remind a skeptical public that the fall of Indochina would have repercussions: "I know it is fashionable to sneer at the word domino theory yet letting Vietnam and Cambodia go down the tube would have serious consequences in terms of our credibility."[7] Kissinger's concern with credibility was quite specific. He made it clear he believed the Southeast Asian debacle would inevitably lead other nations to test the will of the United States. He exhorted Americans to be vigilant and prepare for more sacrifice, admonishing: "The American people may well be tired of many years of exertions but [we should keep] in mind also that sometimes to give in to the mood of the moment may lead to profound regrets later on."[8]

When asked if $150 billion and 55,000 American lives had not already proved America's will and credibility, Kissinger said past sacrifice notwithstanding, Indochina's survival still was dependent on U.S. aid and if it was not forthcoming the United States would be held accountable.[9] Kissinger so consistently reiterated this warning of impending crisis that he was finally asked if perhaps he was single-handedly cultivating an image of American impotence. Kissinger replied no and insisted the problem would not go away by ignoring it. On the contrary, it was his duty to help Americans recognize the problem, for "when they face it," he said, "they can also overcome it."[10] He did add, though, that he was feeling more optimistic (on 12 April) than in October because people were beginning to take his warnings more seriously.

The upswing in optimism probably reflected Kissinger's awareness that more discrete lobbying efforts of his were about to bear fruit. Kissinger was confident that North Korea was the most likely candidate for testing U.S. resolve, and in spring 1975 he was working on convincing a group of senators who had been outspoken in their opposition to the Vietnam war that the danger from a Korean misperception of U.S. will was real and imminent. Coincidentally, on the day of the *Mayaguez* seizure these senators released a statement intended to head off a Korean crisis. Its opening line testified to Kissinger's persuasion: "Let no nation read the events in Indochina as the failure of American will."[11] Kissinger did not consider rhetoric sufficient, however. He told the public that while the United States could not change the past, it had the power to "take charge of the future." Off the record he told reporters, "The United States must carry out some act somewhere in the world which shows its determination to continue to be a world power."[12]

[6] *Washington Post*, 26 May 1975.
[5] *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 March 1975, 328.
[8] Ibid., 326.
[9] Ibid., 326.
[10] Ibid., 12 May 1975, 608–9.
[11] I.F. Stone, "Conned in Cambodia," *New York Review of Books*, 12 June 1975.
[12] Ibid.; also *Department of State Bulletin*, 5 May 1975, 557.

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Kissinger also had specific views on crises and military force. He "deplored the American habit of responding pragmatically to crisis situations instead of developing a coherent doctrine *a priori*."[13] Impromptu planning invariably fails to take into account all the ramifications of alternative plans and often overlooks concerns which, while subdued at the time, are more salient in a broader context. By 1975 Kissinger was a veteran of several international crises and had personal experience with the limitations of *ad hoc* crisis management.

On 14 April 1969, the North Koreans shot down an American EC-121 aircraft, killing all aboard. In his memoirs Henry Kissinger makes the following observations about the EC-121 crisis:

> . . . a leisurely process of decision-making creates a presumption in favor of eventual inaction . . . in a crisis boldness is the safest course. Hesitation encourages the adversary to persevere, maybe even raise the ante . . . Overall, I judge our conduct in the EC-121 crisis as weak, indecisive and disorganized . . . I believe we paid for it in many intangible ways, in demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries.[14]

In addition, Kissinger had drawn some lessons on the use of force from his experience in dealing with the Vietnam War:

> The bane of our military actions in Vietnam was their hesitancy; we were always trying to calculate with fine precision the absolute minimum of force . . . Perhaps the most difficult lesson for a national leader to learn is that with respect to the use of military force, his basic choice is to act or to refrain from acting. He will not be able to take away the moral curse of using force by employing it halfheartedly or incompetently. There are no rewards for exhibiting one's doubts in vacillation; statesmen get no prizes for failing with restraint. Once committed they must prevail.[15]

Although these passages from Kissinger's memoirs should not be unduly emphasized, his belief that indecision and weakness led to demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries would have weighed heavily on his mind prior to the *Mayaguez* crisis, as would his belief that power must be committed decisively or not at all. Believing American prestige was fast approaching a nadir, the last thing Kissinger wanted was an emboldened North Korea or another American military failure.

Schlesinger's beliefs had much in common with Ford's and Kissinger's. Lobbying in coordination with Ford and Kissinger, Schlesinger proclaimed the domino theory to be "overly discredited" and asserted the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam would severely undermine American credibility. Schlesinger was straightforward: the fall of Indochina, "should clearly be marked as the result of the inepitude of the [Cambodian and South Vietnamese] governments rather than due to a cutoff of American aid."[16] He also joined Ford and Kissinger in

[13] John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976), 14.

[14] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 316, 318, 321.

[15] Ibid., 498.

[16] *New York Times*, 28 February 1975.

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pressuring a recalcitrant Congress to provide funds for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Speaking on national television, Schlesinger claimed there was no doubt but that Cambodia would fall if Congress continued to withhold aid, and he strongly suggested that this would not reflect well on the United States:

> Other great powers in history have earned the term perfidious because of their desertion of their allies, and I would hate to see the United States earn that particular reputation.[17]

For Schlesinger the issue was clearly one of perception. He reportedly believed Cambodia was doomed anyway, but thought U.S. aid should continue in order to blur the image of American responsibility for its demise.

General Scrowcroft was the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and one of only three men privy to foreign policy formulation in the White House. According to Ron Nessen, President Ford's press secretary, "Nobody, excepting the Secretary's (Kissinger) other self, Brent Scrowcroft, and occasionally Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, goes in with Henry to discuss foreign policy with the president."[18] The reference to Scrowcroft as Kissinger's other self reflects the common opinion that they had very similar belief systems, an opinion shared by President Ford,[19] and also substantiated by Scrowcroft himself:

> We worked so well together because we had similar outlooks and because we in fact knew what the other would have thought, would have done, in a particular circumstance. So while we had a few very sharp disagreements, there were rarely disagreements of philosophy.[20]

A postcrisis interview with General Scrowcroft revealed that he believed the domino theory was valid in terms of its effects on confidence and credibility. He also thought it was extremely important to terminate American involvement in Vietnam in a way which would preserve an American image of reliability. In that regard, the exit from Vietnam was "at best a mixed success, and did little to enhance confidence in the United States on the part of our friends." Consequently, at the time of the *Mayaguez* crisis, Scrowcroft believed it was essential to "project an air of strength and confidence and decisiveness to our friends; that they could still rely on the United States."[21]

All four decision makers shared some similar and salient beliefs about the international environment. They believed in the domino theory of credibility, and they believed a growing perception of U.S. impotence was threatening and inimical to U.S. interests. Also, with the exception of Ford, they had some unique concerns and beliefs which, while not evident from any publicly available mate-

[17] Ibid., 24 February 1975.
[18] John Hersey, *The President* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 120.
[19] Gerald Ford, *A Time to Heal* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 326.
[20] Brent Scowcroft, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 1 February 1980.
[21] Ibid.

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rial prior to the crisis, manifested themselves forcefully during the crisis. The following review of crisis behavior demonstrates the intimate relationship between each decision maker's beliefs and his behavior.

Crisis Behavior: Inside the White House

12 May, Monday[22]

Early morning news of the *Mayaguez* seizure reportedly galvanized Kissinger, and he made his opinions immediately known to President Ford, who then called a National Security Council (NSC) meeting for 12:00 noon. An hour before the NSC meeting, President Ford told Ron Nessen about the seizure. He surprised Nessen by asking him the hypothetical questions, "Would you go in there and bomb the Cambodian boat and take a chance of the Americans being killed? Would you send helicopters in there? Would you mine every harbor in Cambodia?"[23] Ford's questions demonstrate a concern with the crew's safety, but also a prevailing interest in military options that was also evident in the first NSC meeting. After listening quietly to a briefing by William Colby, the Director of the CIA; to Kissinger argue that international perceptions of American power and will were at stake;[24] and to a general discussion of potential North Korean aggression;[25] Ford broke in and asked what military forces were available. The conversation then narrowed to American military assets and liabilities in Southeast Asia. When some participants noted that American objectives—decided on as recovering the ship and crew while simultaneously demonstrating American power—might be contradictory, Kissinger reportedly replied that the lives of the *Mayaguez* crew "must unfortunately be a secondary consideration."[26] (He later denied this quotation.)

Kissinger left after the first NSC meetings for a speaking engagement in Missouri. Soon after his arrival in Kansas City, the president called to discuss setting a deadline for the release of the *Mayaguez*. An ultimatum had already been drafted. After twelve minutes Ford hung up. The idea was rejected. Kissinger did not want to put any time restraints on the American response.[27] The Secretary of State was confident. He told newsmen, "I have the impression that the government is fully united on the course that needs to be taken."[28] His response to a

[22] All data for this chronological review, unless otherwise noted, is from U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, *Seizure of the Mayaguez:* pts. 1, 2, 3, 4.

[23] Ron Nesson, *It Sure Looks Different from the Inside* (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1978), 118.

[24] Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane, *Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontation* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978), 110.

[25] Scowcroft interview.

[26] *Newsweek*, 19 May 1975, 16.

[27] Roy Rowan, *The Four Days of Mayaguez* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 92.

[28] U.S. Congress, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 1, 68.

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reporter's question about when the crisis might end was uncharacteristically revealing: "I know your magazine deadline. I think we can meet it."[29] According to one source, "Kissinger, who had seemed morose since the ignominious U.S. evacuations of Phnom Penh and Saigon, appeared to have regained his old ebullience."[30]

13 May, Tuesday

In the middle of the night, Scrowcroft was notified that the *Mayaguez* was moving toward Kompong Som harbor. Alarmed about the potential for another *Pueblo*,[31] he immediately called the Pentagon and asked if aircraft would have time to prevent the *Mayaguez* from reaching the mainland. He was told that Thai-based aircraft could intercept the *Mayaguez* in time and were already being loaded for the mission. Scrowcroft ordered the planes into the air, and then went to notify the President and receive permission for the interdiction effort.[32] Later that morning, Ford echoed Scrowcroft's concern and ordered Schlesinger *not* to allow a repetition of the *Pueblo* ordeal.[33] Schlesinger passed the president's orders down the chain of command: the *Mayaguez* was to be quarantined from the mainland.

It was not long before the Cambodians tested the limits of the de facto quarantine by refusing to turn away from aerial warning fire. After a call from Scowcroft at 8:10 P.M., Ford's orders for the sinking of a Cambodian patrol boat leaving Tang Island were relayed to the scene by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). During the next two hours, three Cambodian patrol boats were sunk and another four immobilized. Ford and Scowcroft then decided to call a third NSC meeting for later that evening. (The second NSC meeting had transpired that morning with the only new decision being to order additional Marines and a second aircraft carrier to the scene.)

During this third meeting, Kissinger, back from Missouri, again maintained that the American response had to be forceful enough to make an impact on the pugnacious North Koreans. He was "emphatic on the use of force."[34] Ford listened quietly to Kissinger, Schlesinger, and others, and then ordered an assault on the *Mayaguez* and Tang Island and air strikes on the mainland. He reiterated: traffic between the mainland and Tang Island was to be cut off. He also directed the State Department to deliver a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asking for assistance in the ordeal. Having decided on military action,

[29] Rowan, 92.

[30] Ibid.

[31] In 1968 the United States endured a humiliating experience when North Korea seized the USS *Pueblo*—a ship equipped for electronic surveillance—in international waters and held her crew imprisoned for almost a year, flaunting worldwide their confessions as spies.

[32] Head, Short, and McFarlane, 112–13.

[33] Ford, 277.

[34] Head, Short, and McFarlane, 123.

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the issue of timing assumed primary importance. Kissinger urged the earliest possible use of force. But when the JCS was asked if the operation could be moved up one day, General David Jones recommended against it, and the President accepted the general's advice.[35]

In the middle of this meeting, an American pilot strafing Cambodian patrol boats reported sighting Caucasians on the deck of a fishing boat. Ford ordered the pilots to do everything possible to turn the boat around, but not to sink it. The planes used bombs, rockets, cannon fire, and even gas in attempting to turn the boat around, but, undaunted, the Cambodians continued on to the mainland along with the entire crew of the *Mayaguez*.

14 May, Wednesday

Between the third and fourth NSC meetings, members of the JCS met and agreed that one more day to coordinate and review the situation would be extremely useful. Also, in New York, more than twelve hours after the president had ordered it, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations delivered a request for assistance to U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim. These events were rendered insignificant by decisions made in the final NSC meeting at which General Jones outlined the military plans in detail and noted the benefits of waiting an additional twenty-four hours. But the military operations were not postponed.[36] Rather, discussion settled down to a debate over the use of B-52s on mainland bombing missions. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Kissinger, and Scowcroft were in favor of using B-52s and Schlesinger, Jones, and General George Brown were against it.[37]

Kissinger and Scrowcroft believed it would be better to err on the side of too much force rather than not enough. To allow the conflict to end with no clear idea of who had taken the beating would exacerbate the very image of American impotence they were trying to erase. Schlesinger, on the other hand, thought the use of B-52s would turn domestic and world opinion against the United States because of the negative images associated with their use in Vietnam. He actually preferred no bombing at all. The argument ended when White House photographer David Kennerly suddenly asked if anyone had considered that the seizure might be just the action of a local commander. After a few moments of silence, the president decided Kennerly's point had merit, and he concluded the B-52s would constitute overkill. He ordered tactical air strikes instead. It was also made known to the NSC participants at this meeting that intercepted Cambodian radio messages suggested that at least some members of the *Mayaguez* crew were on the mainland.[38] No plans were altered, however.

[35] Ibid., 118.
[36] Ibid., 121–22.
[37] Nesson, 122; Ford, 279–80; Rowan, 176.
[38] Nesson, 123.

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At 7:07 P.M. the Cambodians locally broadcast a message in their own language announcing the release of the ship. Both Kissinger and Scowcroft learned of the Cambodian broadcast at 8:15. Scowcroft called Ford, and at 8:28 Ford ordered him to tell Schlesinger to hold up the air strikes. While Scowcroft did so, Kissinger called Ford (at 8:29) and argued that the attacks should proceed, pointing out that the Cambodians had only mentioned the ship and not specifically the crew. By 8:37 Kissinger won Ford over, and the two also agreed that a public announcement should be made to explain the U.S. reaction to the broadcast. Kissinger sent Scowcroft down the hall to find the president's press secretary, Ron Nessen. Nessen recalls:

> Scowcroft burst into my office . . . grabbed me by the arm and literally pulled me to Kissinger's office . . . Kissinger had concluded that the fastest way, perhaps the only way, to reply to the [Cambodian radio broadcast] was to release the American response to the press and hope that Cambodian officials in Phnom Penh or elsewhere in the world would see it on the news wires."[39]

It was not the only way to reach the Cambodians, or even the most effective. Someone mentioned broadcasting the U.S. reply over a radio frequency the Cambodians were known to be monitoring, but the secretary of state rejected the suggestion.[40]

Between 10:45 and 11:00 P.M. the crew of the *Mayaguez* boarded a U.S. destroyer from their Thai fishing boat. At exactly 10:57, as Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Ford were gathering in Kissinger's office with some domestic advisors, the second wave of aircraft were bombing Kompong Som. By 11:08 Ford had received two phone calls from Schlesinger who announced the entire *Mayaguez* crew had been recovered safely. One of Ford's political aides suggested he call Schlesinger back for another confirmation of the crew's return before announcing it on national television. While Ford was on the phone, Scowcroft asked whether there was any reason for the Pentagon not to disengage. Kissinger reportedly opined, "No, but tell them to bomb the mainland. Let's look ferocious! Otherwise they will attack us as the ship leaves."[41] At 11:50 the third group hit Kompong Som warehouse, oil refineries, and railroad yard buildings. The fourth air strike was cancelled.

In retrospect, Ford expressed surprise at the cancellation of the fourth air strike and the abortion of the first strike. In his memoirs he indicates he grudgingly accepted the Pentagon's explanation of complications with fuel supplies for the first strike's failure, but said:

> What is harder for me to understand is why the fourth air strike—and I had specifically ordered four—was never carried out. I hadn't told anyone to cancel that attack. Apparently someone had, and I was anxious to find out who had contravened my authority.[42]

[39] Ibid., 125-6.

[40] Ibid., 126.

[41] Ibid., 128-9; Scowcroft does not remember these particular words being used, but does remember the decision for another air strike.

[42] Ford, 284.

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Evidence suggests Schlesinger was responsible for the elimination of the first and last air strikes. There are three pecularities concerning the first air strike. At 8:28 P.M., after General Scowcroft told President Ford about the Cambodian broadcast, Ford ordered the first wave of aircraft to "hold off" on their bombing run. Scowcroft was explicit about the message he passed on to the military: "I called the Pentagon and said *don't call them off,* but don't release them yet.[43]

Yet, sixteen minutes later, at 8:44, and exactly one minute before the aircraft were due over target, the Pentagon ordered *all* strikes cancelled. Somewhere between Scowcroft and the pilots, the president's command to "hold off" on the air strikes was transformed into "cancel all strikes." It is possible the message was accidentally garbled in transit and misunderstood. However, when Scowcroft called Schlesinger back at 8:47 to order the attacks resumed, Schlesinger did not mention that the first strike had been aborted. Instead he called the White House back a few minutes later with the duplicitous message, "First strike *completed.*"[44] Secondly, at the time of the first air strike the *Coral Sea* was 185 miles from Kompong Som. Since A-6 Intruders and F-4 Phantoms have a combat radius range of 300 and 520 miles respectively, the low fuel supply explanation is not convincing, especially since the *Coral Sea* was continuing to close the distance. Finally, steps had been taken to ensure that the first strike group would never hit its target anyway, thus rendering possible complications with fuel supplies and communications irrelevant. Unknown to the president, the planes had been assigned the mission of "armed reconnaissance" and were "not to expend ordinance unless attacked."[45]

Evidence also supports President Ford's and General Scowcroft's belief that Schlesinger was responsible for the elimination of the final bombing run.[46] Sometime after 11:44 P.M. President Ford made two phone calls to members of Congress.[47] Later, he called Schlesinger, and on Kissinger's suggestion, ordered the secretary of defense to proceed with the final air strike. Since Schlesinger had already passed along orders at 11:44 P.M. for the third group of aircraft to strike Kompong Som, which they did at 11:50, it seems assured that the president's order for one last strike came *after* the completion of the third strike. Therefore, it appears likely that Schlesinger just decided to consider the third strike he had recently authorized to be the final strike the president ordered. If the president's irritation over the cancellation of the fourth air strike could have been cleared up with a simple explanation of confused time sequences, Schlesinger presumably would have done so and mollified his commander-in-chief. But ac-

[43] Scowcroft interview. (Emphasis added.)

[44] Ford, 282; Scowcroft interview.

[45] Head, Short, and McFarlane, 302, n. 20. (Emphasis added.) Human reconnaissance at 6,000 feet is difficult and there was no time for film development and assessment in cyclic air operations. Besides, RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft had already photographed the targets on the mainland, and Cambodia's air force was virtually nonexistent.

[46] Scowcroft interview; Ford, 284.

[47] Rowan, 219.

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cording to Ford, he was continually frustrated in his attempt to wrest an explanation from the Pentagon.[48]

Schlesinger was not alone in manipulating the outcome of the crisis. Kissinger apparently decided to keep a possible diplomatic option secret from the National Security Council. Ten hours before the final NSC meeting, Kissinger received word from an American embassy in the Middle East that the Chinese were using their influence to obtain the release of the crew and were expecting success shortly.[49] Rather than pass this information along to the NCS at its last meeting, Kissinger pushed even harder for the soonest-possible military response. Afterwards, both Kissinger and state department personnel told reporters and congressional investigators that there were:

> . . . no known diplomatic responses or initiatives carried out by Cambodia, the Chinese, or anyone else with regard to the seizure of the Mayaguez.[50]

The Correlation Between Precrisis Beliefs and Crisis Behavior

Secretary Kissinger's role in the crisis demonstrates the most detailed correlation between behavior and beliefs. He predicted the United States was going to be tested in an international crisis, probably by the North Koreans. He feared America would lack the will to respond. When he heard the news of the *Mayaguez*'s seizure, he moved quickly to convince Ford of the situation's seriousness and argued forcefully in the first NSC meeting for a demonstrative military response. He went to Kansas City buoyant, publicly predicting a quick and firm American reaction.

Kissinger stifled a plan to give the Cambodians a deadline that might have delayed operations, and he argued for the earliest military response possible, including B-52 strikes. Under his leadership the State Department responded slowly in seeking diplomatic solutions through the United Nations, and Kis-

[48] Ford, 284.

[49] While there is no proof that it was China working to secure the release of the *Mayaguez* crew, there is little doubt on the matter. Consider this excerpt from the GAO report:

> Little weight appears to have been given to a report almost 14 hours before the Marine assault, from a U.S. Embassy in a Middle Eastern country that a third-country official had learned from a senior (security deletion) diplomat that his government was using its influence with Cambodia and expected the Mayaguez to be released soon . . . The Department of State commented that this was an unevaluated report of questionable validity *and that it contradicted the (security deletion) Washington to relay a message from the U.S. Government to the Cambodians.* We found no evidence that the Department attempted to verify this report. (Emphasis added.)

The only country to refuse to relay a message from the United States government to the Cambodians in Washington was China. (U.S. Congress, *The Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 4, 69.) On this general point, neither William Colby nor Brent Scowcroft recalled any information about a possible diplomatic initiative from the Middle East. They both added, however, that they were not saying it was never mentioned, just that they did not remember it. Scowcroft interview; and William Colby, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 4 February 1980.

[50] U.S. Congress, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 2, 246.

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singer himself ignored direct communication with the Cambodians in favor of using the slower and less effective international news media. In order not to disrupt plans for a military response, he isolated the National Security Council from the news that the Chinese expected the crew to be released soon. He constantly briefed and guided the President, at one point convincing him to launch another air strike even though the crew had been safely returned. Kissinger prevented a repeat of what he considered an inept handling of the EC-121 crisis and he was ecstatic with the results. Not only had he signaled American determination to a doubting world and belligerent North Korea, he also reaped the bonus of the safe recovery of the crew: unanimous domestic support and a boost in Ford's sagging political fortunes, both of which strengthened Kissingers's hand in the international arena.

Schlesinger's behavior also consistently reflected his belief system. He favored a strong but proportionate military response. He believed a disproportionate response would undermine American credibility. He desired a surgical operation that would be as impressive for its finesse as for its force. He was particularly upset over the plans to use B-52s and believed any air strikes would constitute overkill, fostering an image of a blundering America lashing out indiscriminately. It seems he felt strongly enough about the air strikes to prevent two from occurring.

Unlike Schlesinger, General Scowcroft shared Kissinger's reluctance to take chances on calculating "with fine precision the absolute minimum of force." He supported the B-52 strikes and was especially determined to prevent a recurrence of the *Pueblo* which would have exacerbated the post-Vietnam image of American impotency:

> What we were trying to do in the *Mayaguez* was prevent *that* from happening; prevent the ship and especially the crew from being spirited away somewhere, where we'd certainly lose the possibility of rescuing them, and then be subject to the kind of humiliations that we were with the *Pueblo* and appear powerless.[51]

Consistent with these ruminations, Scowcroft worked with sedulous determination to prevent the Cambodians from delivering the United States a gratuitous humiliation, primarily by way of his advice to President Ford. But at one point, pressured by time constraints, he took direct action by ordering American jets into the air to prevent the *Mayaguez* from reaching the mainland, and then went to the president for his authorization.

After the significance of the situation was brought to Ford's attention, he displayed a consistent preference for a military response. Yet he was the least opinionated and most flexible of the key decision makers on the details of crisis management. His decisions on interdiction efforts, the quarantine of the *Mayaguez*, the resumption of delayed air strikes, and the cancellation of plans for an ultimatum all seemed predicated on or initiated by the advice of other key

[51] Scowcroft interview. (Emphasis added.)

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decision makers. When his advisors disagreed, as Kissinger did with the JCS over the timetable for military operations and with Schlesinger over air strikes, Ford chose the middle road. The attack was not moved up any further, but neither was it delayed; the B-52s would not be used, but tactical aircraft would. After the crisis, he conceded his role was primarily that of arbitrator between determined personalities; but Ford also realized the final decisions were his, and when made, they reflected his concern with deteriorating American credibility.

The belief systems of the four key decision makers serve as signposts for identifying "communication strategies" in post crisis explanations. Ford, Kissinger, and Schlesinger all maintained that the use of force was solely designed to rescue the ship and crew. When asked if international credibility was a prime impetus behind the forceful response, Kissinger replied absolutely not. When asked about the late air strike, he said it was necessary to protect the Marines still fighting on Tang Island.[52] Ford's explanations mirrored Kissinger's, but Schlesinger added some variety by claiming the military response was necessary to reaffirm a commitment to the freedom of the seas, international order, and civilized communication.[53]

Both Schlesinger and Kissinger did admit to recognizing certain serendipitous results of the crisis. Kissinger claimed the crisis proved:

> . . . that there are limits beyond which the United States cannot be pushed and that the United States is prepared to defend those interests and that it can get public support and congressional support for those actions.[54]

Schlesinger agreed: the episode should help "dispel any illusions about America in a post-Vietnam period," and help other nations realize United States' "commitments elsewhere would be observed."[55]

Schlesinger's concern that the United States appear controlled and not blindly indiscriminate also surfaced in his public statements. He said the American crisis reaction represented a "firm and measured response to the highhanded and crude use of force."[56] He thought it compared favorably with:

> . . . the period before the summer of 1973 [not incidentally, when he became Secretary of Defense] when we were running a thousand, approximately, B-52 sorties a month and several thousand tactical air sorties. This was a very prudent use of force.[57]

Five years passed before a key decision maker set the record straight. General Scowcroft summarized American objectives with the following statement:

> . . . as we saw it at the time, [the paramount objective] was to make it clear, to everyone, to our friends, to potential opponents, that notwithstanding the fact that we had just

[52] *Department of State Bulletin*, 9 June 1975, 755; U.S. Congress, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 1, 97.

[53] U.S. Congress, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 1, 78, 130.

[54] *Department of State Bulletin*, 9 June 1975, 757.

[55] U.S. Congress, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 1, 110.

[56] Ibid., 78.

[57] Ibid., 107.

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withdrawn from Southeast Asia under fairly ignominious circumstances, if you will, that the United States understood its interests and was prepared to protect them.[58]

He also added:

. . . to the extent that we were looking anywhere specifically, it was primarily probably not Southeast Asia at that time, but at Korea. . .[59]

And when asked about the air strikes, his answer was again unimpeachable:

Frankly, we argued the strikes on the mainland as militarily justified and theoretically, of course, we struck targets that would have aided them [the Cambodians] in the operation. In fact it was a demonstration—a punitive strike.[60]

Correcting Previous Explanations of American Behavior

The Belief System perspective dispels some previous assumptions and explanations concerning the crisis: the assessment of the American response as primarily a rescue mission;[61] the suggestion that decision makers, in the wake of an ignominious withdrawal from Indochina, were motivated by the desire for a vicarious experience of brutality;[62] the partisan criticism that President Ford seized the opportunity to use force in order to enhance his popularity and political standing;[63] and the argument that decisions were the result of misperception and information shortage.[64] A recent comparative study on American rescue operations that includes the case of the *Mayaguez* illustrates the importance of thorough case studies as a foundation for comparative research. Confidence in this study is severely constrained by the fact that the American response in the *Mayaguez* crisis was essentially a punitive action and not a rescue attempt. The argument that the American response stemmed from the personal frustrations over Indochina of American decision makers misses the mark by ignoring the relative restraint of Schlesinger and Ford and the strategic reasoning of Kissinger and Scowcroft, particularly their concern about North Korea. The argument that Ford used the crisis for political advantage is an argument from effect to intent, which, when analyzed, only supports the strength of the Belief System explanation.

Contrary to periods of crisis in the past, when the public instinctively rallied to popular presidents, Vietnam and Watergate had brought respect for the presi-

[58] Scowcroft interview.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Michael C. Ryan, "Combat Rescue Operations," in *The Future of Conflict in the 1980s*, William J. Taylor and Steven A. Maaranen, eds. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982).

[62] Lucy Komisar, "You Won't Have Uncle Sam to Kick Around Anymore," *New York Times*, 30 June 1975.

[63] William Shawcross, "Making the Most of Mayaguez," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 88 (30 May 1975).

[64] Charles F. Bennett, "The Mayaguez Re-examined: Misperceptions in an Information Shortage," *Fletcher Forum*, 1 (Fall 1976): 15–31.

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dency to an all time low. Another example of ineptitude and failure was not likely to elicit much sympathy. The only hope for public plaudits rested in the successful rescue of the ship and crew, the president's publicly stated objective. The odds against such a success were overwhelming. Ford and Kissinger knew (and later admitted publicly they believed) at least part of the crew was probably on the mainland. They knew the Khmer Rouge had proven resistant to coercion by bombing in the past and recognized the danger of killing the people they were supposedly trying to rescue. They were relatively sure of recovering the ship, but retaking the ship and sacrificing the crew to death or incarceration could not have been thought a likely impetus for public acclaim. Even before taking the action, major newspapers and congressmen were advocating restraint, and Ford knew he could count on their berating him in the event of failure. In short, the president was prepared for denunciation and conceded as much after the crisis when he said he had known the odds for success were unfavorable.

The claim that the American response was a result of information shortage and misperception is based on the assumption that the goal of the United States was to prevent a reenactment of the *Pueblo* incident and that the Cambodians had no hostile intentions. This implies that if somehow the United States had had enough information and had correctly assessed Cambodian intentions, the crisis could have been avoided. There are several problems with this assertion. First, as Kissinger noted later, Cambodian intentions were irrelevant because they were highly questionable, and under the circumstances American decision makers at that time believed the United States could not afford to tolerate or take chances on another American humilation, which the Cambodians were capable of delivering. Second, as the Belief System analysis revealed, American military actions were clearly intended to be remedial as well as preventative, further minimizing the importance of Cambodian intentions from the American point of view. Finally, a cursory review of Cambodian and North Korean behavior (respectively the catalyst and the major intended beneficiary of the American demonstration of force) suggests that these two countries were likely candidates for hostile acts against U.S. interests. American concerns did not constitute a misperception.

Tension on the Korean peninsula was rising steadily in the spring of 1975. In early April the South Koreans were busy locating and destroying tunnels the North Koreans were furiously digging under the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Later that month, North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung was in the People's Republic of China, from whence he called on the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea if it really wanted peace. William Colby, the man responsible for providing the NSC with intelligence estimates, remembers Kim Il Sung's trip to China well:

> . . . Kim Il Sung trotted over to Peking and he was obviously trying to drum up trade for an attack in Korea . . . The fact is, he thought, the Americans are weak, I can take advantage, why don't I do it, all I need is support from my big sponsors.[65]

[65] Colby interview.

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South Korean President Park Chung Hee predicted an invasion before the year was out. Park had a reputation for crying wolf when it suited domestic political needs, but the normally reticent Japanese were voicing identical concerns. American decision makers would have been remiss if they had not been concerned about possible North Korean aggression.

Was the danger of another *Pueblo* imminent? This apprehension has been dismissed in the past by observers who have portrayed the Cambodians as bewildered victims, but evidence supports a different conclusion. Congressional testimony by Captain Charles T. Miller of the *Mayaguez* left no doubt that once it became apparent the ship and crew were American, the Cambodians were directed from central authorities in Phnom Penh by radio communications.[66] Phnom Penh was in contact with Secretary-General Waldheim and was well aware that the American prisoners were the cause of the U.S. military presence. Nevertheless, the Cambodians made determined efforts to transport the crew to the mainland, ignoring the ship and its contents, but frequently accusing the crew of spying. In addition, Miller leaves no doubt but that the crew members were released (on a Thai boat which, along with its Thai crew, had been held for five months) because of the U.S. military presence. Miller asserts that the Cambodians were openly terrified by American warplanes and only began negotiating with him once the planes appeared over the mainland. Cambodian behavior must be interpreted through a hypothetical Rational Actor perspective, but it can at least be said with confidence that the Cambodians were quite capable of holding the crew hostage, and by no means were they simply innocent bystanders.

Finally, there are two studies of the *Mayaguez* crisis which stand out for thoroughness, access to primary information, and as examples of how analysis can err when due attention is not given to theory. The General Accounting Office study which immediately followed the crisis suffered a common fate of case studies—it produced an abundance of information and observations but no explanation. The second study, the most recent and authoritative examination of the crisis to date, employs a descriptive model and abjures responsibility for explaining the relationship among the diverse variables it utilizes.[67] However, the study and its model even fail to describe the crisis decision making process accurately, and, therefore, parts of the implicit explanation for crisis behavior which creep into the study's conclusion are not adequate either.[68]

Most basically, the study does not demonstrate the punitive nature of the air strikes, nor does it reveal the invasion of Tang Island for the near catastrophe it was. It misses Kissinger's and Schlesinger's manipulation of the decision making process and ignores their feuding. More importantly, the study concludes that President Ford was the principal and dynamic crisis manager, while quite the contrary was true. Finally, it misidentifies some beliefs of Ford's which allegedly guided his management of the crisis. The study claims that Ford en-

[66] U.S. Congress, *Seizure of the Mayaguez*, pt. 2, 190–1, 194, 199, 208, 217–18, 250.

[67] See Head, Short, and McFarlane, 33, 70–81.

[68] On the following points concerning the Crisis Resolution study, see ibid., 28, 177, 223, 243.

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tered the crisis determined that any response be consistant with American values and command broad-based public support. Yet the calculated risk of the crews' lives in order to demonstrate American power was not considered likely to elicit broad-based support because the success of the rescue was not likely. In this same vein, the study concludes that President Ford's belief system included the belief that the American people would demand a response that was successful and reflected firmness without being excessive. But as Ford has said publicly, he knew the odds of success were against him and they were. While what constitutes excessive military force is debatable, the only decision to limit force was Ford's decision to cancel the B-52 strikes, a decision Ford says turned on the commentary of the White House photographer. The authors' privileged access to NSC minutes and members may have helped skew their analysis. Without the comparative model approach which imposes a degree of objectivity by forcing consideration of different explanatory variables, the authors ultimately relied on their intuitive understanding of decision making in the crisis. Being close observers of this process, their perceptions were understandably biased and their descriptive model simply served as a pool of variables from which their intuitive critique of the crisis could be constructed.

Comparative Utility of Decision-Making Models

The question remains, however, as to why the Belief System analysis provides a better explanation of American behavior than either the Rational Actor or Bureaucratic Politics models. Clearly, a bureaucratic politics explanation would have more effectively anticipated the political infighting between Schlesinger and Kissinger during the crisis. The feud spilled over into the aftermath of the crisis also. When criticism began to mount, Schlesinger leaked the news that Kissinger urged the use of B-52s, while he had cautioned restraint. This raised Kissinger's ire, and he protested to reporters: " . . . a president must be able to look at all options without having someone reveal the alternatives in order to take credit for preventing them from being implemented."[69]

Still, a bureaucratic politics explanation of the *Mayaguez* crisis would be unsatisfactory because it predicts policy positions from the decision makers' bureaucratic backgrounds. One bureaucratic politics analyst, Morton Halperin, has assessed the military as chary of using limited force: if called upon to act, the military prefer a minimum of restraint.[70] This contradicts the behavior of the JCS and secretary of defense in the *Mayaguez* crisis, where they supported the use of force but in a restrained manner, while the secretary of state, the nation's chief diplomat, argued for strong and quick military action. In fact, the belief

[69] Stone.

[70] Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 60–62.

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systems of key decision makers appeared to have more influence on their respective bureaucracies than vice versa. The JCS sided with Schlesinger in the B-52 debate and cooperated with his detailed handling of military operations; the State Department operated as a virtual appendage of Kissinger's belief system. For example, the following State Department official's remark—"We know what we have to do, we just have to wait for the means to do it to arrive on the scene"—perfectly reflected Kissinger's preferences but not at all the institutional proclivities of the diplomatic bureaucracy.[71]

In summary, this study supports conclusions reached by several previous research efforts: " . . . the bureaucratic politics paradigm is useful in crisis studies mainly for its account of the bargaining *process* (when such bargaining does occur), not for its explanation of why people's attitudes differ."[72] Rather than avoiding this evidence of the model's limited applicability and confusing it by adding additional and inconsistent variables such as "shared values," decision making theorists should welcome this knowledge as theoretical progress and continue to explore the range of the model's utility.

Since the basic decision to respond with force was reached with unanimity, based on geopolitical rationale, and not marred by any major misperception concerning the nature of the circumstances surrounding the event, a Rational Actor model might seem sufficient for explaining U.S. behavior. It is not. Certainly each individual's behavior and apparent motives reflected a basic means-end chain, and no subconscious impulses were evident in any of the decision makers' statements or behavior. Yet the decision-making process during the crisis was too far removed from the pure end of the rationality spectrum, a distinguishing feature of the Rational Actor model. Among other things, the decision makers were unable to see that some of the decisions they supported ran the heavy risk of working against, instead of toward, their objectives.

More than anything else, Kissinger wanted a convincing demonstration of American power. But by relentlessly pushing for the use of force and overriding JCS reservations about the need for more time, he almost produced the antithesis of his affective concepts: an unmitigated military disaster. Similarly, Schlesinger was concerned with a strong but proportionate use of force, but by working against the air strikes, which proved to be both the impetus for the release of the crew and the margin of victory in any assessment of which side took the worst beating, Schlesinger almost produced the antithesis of his affective concepts: a failure due to disproportionate (insufficient) use of force.

[71] *Newsweek*, 19 May 1975, 20.

[72] See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bureaucracy, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 512; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 26–28; Glen Stassen, "Individual Preference Versus Role-Restraint in Policy Making," *World Politics* 25 (October 1972); and Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), 276.

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Second, the nation-state level of analysis (unitary actor) of the Rational Actor model would preclude any understanding of the impact of individuals on the outcome of the crisis. One can only speculate on how the news from the Middle East would have affected National Security Council deliberations, or how completion of the first bombing run would have affected Cambodian behavior. But it is quite conceivable that in the first instance, operations might have been postponed (a problem Kissinger recognized as similar to the effect of issuing an ultimatum), and that in the second, the Cambodians might have killed the crew in retaliation and blamed the crew's deaths on American bombs (an objective at least some of the crew suspected of the Cambodians). Finally, a rational actor analysis would suffer from an inability to discriminate between competing rational actor explanations. Credible cases have been made for a number of rational actor hypotheses on the *Mayaguez* crisis, including parts of the explanation presented here by belief system analysis, as well as others, such as the contention that the United States was trying to prevent CIA material claimed to be aboard the *Mayaguez* from falling into enemy hands.

In the case of the *Mayaguez* crisis, for two reasons the belief system explanation is the most satisfactory from the viewpoint of theory. First, it demonstrated how different beliefs among the decision makers influenced the details and perhaps the overall response in the crisis. Second, even though the four key decision makers shared core beliefs about American interests and the nature of the current international environment, these beliefs were not a function of the environment but were indigenous to the decision makers. In other words, there is every reason to suspect that if decision makers with different belief systems had inhabited the White House in 1975, the outcome of the *Mayaguez* crisis would have been decidedly different. Three examples may be cited to support this assertion.

The American experience in Vietnam produced a schism between the belief systems of two groups of American leaders.[73] Those who supported the war effort (strongly or ambivalently) believed the "lessons of Vietnam" included a validation of the domino theory and the necessity of honoring alliance commitments. The other group, critics of the war effort, believed Vietnam illustrated the need for the United States to scale down its international role and work on enlisting the cooperation of the United Nations. This chasm of beliefs was reflected even before the crisis. The "credibility argument" was seriously debated between the White House and bipartisan congressional leadership in the conflict over continuing aid to Indochina, and in essence was rejected when Congress summarily cut off the aid. Years later, the same issue represented the essence of the public controversy over President Carter's intention to withdraw American troops from Korea. There is little doubt that decision makers with the second set of beliefs would have reacted to the seizure of the *Mayaguez* differently.

[73] Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," *World Politics* 32 (October 1979).

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The *Pueblo* and Iranian hostage crises provide two similar scenarios for comparison of belief systems and their effect on decision making. One informed account of the National Security Council decision process in the *Pueblo* incident claims the American response turned on the argument of then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. Clifford suggested his colleagues should stop asking, "What have we got to hit them with?" and ask, "What are this country's objectives?" Clifford argued the primary objective should be the safe return of the crew and not teaching the North Koreans a lesson. Clifford supposedly convinced President Lyndon Johnson, and military options were abandoned.[74] Clifford's priorities were diametrically opposed to those of the key decision makers in the *Mayaguez* crisis, and consistently, he thoroughly criticized the Ford administration's response to the seizure of the *Mayaguez*.[75]

The hostage dilemma in Iran revealed a president torn between two advisors with very different belief systems. Up until the time the American embassy was seized in Iran, President Jimmy Carter's success at finding peaceful solutions to international conflict (for example, the Panama Canal Treaty and the Camp David Accords) had the greatest effect on his still nascent foreign policy belief system. He proudly pointed out repeatedly that no United States servicemen had died in combat under his administration. Not surprisingly, he initially followed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's recommendations for diplomatic solutions. Only when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan—a "revelation" to Carter—and American embassies in Libya and Pakistan were sacked and burned (with the loss of one Marine's life) did National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski find his beliefs on the ascent in the White House. The result was Carter's decision to authorize military rescue operations, followed by Vance's resignation—dramatic evidence of the conflict between Vance's and Brzezinski's belief systems, which, along with Carter's flexibility, demonstrates the significance of different individuals in the decision making process.

Decision-making analysts must not be misled by the fact that decision makers often *feel* compelled to act in a certain way. The four key decision makers in the *Mayaguez* crisis all felt compelled to act, and act quickly.[76] But different decision makers could have felt just as compelled to act and acted differently. The only appropriate—if less than completely satisfactory—manner of testing external variables is to consider whether or not all decision makers confronted with the same circumstances would behave similarly. This is a difficult test to ad-

[74] Trevor Armbrister, *A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 259.

[75] *New York Times*, 21 May 1975.

[76] According to William Colby there was a high degree of consonance on the need to do something: "anything was better than nothing." He remembers Ford as being "convinced that we could not sit idly and just sort of wring our hands about this ship being taken from us." Scowcroft agrees: "Whether we were right or wrong, we felt impelled to move quickly . . . " Ford felt the same too. He recalled, "I was having thoughts like this: if I had done nothing the consequences would be very, very bad, not only in failing to meet the problem, but the implications on a broader international scale." (Colby and Scowcroft interviews. Ford quoted in Head, Short, and McFarlane, 117–18).

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minister, for history makes a notoriously bad laboratory. All an analyst can do is attempt to demonstrate that decision makers who held different beliefs most likely would have acted differently in the *Mayaguez* crisis and that historical examples suggest different belief systems have produced different behavior in similar crises.

Conclusions

With respect to using models as comparative research tools, the task of the decision making analyst is to sort the extraneous from the critical. Never able to *prove* causation, the analyst must establish a convincing case for correlation. In the case of the *Mayaguez* crisis, the correlation between beliefs and behavior was compelling. At no point in the crisis did decision makers act so as to violate their immediate precrisis beliefs and attitudes, and at every step in the decision making process they were apparently motivated by those beliefs. The belief system perspective successfully revealed the origins of the American behavior, explained the differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger, and differentiated postcrisis communication strategies promulgated for public consumption from the true objectives of the decision makers. In addition, this study, while making no pretense of having explored the decision makers' belief systems in depth, can and has made a contribution to such studies which undertake that task, for example, operational code studies where " . . . references about various aspects of an actor's operational code are possible from case studies of his behavior in particular situations."[77]

The belief systems approach has both methodological and theoretical limitations. The methodological limitations are obvious and endemic to all social science inquiry into the existence and origins of human beliefs and values. The theoretical limitations of the approach remain undetermined. One is forced to ask, using Karl Deutsch's graphic metaphor, to what extent a decision maker's behavior resembles the bullet, driven along a path by past beliefs and attitudes, or the piece of driftwood, awash in a sea of spontaneity.[78] In the case of the four decision makers who controlled U.S. behavior in the *Mayaguez* crisis, it was much more the case of the bullet. However, one can easily imagine variables external to the decision makers which would have constrained the American response in the crisis regardless of who inhabited the White House—for example, if the opponent had been a nuclear power or if there had been no American forces available for use. Identifying factors which are capable of stopping, slowing, or shifting the trajectory of the bullet will help define the limits of the Belief System model's utility, just as this and other studies have helped define the limits of the Bureaucratic Politics and Rational Actor models.

[77] George, 222; also see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[78] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1953), 168.

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Who Were the Stalwarts? Who Were Their Rivals? Republican Factions in the Gilded Age

ALLAN PESKIN

The years from Reconstruction to the Spanish-American War, the so-called Gilded Age, were a golden age of political partisanship. Crossover voting was rare; "independents" were scorned. To a degree unmatched since, party loyalty was a test of manhood; partisan allegiance represented a means of self-identification. To be a Republican or to be a Democrat—these were not lightly-made decisions but were shaped by self-interest, ethnicity, and, above all, history, most notably the polarizing trauma of the Civil War.

Such passionately-held partisanship did not guarantee party unity. Quite the contrary; the very importance of parties as institutions intensified the internal struggle to control the party's machinery and shape its program. Yet, at the same time, the political imperatives of an era characterized by high voter turnout, straight ticket voting, and close national elections dictated a strategy of mobilizing one's own adherents rather than persuading the unpersuaded. Since one disgruntled faction could deprive the national ticket of victory by sitting on its hands, party managers were compelled to devote the bulk of their energies to securing party unity and enthusiasm. In the voluminous correspondence of James A. Garfield during the presidential campaign of 1880, for example, there is scarcely any mention of the Democrats, but considerable attention is paid to

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the activities of fellow Republicans.[1] Garfield devoted much more effort to placating Republican rivals such as Roscoe Conkling than to confronting his Democratic opponent, Winfield Scott Hancock.

Such concern was not misplaced. In every presidential election from 1872 to 1884 the Republican party had either split or threatened to split along factional lines. Curiously enough, the precise nature of Republican factionalism has never been rigorously explored.[2] The Democratic and Republican parties themselves have recently been the object of a massive historical scrutiny which has shattered the easy traditional view that parties in the Gilded Age were meaningless, flatulent, and indistinguishable.[3] Yet the persistent intraparty factionalism, which absorbed so much contemporary political energy, is still treated as an amusing but incomprehensible clash of personalities, with petulant political prima donnas maneuvering for petty, and presumably corrupt, prerogatives. Historians are all too ready to second the shallow analysis of Senator Henry L. Dawes that Conkling's quarrel with Garfield represented nothing more than "a great big baby boohooing because he can't have all the cake. . . ."[4]

Unexamined assumptions and loose terminology litter the standard textbook treatments of Republican factionalism during the Gilded Age. In these texts the Republicans are usually divided into rival groups called "Stalwarts" and "Half-Breeds." "Stalwarts" are described as those "taking their orders from New York's imperious Roscoe Conkling."[5] Their ranks included such other powerful senators as John Logan of Illinois and Donald Cameron of Pennsylvania. They are characterized as "all-out believers in party regularity and the bloody shirt,"[6] cynical machine politicians, hungry for office, and hostile to reform.

"Half-Breeds," it is claimed, "followed paths blazed by James G. Blaine" of Maine.[7] Among their number are variously included Rutherford B. Hayes, John

[1] See the volumes of incoming and outgoing correspondence in the James Abram Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The entire collection is also available on 177 reels of microfilm as part of the President's Papers Series.

[2] Two studies of uneven merit and limited circulation have addressed the problem of Republican factionalism in recent years. William G. Eidson in "Who Were the Stalwarts?" *Mid-America*, 52 (October 1970) limits his investigation to a handful of senators. Vivian B. Schrack's 1968 Pennsylvania State University dissertation, "A Search for the 'Half-Breeds'," quite correctly assesses the significance, or rather the lack of significance, of that term, but after this promising beginning drifts into a narrative of familiar events.

[3] An excellent analysis of new trends in Gilded Age scholarship can be found in Vincent P. De Santis, "The Political Life of the Gilded Age: A Review of the Recent Literature," *The History Teacher*, 9 (November 1975): 73–106. For a thoughtful discussion of the "new" political history, see Richard L. McCormick, "The Party Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory Hypothesis," *Journal of American History*, 66 (September 1979): 279–98.

[4] H.L. Dawes to his wife, May 16, 1881, Henry L. Dawes Papers, Library of Congress.

[5] Bernard Bailyn, David Brion Davis, et al., *The Great Republic* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1981), 626.

[6] Charles Sellers, Henry May, and Neil R. McMillen, *A Synopsis of American History* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 216.

[7] Bailyn et al., 626.

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Sherman, and James A. Garfield, all from Ohio, George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts, and Benjamin Harrison of Indiana. Although some texts discern marginal distinctions between the two groups of Republicans on such matters as Southern policy and, perhaps, civil service reform, the general agreement seems to be that "these factions reflected personal loyalties and alliances rather than significant differences of opinion and principle."[8] Their quarrels were over patronage rather than policies; their differentiation was a matter of style rather than substance. Both groups were spoilsmen but the Half-Breeds seemed to have been more genteel in their pursuit of office—less "blatant" is the term favored by at least three textbook authors.[9]

In short, the consensus seems to be that Republican factional strife was a loud but empty battle between the friends of Conkling ("Stalwarts") and the friends of Blaine ("Half-Breeds").[10] Yet this simple picture is clouded by complications. Matthew Josephson, for example, lists Blaine among the Stalwarts, and a more recent study excluded Conkling from that group.[11] The utility of such an imprecise scheme of classification seems open to doubt.

Part of the problem lies in the terminology employed. The label "Half-Breed" is particularly suspect. Blaine himself did not call his allies "Half-Breeds." Unburdened by false modesty, he preferred to call them "the Blaine Section."[12] Although political mavericks had been sneered at as "half-breeds" intermittently since the 1840s,[13] the term seems to have acquired a specific context early in 1881. New York, that fertile breeding ground of political slang, the state that gave to the language Loco-foco, Hunker, and Barnburner, resuscitated "Half-Breed" to characterize "a Republican who is dissatisfied with the Conkling Machine and acts against it,"[14] particularly in the senatorial contests held at Albany of that year. It was then regarded as a neologism: in June 1881 *The Nation* thought the

[8] C. Vann Woodward in *The National Experience* by John M. Blum, Edmund Morgan, et al. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), 498. As consultant for this section of the textbook, I too must plead guilty to perpetuating this interpretation.

[9] John A. Garraty, *The New Commonwealth, 1877–1890* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 238; Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, Frank Friedel, *The Essentials of American History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, n.d.), 231; Sellers, May, and McMillen, 216.

[10] There are some notable exceptions. *The Democratic Experience* by Carl N. Degler, Thomas C. Cochran, et al. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1981) contains a long and sophisticated chapter on the politics of the Gilded Age by Vincent De Santis in which the term "Half-Breeds" is not used and Stalwarts are only briefly mentioned within the context of the Republican National Convention of 1880. Irwin Unger in *These United States* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978) is equally cautious in avoiding these terms. Both Unger and De Santis are specialists in the political history of the Gilded Age.

[11] Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos, 1865–1896* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1963 reprint of the 1938 edition), 90; Eidson, "Who Were the Stalwarts?", 244.

[12] James G. Blaine to James A. Garfield, 16 December 1880, typed copy, James Abram Garfield Papers, Library of Congress.

[13] See Hans Sperber and Travis Trittschub, *American Political Terms, An Historical Dictionary* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), 183–85.

[14] *The Nation*, 16 June 1881.

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phrase an amusing novelty.[15] Its application at first was strictly local[16] and its life span was brief. By 1882 it was observed that "the terms of 'Half-Breeds' and 'Stalwarts' are passing into comparative disuse,"[17] and by 1884 the *New York Tribune* was ready to consign both terms to "the lumber-room of political history."[18]

Many years later, historians seized upon "Half-Breed," a hitherto obscure term originating as an insulting put-down of the anti-Conklingites in New York state, and applied it indiscriminately to a wing of the national Republican party. In so doing, these historians created the illusion that the Republican party was composed of two symmetrical, well organized, identifiable factions when, in fact, the groupings were much less formal and far more fluid. What sort of faction could contain both Hayes and Blaine, who were not even on speaking terms after 1877? Or encompass Blaine and Sherman, who carried on an intense, bitter rivalry for the presidential nomination for over a decade?

A somewhat better case can be made for the Stalwarts as an identifiable group. Yet even here confusion abounds. Oddly enough, the phrase "Stalwart Republican" was first given currency by Blaine, who used it to commend those who stood steadfast for maintaining Reconstruction in the South.[19] By 1880, however, "Stalwart" had metamorphosed from an adjective into a noun. In this new usage, as *The Nation* observed, "all reference to the South has dropped out of the term,"[20] and it had been appropriated by Blaine's rivals.

Unlike the so-called Half-Breeds, these self-styled Stalwarts[21] did constitute in 1880 a coherent, organized group with recognized leaders and common goals. To Blaine they were "all the desperate bad men of the party, bent on loot and booty,"[22] but their immediate goal was actually far less sinister: they wanted to nominate Ulysses S. Grant for a third term as President of the United States. It was this purpose which brought them together and gave the faction whatever unity it possessed. To the astute political editor Murat Halstead, the Stalwarts were merely "the minority crowd at the Chicago National Convention of 1880" who voted for Grant.[23] If the Stalwarts and their rivals are to be found at all, that convention is the place to seek them.

[15] Ibid.

[16] All the 1880s references to "Half-Breeds" cited in Sperber and Trittschub are taken from New York.

[17] Ibid., 485.

[18] *New York Tribune*, 3 January 1884, cited in Eidson, 261.

[19] Eidson, 235-36.

[20] *The Nation*, 16 June 1881.

[21] "Stalwarts" was only one of the terms which members of the faction used to describe themselves. They also called themselves variously: The Grant Element; The Old Guard; and, after the convention of 1880, The 306. See William Henry Calkins to James A. Garfield, 25 December 1880. Garfield Papers.

[22] James G. Blaine to James A. Garfield, 16 December 1880, typed copy, Garfield Papers.

[23] *Cincinnati Commercial*, 6 January 1882, cited in Schrack, "Search for the 'Half-Breeds'," 6.

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Folklore has it that nineteenth century political conventions were stage-managed by cigar-chomping bosses who cynically made and unmade presidents in smoke-filled hotel rooms. In practice, these conventions were surprisingly responsive to grass-roots party sentiment. Although some state delegations, particularly in the South, were hand picked by the machine, in other states, most notably in the Midwest, the delegates were the end product of a chain of township, district, and state meetings which provided for substantial public participation even in the absence of the partisan primary election. These delegates could lay claim to being a representative cross section of the active elements of the Republican party. An analysis of their ranks provides an opportunity to peer beneath the top levels of leadership and sketch a group portrait of Gilded Age Republicans.

Over 750 Republicans gathered in Chicago on 2 June 1880 to choose their party's standard-bearer for the forthcoming election. Each state was entitled to send two delegates for each congressional district and four more, representing the state at large. The eight organized territories plus the District of Columbia sent two delegates apiece.[24]

They met at a particularly critical time in the development of their party. Although Republicans had controlled the White House for twenty years, their hold on national power had grown increasingly precarious. In 1872 the party had been strong enough to withstand the trauma of the Liberal Republican bolt and still reelect Ulysses S. Grant with ease. After the Depression of 1873, however, the Democrats gained new strength, particularly in the large, urbanized northern states, and won control of the House of Representatives in the 1874 election. As Reconstruction in the South ran out of steam, state after state was "redeemed" for white, Democratic home rule. In both the North and the South the Democrats were rebuilding their pre-Civil War constituency and threatened to reassume control of the national government. In 1876 they came perilously close to succeeding. Their presidential candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, secured a clear majority of the popular vote but was denied victory after a complex dispute. Only Republican control of the electoral machinery in three southern states enabled them to thwart Tilden's bid; by 1880, with the total collapse of the Reconstruction experiment, Republicans could no longer count on that asset.

In 1880 the Republican party stood at a crossroads: should it reaffirm its recent past and return to Grant, or should it blaze fresh paths with new men and measures? It was a familiar quandary. Grant was, at the same time, both the most popular leader in the Republican party and its most controversial figure.

[24] Officially, the delegates numbered 756, but the actual total differed somewhat from that figure. A dispute over the credentials of the Kansas delegation was resolved by permitting ten anti-Grant Kansasans to retain their seats but allowing them to cast only six votes among them. Names and post office addresses of all the delegates and alternates can be found at the end of the *Proceedings of the Republican National Convention Held at Chicago, Illinois . . . 1880* (Chicago: J.B. Jeffery, 1881). Except for some last-minute alterations of the New York delegation this list is generally reliable.

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The only Republican from the party's inception until 1896 to be elected president with a majority of the popular vote, Grant had also torn the party apart in 1872, driving the so-called Liberal Republicans into a temporary alliance with the Democrats behind the banner of Horace Greeley. To those bolters (whose views greatly influenced subsequent historians), "Grantism" had become a synonym for corruption in government. Many other Republicans fondly looked back upon Grant's presidency for its initial firmness in upholding Reconstruction and for its loyalty to the Republican state organizations. From their point of view, the innovations made by Grant's successor, Rutherford B. Hayes, though perhaps more respectable to the "better element," had been a disaster. Southern Republicans, in particular, resented Hayes's four-year experiment with bestowing patronage upon Democrats. Some northern machine politicians feared that Hayes's mild flirtation with civil service reform might undermine their hold on the local organization. Both groups looked to Grant to restore the Grand Old Party to its good old ways.

Grant's political resurrection was not unopposed. The refusal of incumbent president Hayes to seek renomination threw the field open to a host of eager challengers, but the contest was really Grant against the field. In addition to Sherman and Blaine, that field included William Windom, Minnesota's favorite son, Elihu Washburne of Illinois and George Edmunds of Vermont. Edmunds's support came largely from the reform element of the party. Mainly from New England, his supporters were ideologically related to the Liberal Republicans of 1872 and the so-called Mugwumps who would desert the Republican party in 1884 rather than support the candidacy of Blaine, whom they regarded as corrupt. Blaine returned the sentiment, contemptuously dismissing these "Reformers by profession" as "conceited, foolish, vain . . . pretentious but not powerful."[25] In 1880, however, Blaine and the reformers, along with the supporters of the other candidates, were able to submerge their differences for the duration of the convention and forge a common front to block the return of Grantism. It was only for these few hectic days of the Chicago convention that the Republican party exhibited that pattern which it is so often portrayed as holding throughout the entire Gilded Age—that of two hostile and well-defined factions in confrontation with each other.

On the first ballot Grant received 304 votes, far more than any of his rivals and only seventy-five votes short of victory. Grant's total remained frozen near the 300 mark for over thirty ballots. Nothing testifies so vividly to the fissures that rent the Republican party as does the tenacity with which these delegates stuck to their candidate. Although there were some shifts within the anti-Grant camp, scarcely any delegates crossed the gap which separated the Stalwarts from their rivals. Finally, on the thirty-sixth ballot, the non-Stalwarts were able to

[25] James G. Blaine to James A. Garfield, 16 December 1880, typed copy, Garfield Papers.

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unite behind a dark horse, James A. Garfield, hitherto Sherman's floor manager and give him the majority needed for nomination.[26]

The Stalwarts, however, kept their ranks intact. Even on the last ballot, when they had clearly lost the struggle, they gave Grant 306 votes.[27] For years to come these "immortal 306" would annually congratulate themselves at banquets and commemorations for their fidelity. A medal was struck in their honor and distributed to each of "The Old Guard," as they proudly styled themselves.[28]

What was the cement which held this faction together so stalwartly in a losing cause? The conventional explanation is patronage pure and simple: the hope of being rewarded with the spoils of office from a friendly administration. Historians have often cited the *cri de coeur* of Texas Stalwart, Webster Flanagan: "What are we up here for?" he asked his fellow delegates. "I mean that members of the Republican party are entitled to office, and if we are victorious we will have office."[29]

If office was all he was after, Flanagan was likely to be disappointed. Few convention delegates could count on a government job in the Garfield administration no matter which side they supported at Chicago. Although Garfield died before he could submit all his government appointments to the Senate, he did nominate enough so that a pattern can be discerned. Of the 385 men Garfield nominated to fill civilian posts, only twenty-one had been delegates to the Chicago convention.[30] Approximately one delegate out of thirty-six could look forward to a share of the spoils. A veteran of Garfield's Civil War regiment (the 42nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry) or an alumnus of his colleges (Hiram in Ohio and Williams in Massachusetts) had almost as good a statistical chance to be awarded a government job as a delegate who had supported his presidential nomination.

Nor did it make much difference whether a delegate had supported or opposed him. True to his purpose of attempting to harmonize the Republican party, Garfield tried to distribute the spoils of office to all factions. Eight

[26] For the 1880 Republican convention, see the official *Proceedings* and Allan Peskin, *Garfield* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1978), 451–81.

[27] Although Grant did receive 306 votes on the final ballot of the convention, for purposes of this study I have recognized only 302 certifiable Stalwarts. This is based, with minor modifications, on the list of Grant supporters identified by Thomas Platt in *The Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt* (New York: B.W. Dodge, 1910), 188–23. Platt omits three Sherman or Blaine supporters from Virginia who quixotically switched to Grant on the last ballot. Platt also includes a Texan, Frank Harwin, whose name is not on either the official list of delegates in the *Proceedings* or any of the unofficial lists. I have not included him on my list of Stalwarts. A complete list of these Chicago Stalwarts and non-Stalwarts can be provided by the author upon request.

[28] Alfred R. Conkling, *The Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling, Orator, Statesman, Advocate* (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1889) reproduces a picture of the medal on pages 608–09.

[29] *Proceedings*, 160.

[30] *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of American, 47 Congress, special session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), XIII, 3–102.

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Chicago Stalwarts, or 2.65 percent of the total, were nominated to office, as were thirteen non-Stalwarts, or 2.96 percent of that body—a negligible difference. From this it would appear that, in 1880 at least, the spoils system was less of a motivating force in intraparty politics than it has usually been portrayed.[31] There were, of course, indirect rewards. Voting for the winning candidate at the convention might increase a politician's access to the new president, improve his status within the state party apparatus, and allow his friends to share in his luster, but it certainly was not a guarantee of tangible favors.

If lust for loot and booty (as Blaine so luridly put it) was not the Stalwarts' *raison d'etre*, what did set that group apart from other Republicans? The most immediately identifiable Stalwart characteristic was geography. Of the 306 votes recorded for Grant on the final ballot, 139 or 45.42 percent came from the former Confederate states (including Kentucky). If Grant's thirty-six votes from the loyal slaveholding border states (Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and Missouri) are included, that percentage rises to 57.19 percent of the total Stalwart strength.[32] In the forthcoming election not one of these southern states would give the Republican ticket a single electoral vote. The Republican system of apportioning convention seats according to congressional districts rather than according to party strength gave to these southern rotten boroughs (and, consequently, to the Stalwarts) greater weight in party councils than their numbers would otherwise deserve.

The other great reservoir of Stalwart strength was found in three large urbanized Northern states: New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois—the home states of the three most prominent Republican machine politicians: Conkling, Cameron, and Logan. These three states gave 111 votes to Grant on the final ballot. These votes plus those of the former slave states accounted for 93.5 percent of Grant's strength at Chicago. His remaining support was scattered, idiosyncratic, and inconsequential. New England gave Grant only four votes, all from Massachusetts. Aside from Illinois, the other four states of the Old Northwest gave Grant only two votes.[33] These were the historic centers of Republicanism and the lack of enthusiasm they displayed for Grant indicated the extent to which the Stalwarts were out of touch with the mainstream of their party.

Of the fourteen state delegations which gave Grant a majority at Chicago, only four, with a total of eighty-eight electoral votes, would support the Republican candidate in November. Garfield was well aware of this disparity. Shortly after the election he observed that the Grant element "though quite inferior as

[31] For a view that minimizes the role of patronage in a slightly earlier period, see Eric L. McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 377-83.

[32] *Proceedings*, 271.

[33] Ibid.

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an electing force was nevertheless the leading nominating force and hence passes in public estimation for more than it really is."[34]

The same disparity applied at the congressional level. In the forty-sixth Congress, which was elected in 1878, Republicans held 133 seats out of 293.[35] Forty-seven of these Republican districts sent one or more Grant delegates to the Chicago convention, which meant that only 35 percent of the currently Republican districts in the nation were represented by Stalwarts. Thirty-six of these forty-seven Stalwart districts, or 76.6 percent, were from New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. The non-Stalwart delegates, on the other hand, were sent to Chicago by 106 Republican congressional districts, or 80 percent of the Republican-controlled districts.[36] By all measures, therefore, the non-Stalwarts were more representative of the Republican party in 1880 than were their rivals.

The non-Stalwarts also represented the Republican party of the future. This can be seen by examining the political careers of the Chicago convention delegates. At one time or another in their careers, 104 of all the delegates would achieve election to the United States Congress. This congressional contingent was composed of Stalwarts and non-Stalwarts alike, in numbers roughly proportional to their strength on the convention floor, indicating that each faction was equally distinguished as far as national leadership was concerned. Forty-one Stalwarts (13.58 percent of that group) served in Washington either as congressmen, senators, or vice-presidents, while an equivalent percentage of non-Stalwarts (14.35 percent) had similar attainments. The non-Stalwarts, however, started their congressional careers later. Of the sixty-three non-Stalwart congressmen, twenty-four (38 percent) first entered congress after 1880, whereas only nine (22 percent) of the Stalwarts began their congressional careers after the Chicago convention.[37]

It would be tempting to conclude from this that the difference between the Republican factions was generational, with the Stalwarts drawn from the old-line party loyalists and the non-Stalwarts from a younger breed. This, however, was not the case. The term "Old Guard" cannot be taken in its literal sense. There was no age gap separating the factions: the median year of birth for both the Stalwart congressional contingent and their non-Stalwart counterparts was 1833, making members of both groups about forty-seven years old (on an average) at

[34] J.A. Garfield to James G. Blaine, 19 December 1880, typed copy in Letterbook, Garfield Papers.

[35] James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield. With a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860*, (Norwich, Conn.: Henry Bill, 1884), vol. 2, 708–11.

[36] Since each congressional district sent two delegates to the Chicago convention, some districts could be represented by both a Stalwart and a non-Stalwart, which explains how these figures can add up to more than one hundred percent.

[37] All data on the congressional careers of the delegates is taken from the *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).

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the time of the convention. The non-Stalwarts were not younger than their rivals; they merely bloomed later.

A handful of the Chicago delegates from both factions had sat in Congress during Reconstruction ten to fifteen years earlier. Although their numbers were too few to justify drawing sweeping conclusions about the party as a whole, by 1880 these men did constitute, by virtue of experience, seniority, and leadership, an elite segment of the Republican party. During the years immediately following the Civil War they had been confronted with decisions on southern policy and the economy which would chart the course of the Republican party for the next generation. An examination of their voting records on these issues provides some suggestive clues as to whether any significant differences over programs or policies separated the leaders of the factions.

The Reconstruction congresses are perhaps the most thoroughly studied segment of American legislative history. Sophisticated roll call analyses have been made which pinpoint the position of each congressman and senator on the major issues. Utilizing the invaluable tables compiled by Michael Les Benedict,[38] the Stalwart and non-Stalwart congressmen can be placed according to their stand on Southern affairs. Seven of the Chicago Stalwarts sat in the thirty-eighth, thirty-nineth, and fortieth Congresses (1863–1869) for an aggregate of twenty-two sessions. Arranging their votes on a scale of one to five, with five points being the most radical and one the least, these Stalwarts average 3.5, tilting them decidedly to the radical wing of the Republican party. Fourteen non-Stalwarts served in these same congresses for a total of forty-two sessions. Their votes on Reconstruction questions averaged only 2.68, placing them in the moderate to conservative camp of the party.

Did that disagreement carry over to issues other than Reconstruction? The most divisive economic issue in the late 1860s was the money question: should the government expand or contract the currency? Turning again to Benedict's tables and converting them to a three-point scale with three standing for extreme inflationists and one for contractionists, we find that the Stalwarts in the thirty-ninth, fortieth, and forty-first Congresses leaned slightly to the contractionist side with an average rating of 1.56. In the same congresses, on the same issue, the non-Stalwarts voted the same way. Their position on the inflation-contraction scale was 1.59, so close to that of their rivals as to be virtually identical.[39]

Did any significant social or demographic characteristics, such as educational level, urbanization, or ethnicity, set the Stalwarts apart from the non-Stalwarts? If the congressional contingent is a fair sample, it would appear that the non-Stalwarts did have a considerably higher educational level than their opponents and, perhaps, the higher social and economic status that education often im-

[38] Michael Les Benedict, *A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), 339–77.

[39] Ibid., 378–81

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plies. Only 26.8 percent of the Stalwarts held college degrees as compared with 38 percent of the non-Stalwarts who were college graduates. Another 9.76 percent of the Stalwarts attended college but did not graduate while 12.7 percent of the non-Stalwarts had some college experience short of graduation.

Looked at in another way, however, this disparity could be considered a function of geography rather than social class. Stalwarts were virtually nonexistent in New England, the section which was traditionally most commited to college education. On the other hand, Stalwarts were disproportionately represented in the South, where native Republicans tended to be drawn from the ranks of poor whites and blacks—groups which had considerably less access to college education in their youth than had the more privileged classes. If New England and the South are removed from the calculations, then the educational disparity vanishes: 51.2 percent of the Stalwart congressional contingent from the rest of the country either graduated or attended college while 52.6 percent of the equivalent non-Stalwarts did so.[40]

The Republican convention of 1880 met on the very next day after the census takers had made their decennial rounds. When tabulated, those census returns would reveal that Americans were moving from the countryside to the cities at an accelerating pace. Though still an overwhelmingly rural nation that looked upon cities with suspicion and envy, America was on the verge of an urban transformation. The Republican convention reflected that transformation: 22.9 percent of the state delegates lived in the hundred largest cities which ranged from New York City (population 1,206,299) to Springfield, Illinois (population 19,743).[41]

The factions did not reflect this transformation equally. The Stalwarts, who drew 28.15 percent of their strength from the hundred largest cities, were more urbanized than their rivals, who sent 19.8 percent of their delegates from the same source. Moreover, the larger the city, the heavier the concentration of Stalwart support. The nation's four largest cities (New York, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and Chicago) accounted for 9.93 percent of the Stalwart total, but only a meager 2.5 percent of that of the non-Stalwarts. In those cities which ranked from fifth (Boston, population 362,839) to fiftieth (Denver, population 35,629), the Stalwarts held only a slight advantage, with 12.25 percent of their delegates drawn from those towns as opposed to 10.5 percent of the non-Stalwarts. In the smaller towns, which ranked from 51st to 100th and ranged in population from nineteen thousand to thirty-four thousand, the non-Stalwarts actually held a slight edge with seven percent as compared to the Stalwarts' six percent.

An approximate measure of ethnic origins can be derived from the delegates'

[40] *Biographical Directory of Congress.*

[41] All population statistics are drawn from the United States Department of the Interior, Census Office, *Statistics of the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census (June 1, 1880)*, (Washington, D.C., 1883), Table XXV, 670–71.

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last names. Most of the delegates, as might be expected in a nation settled largely from the British Isles, bore names which reflected that heritage. Significant numbers, however, had names that indicated a German, Scandinavian, or Dutch ancestry. By this admittedly subjective and imprecise test, it would seem that the Stalwarts had more diverse national origins than their rivals. Thirty members of each faction bore distinctly non-British names, which meant that while 9.93 percent of the Stalwarts could trace their fathers' ancestry to the continent of Europe, only 6.83 percent of the non-Stalwarts were able to do so.[42]

In summary, the Stalwarts and the non-Stalwarts were approximately the same age but the Stalwarts were distinctly less educated, somewhat less British, and considerably more Southern and more urban than their rivals. This is the traditional demographic profile of Democrats, not Republicans. Ever since Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr forged the alliance which would develop into the Democratic party, it had been based on a coalition of the slaveholding states plus the largely ethnic urban masses of the Northern cities. The Stalwarts drew over 75 percent of their strength at the Chicago convention from these same two sources, as opposed to only 39 percent of the non-Stalwart delegates.[43] Murat Halstead understood this connection when he characterized the Stalwarts as those Republicans "who represented the Democratic States and [the Democratic] Districts of the Republican States"[44] but he failed to grasp its full implications.

Who were the Stalwarts? They were those Republicans who were compelled to wrestle with Democrats on the Democrats' home ground. Facing, as they did, different and more acute political problems than other Republicans, the Stalwarts had to adopt different strategies. On the one hand, the northern Stalwarts had to make some gestures to attract, or at least disarm, the resurgent Democrats. This may account for Conkling's occasional adoption of the hallowed anti-monopoly rhetoric that had been standard among Democrats ever since Andrew Jackson's Bank War.[45] In the South, however, where the uncompromisable issue of race overshadowed all else, Republicans feared that any gesture towards Democrats might erode their already precarious position.

[42] Among the hazards of this sort of test is that it does not distinguish between black and white delegates who may well have borne similar last names but who certainly did not have similar places of ethnic origin. I have assumed that southern Stalwarts and non-Stalwarts divided roughly proportionally along racial lines. If the Georgia delegation is a fair sample, this seems to be a safe assumption.

[43] A further link (though tenuous) between the Stalwarts and the Democrats can be found in the Stalwarts' pre-Civil War political affiliation. Though only a handful of delegates to the 1880 convention had been politically active before the formation of the Republican party, it is suggestive that of six Stalwart congressmen, four had been Democratic before joining the Republicans, while only one of the five non-Stalwarts came to the Republican Party by way of the Democracy.

[44] *Cincinnati Commercial*, 6 January 1882, cited in Schrack, 6.

[45] See Lee Benson, *Merchants, Farmers and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850-1887* (Cambridge, Mass.: Russell & Russell, 1955), 155-60. In this neo-Beardian study, Benson attempts to trace the Half-Breed-Stalwart dispute in New York state to economic issues.

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Lacking the freedom of maneuver enjoyed by Republicans in more secure areas, Stalwarts were compelled to devote much of their attention to the basic necessities of political control. This narrowed their vision. Conkling "never interests himself in anything but personal antagonism," John Sherman observed. "He never rises above a Custom House or a Post Office."[46] Fearing to rock an already sinking ship, Stalwarts were understandably reluctant to gamble with promising but risky new national issues, such as the tariff, around which non-Stalwarts like Sherman and Blaine were reshaping the Republican party. Instead, Stalwarts in both sections clung more firmly to the secure issues of the past and sought in party loyalty and organizational discipline the best defense against the rising Democratic tide. By wooing southern Democrats and encouraging civil service reform, President Hayes had weakened those local organizations. To reverse his policies, Stalwarts turned to the familiar figure of Grant the Hero, a proven vote-getter and a potent symbolic figure during whose presidency the regular party organizations had flourished. It was not factionalism nor personal loyalties alone which led them to Grant; it was a matter of political survival.

The Stalwarts were those Republicans most directly threatened by the revival of the Democratic party that began in the mid-1870s. As the front line troops in the political wars, they naturally suffered the heaviest casualties. The non-Stalwarts, in their secure Republican bastions of New England and the midwest heartland, survived to inherit control of the party while their rivals fell under the onslaught of the resurgent Democrats. The Convention of 1880 was the Stalwarts' last serious bid for power. Four years later their legatee, Chester Alan Arthur, would fail to win renomination despite the advantages of the incumbency.[47]

The Stalwarts would not be genuine contenders for any subsequent Republican presidential nomination. Their last major impact on presidential politics was in 1884 by helping assure the defeat of Blaine in New York state—a negative, local, and self-destructive act. They would continue to control the machinery of some state party organizations, but as a power in national politics their force was spent.

By the time the terms "Stalwart" and "Half-Breed" had become current, the factions which they supposedly described had already ceased to have meaning for the Republican party. It does not thereby follow, as some historians have uncritically assumed, that they never did have any meaning. Republican divisions were real, not merely empty squabbles over patronage or personalities. A party split which could deadlock the 1880 convention, paralyze the Garfield administration, and lead to the resignation and humiliation of New York's powerful Stalwart senators, Roscoe Conkling and Thomas Platt, had to be based on some-

[46] John Sherman to James A. Garfield, 23 January 1881, Garfield Papers.

[47] On the first ballot of the 1884 convention Arthur would receive only 33.9 percent of the votes, a considerable erosion from Grant's 40.2 percent four years earlier. Arthur's support was even more heavily Southern than Grant's had been: 70.86 percent as compared to 57.1 percent. See the *Proceedings of the Eighth Republican National Convention . . .* 1884 (Chicago, 1884), 141–42.

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thing more fundamental than personal rivalries and ambitions. With a distinctive constituency and a coherent set of goals, the Stalwarts were, for a time, a genuine, recognizable element in Republican and national politics. Contemporaries certainly thought so. When Charles J. Guiteau shot Garfield he announced, "I am a Stalwart of the Stalwarts," as if that explained all.[48] In his demented way he understood the politics of the Gilded Age better than many subsequent historians.

[48] *Report of the Proceedings in the Case of the United States vs. Charles J. Guiteau . . . .* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1882), vol. 1, 215–16.

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Book Reviews

Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning *by Colin S. Gray. Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984. 130 pp. $5.95.*

Colin Gray's concise monograph illuminates with balance, but not dispassion, five options in strategic nuclear policy. The book is a valuable teaching tool, for it tells a great deal about the direction of the strategic policy debate.

The first option Gray discusses is classic finite deterrence, worded here as mutual assured vulnerability. As all familiar with this subject know, finite deterrence requires that each side target only the other's population centers. Weapons with great accuracy are considered destabilizing, and those over a certain number are considered superfluous. Largely because finite deterrence requires few nuclear weapons, it has long been the strategic doctrine of most arms controllers. But Gray reminds us that this approach has never been operational policy. Defense planners, going back to Robert McNamara's day, have always targeted Soviet military bases. Within the councils of governments, finite deterrence has been rejected because it gives only the bleakest answer to the question, what if deterrence fails?

The second option – mutual assured vulnerability with targeting flexibility – is the position, Gray wryly notes, "where most of the policy refugees from mutual assured vulnerability have evacuated intellectually" (p. 67). This policy, often associated with former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, gives the president the ability to respond to a Soviet provocation with a series of limited, or perhaps tactical, nuclear strikes. Such a response would, so the argument goes, sufficiently warn the Soviets, prevent further escalation, and spare any president the unsavory choice between surrender or annihilation. But Gray doubts that any nuclear war can be closely controlled and worries that a measured response to a Soviet attack would only "produce defeat on the installment plan rather than effective intrawar deterrence" (p. 70).

The third option, dubbed somewhat awkwardly "counterforce and countercontrol preeminence with recovery denial," describes (and Gray is quite convincing on this point) contemporary strategic policy. Its blood lines can be traced from Nixon (National Security Memorandum 242) to Carter (Presidential Directive 59) to Reagan (National Security Decision Directive 13), and finally to the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission. In Gray's

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words, this strategy calls for a nuclear force that can "defeat the Soviet state and its military instruments" (p. 121). Its targets are hardened Soviet military sites and the entire apparatus of Soviet political control (the top leadership, the Communist party bureaucracy, and the KGB). As a proponent of the view that nuclear weapons should be deployed not just to fight a war but to win one, Gray feels this policy is a step forward. But it is only a step forward. It flunks Gray's central test of a war-winning strategy, having an adequate defense of the homeland.

Option four, damage limitation for deterrence and coercion, provides, in Gray's view, the missing ingredient—ballistic missile defense. Armed with accurate missiles and a homeland defense capability, Gray is convinced the United States could, as in John Foster Dulles's time, make nuclear threats once again a keystone of policy. The Soviets would not only be deterred, but if necessary could be coerced.

The fifth option, described as damage limitation with defense dominance, would combine strategic defense with drastically reduced offensive arms, negotiated through arms control. This approach, first advanced by the late Donald Brennan and recently discussed by Jonathan Schell, is given a respectful hearing. Although Gray rejects it as technically and politically impractical at the present time, he finds it morally compelling. "It really is intolerable, and foolish, to *choose* to live under a nuclear sword of Damocles indefinitely. One day that sword is likely to fall" (p. 92). Indeed, this option is intriguing and deserves a respectful hearing from all of us.

Arms controllers have for several decades reflexively drawn upon the logic of finite deterrence. But the ground is shifting under them. Nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly accurate, the exotic technologies of nuclear defense are gaining political support, and both the Carter and Reagan administrations have publically endorsed the doctrine of nuclear war fighting. Colin Gray now awaits the next step—homeland defense. It is time for arms controllers to think anew. Repeating the old lines will no longer suffice.

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Global Perspectives on Arms Control *edited by Adam M. Garfinkle. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984. 172 pp. $27.95.*

The European Missiles Crisis: Nuclear Weapons and Security Policy *edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Nikolaj Petersen. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984. 274 pp. $27.50.*

One might think it obvious that arms control should get a good press. After all, it is concerned with limiting the dangers of war and has the virtue of not trying to do too much too fast. Yet such virtue is far from uncontested. Especially in the past five years, arms controllers have been attacked by opponents on both left and right. Left-wing radicals despise the genteel efforts to sort out policy predicaments and demand radical and rapid disarmament. Right-wing radicals despise the "naive" efforts to build bridges to the enemy and demand realistic and rapid rearmament. It has been difficult to find true be-

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lievers in arms control, but if these two volumes are anything to go by, some of the most sensible ones are to be found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Garfinkle collection of articles is the result of a Foreign Policy Research Institute conference in May 1982 as part of an occasional series on international arms control. They had the good sense to invite cosponsors and coauthors from Europe and Asia. The idea was interesting; the execution is consistent. Large parts of the volume are taken up with a sterile slanging match between apologists for Soviet and American extremism. There are also the obligatory chapters on "future war," no doubt so the project and book can be sold as "policy relevant." What is left are four unconnected chapters on arms control problems in Europe, east and south Asia. By far the best of these efforts is from Phil Williams who assesses the differing approaches in Europe to arms control and East-West relations. His sensible critique of left- and right-wing radicals argues for greater concentration on the political roots of arms control.

The better of the two volumes is that by Holm and Petersen. Theirs is based on a more coherent conference in Denmark in April 1983, under the auspices of the Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs. Although the book was completed months before the collapse of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks, it is likely to stand for a while as the most systematic study of recent European nuclear arms control. Remarkably, for a book on such a controversial subject, there is little posturing and propaganda. There is, in keeping with the character of anguished arms controllers, much lingering over dilemmas and grey areas of policy.

The deepest dilemma is set out in the introduction and is to be found in most chapters: how to cope with the United States formulating an alliance negotiating position when it is not in agreement with most of its allies. This dilemma is seen as part of a broader and recurrent problem: how to couple American defense to that of its allies when there is no uniformity of foreign policy. Europeans aspire to a greater role, but are unwilling to put their money for defense where their mouths for criticism are. Americans aspire to lead a unified bloc, but are unwilling to compromise with their allies. Europeans want American weapons for protection, but then want to be able to distance themselves from Washington's policies. Americans want the Europeans to accept their missiles, but are unable to convince the European citizenry that the United States is negotiating seriously at the arms control talks.

These dilemmas, and far more, bind the book into impressive shape. A few chapters are loose at the seams, but most are taut. The best is by David Holloway who tackles the much neglected topic of the Soviet posture towards INF. He outlines complex and competing Soviet policies, and most notably the changes in Moscow's motives. He suggests that although a result of the SS-20 deployment was to exacerbate rifts in NATO, the Soviet goal was merely to modernize its forces. In later stages, political objectives loomed larger.

Lawrence Freedman's solid survey of past INF talks illustrates how not to negotiate. As a pained, but still faithful arms control believer, Freedman lays most of the blame for failures of recent INF arms control on the short sighted assessment of the political roots of military problems. Hans Günter Brauch's somewhat rambling assessment of the German view of INF delves into the question of why land- as opposed to sea-based INF

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were chosen. He argues that the former "begged" for domestic opposition when the latter would have done just as well for military purposes. But as the commentary on the chapter points out (each chapter is matched by useful counterarguments) the purpose of Cruise and Pershing was more political than military, and the domestic opposition only brings to light already existing political differences in the alliance. None of the contributors sees these differences disappearing, for they are rooted in the real political differences within a broader alliance. The seams can be partially mended if realistic arms control is pursued. But most Europeans, unlike radicals on the right and left, are not utopians. The colors of superpower politics may be black and white, but the Europeans are used to seeing things in shades of grey.

GERALD SEGAL
University of Bristol

The Making of America's Soviet Policy *edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 369 pp. $27.50.*

This is a well-conceived and well-executed study, prepared under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. The editor has planned and combined the individual analyses of an array of experienced and informed contributors, and drawn upon them for thoughtful introductory and concluding discussions. As the title indicates, the focus of the study is on the policy process, not the substance of policy. The book comprises sections on "the actors" (public opinion, Congress, and the president and executive branch), selected major "issues" (nuclear weapons, political crises, economic relations, and social issues), and "the historical record" (Cold War, détente, renewed hostility, and Soviet policy toward the United States), and culminates in "policy-making conclusions." It is an analysis of problems in managing policy; it provides historical perspective, but it is not a historical review of American policy or of American-Soviet relations.

The contributors include several with direct experience, as well as academic credentials. Only three of the thirteen have specialized in American-Soviet relations or Soviet affairs, but all are well qualified to address the subjects they cover: Richard K. Betts, Robert R. Bowie, I.M. Destler, Alexander L. George, Marshall Goldman, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest R. May, William Schneider, Dimitri K. Simes, Strobe Talbott, and Raymond Vernon. (The reader can match most authors and chapters based on their areas of past work.) On the whole the study does not break new ground in discussion of particular subjects; most of the authors have drawn upon their own earlier research. What the book does offer is a synthesis relating more general analyses to the specific subject of American policy making oriented to dealing with the Soviet Union.

The study addresses a real problem: what can be done about improving the making of America's Soviet policy, and this practical purpose has infused the various parts of the analysis, as well as the editor's conclusions. One of the merits of the study is to emphasize the importance of American institutional and politico-cultural factors in American-Soviet relations. Too often the subject is addressed by specialists in Soviet affairs who nat-

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urally, and usefully, address the peculiarities of the Soviet element in the equation. Such an approach, however, also often implies too much of an initiating and dominating Soviet role—as subtly reflected in the fact that the subject itself is usually called "Soviet-American relations." This study in particular draws attention to many of the important ways in which American domestic political considerations influence and condition foreign policy making and foreign policy.

Indeed, the main problems in American policy-making vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are seen to include not only understanding of Soviet aims and policies, and ways of dealing with conflicting interests between the two countries, but also how to attain coherence and consistency in American policy. Often the greatest difficulty is not in knowing *what* the United States should do, but *how* and even *whether* the American polity is able to conduct a long-range strategy in pursuit of foreign policy interests. The conclusions are not startling, but they are not all self-evident without the analysis. The overriding conclusion is concisely embodied in the last sentence of the book: "In short, our strategy should be not only to manage the current threat of Soviet power but also to seek to improve gradually the conditions that make it so difficult for a society organized like ours to manage its relationship with the Soviet Union" (p. 354).

Those working in the foreign policy field will find the material familiar, but should profit from its broad overview and connective purpose; for most readers it also contains much that will be informative as well. It can provide a useful text for seminars on policy making, or provide an additional dimension for courses dealing with American-Soviet relations. Above all it should stimulate thinking about an important problem.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? *by Robert W. Komer. Cambridge, Mass., Abt Books, 1984. 116 pp. $19.00.*

During the Carter years, Robert Komer was known around Washington and in Europe's capitals as a man who could get things done, bureaucratic inertia notwithstanding. As Harold Brown's Special Advisor on NATO Affairs, and then as Brown's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Komer was instrumental in forging a more coherent blueprint for modernizing NATO's defenses.

Now out of office, Komer perceives that much of his handiwork may not have been fully implemented. In *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense*? he outlines his fears that advocates of "global unilateralism," a euphemism for diverting the lion's share of budgetary funds to a large-deck carrier navy, have shifted the locus of U.S. defense strategy and concomitant budgets without ever having openly debated or justified the merits of their cause.

Komer's thesis is that the United States simply cannot pursue a unilateral defense strategy. Only in concert with its allies, specifically its European allies, can the United States hope to mount a credible conventional defense that would deter the Soviets. Komer

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further argues that the United States must adopt clear-cut regional priorities upon which to fashion force structure and posture. Europe must come first; the Persian Gulf a close second. East Asia is less important; Japan will likely be neutral in any confrontation with the Soviets (p. 87). Finally, Komer asserts that Third World conflicts cannot justify the acquisition of naval forces built around the large-deck carrier task force.

Few of Komer's arguments are particularly novel, and many readers will sense a return to the past. In 1977 the Carter Administration sought to withdraw troops from Korea. That administration successfully prevented procurement of a large-deck aircraft carrier and was the moving force behind the approval of NATO's Long Term Defense Plan; actually Komer was that force. Komer's book, in effect asks, "Why stop now when we are onto a good thing?"

There are many answers to Komer's question, the first being that it is wrongly put. The Reagan administration has realized many of Komer's initiatives: completion of Host Nation Support Agreements with Germany and other European countries; funding the prestocking of equipment in central and northern Europe; heading a drive for European-American cooperation in the production of new "emerging" armaments technologies. Furthermore, in June 1984 the United States and Germany agreed to a revolutionary concept in air defense cooperation whereby both countries acquired each other's systems (Patriot and Roland, respectively), and Germany agreed to operate selected units of both types that were dedicated to the protection of U.S. forces in Germany. It is difficult to assert, therefore, that the Reagan administration has turned away from Europe.

Moreover, some of Komer's suggestions are, by his own admission, politically difficult to achieve. In particular, his exhortations notwithstanding, it is unlikely that Europe can easily be coaxed into increasing its real spending by 4 percent annually, when many countries fall short of the 3 percent goal Komer worked so hard to implement.

On the other hand, the Weinberger Department of Defense has differed from its predecessor in seeking to maintain credible U.S. commitments worldwide. It cannot expect Japan to contribute to the common defense, as Komer suggests (p. 98–99), yet assume a neutral Japan and remove those forces that reassure it of U.S. support. It cannot plan operations in the Persian Gulf yet cut back on those naval forces whose participation could be critical to successful operations, particularly if land bases in that region are not made available to the U.S. It cannot ignore developments in Central America. In short, the Department of Defense under Caspar Weinberger argues that there is a world outside Europe and Southwest Asia that the U.S. ignores at its peril.

Komer's book is not objective, nor does its author intend it to be. Yet, while partisan, it is not polemical; instead it is a serious attempt by a dedicated former public servant to demonstrate what he perceives to be the flaws in current policy. Reasonable people will differ over the validity of his case; few, however, can doubt the highmindedness of his purpose.

DOV. S. ZAKHEIM
U.S. Department of Defense

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The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1980 *by Martin P. Wattenberg. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984. 160 pp. $15.00.*

A little change in the title—for that word "Parties" insert "Partisanship"—and you have a perfect capsule summary of this study. It is entirely an examination of recent perceptions of and loyalties to political parties in the United States. And as the dates in the title will suggest to the initiated, it draws almost exclusively on the election year surveys of the Center for Political Studies (née Survey Research Center) of the University of Michigan.

The argument in brief is this: since 1952 there has been a decline in the salience and importance of political parties for the American electorate. That decline is reflected in the increasingly volatile evaluations of the parties and in the increasing number of Americans who have tuned them out. The decline, however, is due more to an increase in neutral reactions to the parties than to an increase in negative feelings about them. The causes of the decline have more to do with American politics than with demographic changes in the voters. Candidates and public officials distance themselves from parties and, aided by the attention of the media, they increasingly make the parties seem irrelevant to many Americans.

The argument is developed logically and systematically, and it is fully sustained by the data. Along the way there are also valuable bonuses: sophisticated reexaminations of the concepts of partisanship and independence. The book is a short 131 pages of text on small pages—just about right for an easy evening's reading. It is written in clear and honest academic prose. There are not many felicities, but there is no pretense or padding either. It is, in short, an attractively lean book.

The author raises my critical eyebrows only in the final extension of the argument to deal with the broader "decline of political parties" issue. His data are simply too narrow in two ways for such conclusions. First, he deals only with voter perceptions; there are no systematic data on party organizations, on legislative parties, or on party activities in nomination and election contests. Second, the data are limited in time to the three decades promised in the title, even though the decline of the American parties by some measures (for example, legislative cohesion) has its origin many years before. This is not to say that the central argument does not bear on the question of party decline; it certainly does. But it bears somewhat less heavily than the author would have it.

To conclude, this is a lucid and tightly reasoned study of the decline of partisanship in recent American politics. The reader can hesitate to take to the author's final leap of logic and still find the book both important and stimulating.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

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The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment *edited by Fred I. Greenstein. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 197 pp. Cloth, $18.50; paper, $7.95.*

President Reagan's campaign as an ideologically-committed candidate and his successful enactment of a coherent conservative program violate so much of the conventional political science wisdom about how American politics is supposed to work that it is useful to have this early assessment of his presidency.

This book contains six essays that cover the first two years of the Reagan presidency. The beginning and closing essays by Fred I. Greenstein review the context of Reagan's election and take an early stab at placing Reagan in the general political science literature on presidents. Greenstein is a close student of the presidency and his discussion of Reagan will be required reading for all president-watchers.

Hugh Heclo and Rudolph G. Penner cover the fiscal and political strategy of Reagan. Richard P. Nathan contributes an insightful essay on the Reagan presidency in domestic affairs, while Samuel P. Huntington and I.M. Destler write on Reagan's defense and foreign policies, respectively.

As is true with edited collections, no common perspective unites this book. The essays, all competently done, meet the objective of presenting an early look at selected aspects of Reagan and his redirection of American public policy. It would be unfair to lament the absence of a common framework or a unifying theme.

It might not be unfair to lament the limited attention given to another aspect of the Reagan presidency, however, and that is the way Reagan has revived the issues of class, class conflict, and social justice in American politics.

When such mainstream writers as David Broder and *Newsweek* magazine and the *Wall Street Journal* all see Reagan and the 1984 election in terms of class, one wishes more attention was paid to this in the book. The authors attempt, in Greenstein's words, a "dispassionately analytic appraisal" (p. 1), but in their quest for "objectivity" they have tended to underemphasize what makes the Reagan presidency really distinctive: it has reintroduced overt class policies to the American political agenda and shaken the pluralist contention that class counts for relatively little in the U.S.

The Garfield Foundation, which supported this book, may want to consider a conference at which scholars can grapple with the broader issues of class and pluralism raised by the Reagan presidency.

JOHN F. MANLEY
Stanford University

Legal Homicide: Death as Punishment in America, 1864–1982 *by William J. Bowers with Glenn L. Pierce and John F. McDevitt. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1984. 614 pp. $35.00.*

In *Furman* v. *Georgia* (1972) the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four division with all nine justices writing individual opinions and no opinion of the Court as to the

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reason why, effectively voided every statute permitting capital punishment. Unrebuffed by such a fragmented and uncertain judicial assault, some thirty-five states reinstated the death penalty, roughly one-half mandating such punishment for first degree murder and the other half stipulating in law "guided discretion." The Court's unclear disposition was read this way: capital punishment had been almost randomly meted out, barren of any rational purpose, and, therefore, it was cruel and unusual punishment. Some states found a cure in mandatory executions; others would cope with discretion guided by law. Only a minority remained in harmony with the rest of the civilized world and refused to sanction capital punishment. In *Gregg* v. *Georgia* (1976) the Court held unconstitutional, as cruel and unusual punishment, mandatory executions for those found guilty of capital offenses, but it upheld the death penalty *per se* and as imposed under careful but discretionary state procedures. In brief, the Court argued that capital punishment comports with contemporary societal values, that it is not excessive (for first degree murder), and that it serves at least one legitimate purpose: retribution. As for deterrence, the Court said the evidence was inconclusive.

In this book William J. Bowers demolishes the asserted propositions upon which capital punishment constitutionally rests. Most of the contents of this volume are not new; all but three of the eleven chapters have earlier appeared in print. Bowers does not dwell on the morality of capital punishment *per se*, as have both Justices Thurgood Marshall and William J. Brennan, Jr. of the Supreme Court. Instead, he assembles more than enough data to demonstrate that post-*Furman* "guided discretion" state laws, upheld by the Court in *Gregg*, have failed to remedy the defects that contaminated pre-*Furman* applications of the death penalty. He refutes the claims that the Court's own constitutional criteria have been satisfied. Using simple and advanced statistics, Bowers examines the administration of criminal justice under post-*Furman* statutes and finds "arbitrariness [to be] a systematic, pervasive, and inexorable problem [from arrest to sentencing] . . . The results are plain: the system of capital punishment is riddled with arbitrariness from beginning to end" (p. 375).

Not surprisingly, Bowers—as did the late Justice William O. Douglas in *Furman*—uncovers massive racial discrimination, a reflection, he says, of the racial prejudice that is ingrained in this society. Post-*Furman* statutes "have failed to alter in any substantial way the cumulative pattern of differential treatment by race that was present under the now constitutional pre-*Furman* capital statutes" (pp. 261–262).

That society utilizes the death penalty as retribution Bowers questions by documenting the fact that societal vengeance rears its head quite selectively during times of war and economic depression, in "times of crisis." Moreover, "the death penalty appears to have been used to protect the interests and positions of the dominant group in the social order" (p. 143).

As to the "inconclusive" evidence regarding deterrence, Bowers demonstrates that the matter is very much conclusive: the use of capital punishment does not deter; in fact, he argues, "the way that we have carried out executions historically in the United States appears to have contributed slightly but significantly to the increase in homicides . . . . [E]xecutions appear to have provoked rather than to have prevented homicides," thus serving a "brutalizing" rather than a deterrent function (p. 333). That is, state executions

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"convey the message of lethal vengeance" to "people with a victim in mind" (pp. 300-301). An abundance of evidence corroborates this startling conclusion.

More than 1200 people now await their fate on death row; the law seems settled. But William J. Bowers has reopened the debate with a massive "Brandeis brief" that thoroughly depicts capital punishment as "unfair, ineffective, and offensive to contemporary values [and thus] unconstitutional" (p. 392). It seems implausible that his powerful arguments can be refuted.

JAMES MAGEE
University of Delaware

Human Rights and World Politics *by David P. Forsythe. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 309 pp. Cloth, $25.95; paper, $8.50.*

This book's effectiveness as an introduction to international human rights is achieved precisely because it is more than that. It also introduces the reader to many of the important issues of world politics and law, and to the development and operation of political institutions. Human rights are explained in terms of their relation to security and economic development and to the evolution of the international political system. As a result, one gets a tangible sense of what human rights and the institutions intended to promote them actually are, not what they might be in the mind's eye of a philosopher. Accordingly, one is asked to evaluate contemporary human rights law and practice, not against an ideal standard, but against real possibilities.

Forsythe starts with the development of international law of human rights from the first Geneva Convention in 1864 to the present. He then proceeds to the question (p. 41), "To what extent has the 'law on the books' become the 'law in action'?" and provides a careful survey of the very diverse measures taken by intergovernmental, governmental, and nongovernmental bodies to implement human rights. Chapter 3 examines the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. By reference to the policies of the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations, the author shows how important theoretical issues (for example, realism versus idealism, interpretations of the national interest, etc.) are present in choices about human rights. The fourth chapter describes how nonprofit organizations work for human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and the fifth presents three main types of philosophy underlying the human rights issue—conservatism, liberalism, and communalism.

The presentation of this material is introductory and occasionally superficial, but the author does not claim more than he actually delivers. He explains legal and technical terms to his presumably nonexpert reader and illustrates abstract points with examples from recent history. His argument for the importance of human rights, especially of economic rights, is clearly distinguished from his factual descriptions of human rights law, institutions, and policies. Statistics (some of them dated) and controversial claims are carefully documented in extensive endnotes that serve as an excellent annotated bibliography. While the style is not lively, it is consistently clear and concise.

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Forsythe uses his extensive knowledge of the International Committee of the Red Cross to show how early international efforts to protect victims of war contributed to the development of international human rights. He also presents the results of his empirical research on the "non-profit lobby," providing an objective assessment of the impact of the nongovernmental human rights organizations. These features will interest the human rights expert as well as the novice.

The main flaw in the book is its failure to provide a clear statement of the concept of rights and to distinguish between rights and other goods. As a result, there is a tendency to use human rights interchangeably with justice and humanitarianism. At one point (p. 129) the author even says that "any group interested in peace, arms control, or disarmament; workers' rights; church activity, national freedom and independence can—with considerable reason—claim to be working for human rights." This many not be strictly wrong, but it obscures the specific meaning of the claim that a social objective is a right. Yet the great strengths of the book remain. It will provide an exceptionally concise yet subtle introduction to human rights, not as an abstract ideal, but as part of the fabric of world politics.

LOWELL W. LIVEZEY
Princeton University

Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today *by Charles F. Doran. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 294 pp. $32.50.*

There is a fairly widespread perception among Canadians that Americans do not pay much attention to Canada. Not all Canadians lament this assumed lack of attention; indeed, some have gone on record as welcoming it, on the theory that benign neglect is a quality to be cultivated in a neighbor ten times more powerful than oneself. Yet many Canadians do remain resentful of what is seen as an American tendency to "take Canada for granted."

Charles Doran's book comes as a timely and learned reminder that, whatever the validity of the charge of general U.S. indifference to Canada, there are Canadianists in the American scholarly community who not only know Canada very well, but who can offer new and powerful insights into what is objectively Canada's principal foreign policy interest, namely the country's relationship with the United States. Doran, director of the Center of Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, argues in this admirable book that the current "tone" of the bilateral relationship, which took a distinct turn for the worse in the past decade, could stand improving. Though the thrust of his analysis is that the relationship still appears to have a potentially bright future before it, he worries that "with only a slight alteration of circumstances that future could be in jeopardy" (p. 273). At times wearing the hat of dispassionate scholarly analyst, at other times that of committed policy advocate, Doran seeks to inform and advise policy makers on either side of the border that they have it within their power to will a return to the kind of "partnership" characteristic of

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what he sees as the golden age of Canadian-American relations, which began around 1940 and lasted for three decades.

Doran has some interesting things to say about the eclipse of what has become known as the "special relationship." Unlike those who see the retreat from "partnership" (a concept Doran explores in his concluding chapter) to be primarily a result of an increasingly economic-nationalist Canadian government under Pierre Trudeau, Doran suggests to the contrary that it was the United States that, for reasons related to its self-perceived declining capabilities in the international political economy of the early 1970s, "desert[ed] an arrangement that had become too costly for it to maintain" (p. 26).

Doran's book stands apart from other recent treatments of the Canada-U.S. relationship in two important respects. First, his analysis of the relationship is embedded within the broader context of the international political system, for as he rightly notes, Canadian-American affairs too often are depicted in "dyadic" terms that tend to obscure the sources of state behavior. Second, he has brought to this book the benefits of his own previous work on the political economy of energy; as a result, his discussion of Canadian-American relations in oil and gas demonstrates a sophisticated grasp of complex energy questions. His section on the Alaska Highway Natural Gas Pipe Line (pp. 241–49) can be recommended as easily the best analysis of this topic.

There are shortcomings, as well, in this book, one of which has to do with the fact that it was written nearly two years ago. It is hardly accurate to state today (if it ever was accurate to state) that "Canadians cling more and more to an autarkist mentality that tends to shut out external reality, especially reality that has anything to do with the United States" (p. 5). A bit like Christopher Columbus in 1492, Conservative and Liberal leaders in the 1984 federal election campaign are busily discovering America, with the clear implication being that they believe economic and political salvation somehow resides in the cultivation of the U.S. market, and in the renewal of "partnership."

DAVID G. HAGLUND
Queen's University

The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership *by Ann Ruth Willner. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 212 pp. $17.95.*

Twenty years ago, Ann Ruth and Dorothy Willner published an article on "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders." A model of succinct theory and creative insight, it became part of the standard literature. Since then, Ann Willner has attempted to develop further her ideas on the subject and this book may be seen as a culmination of her work.

The Spellbinders begins with a theory of charismatic leadership, set forth especially in the first three chapters, and then applies it to six examples: Fidel Castro, Mohandas K. Gandhi, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Sukarno. The theory is as familiar as the examples. Charismatic leadership is defined in terms of "a relationship, an interactional process, inherently neither moral nor immoral" (p. 12), dependent upon the perceptions of the followers. The leader's audience attributes to him extraordi-

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nary attributes, "assimilating the leader to the divine" (p. 19), endowing him with "superhuman, supernatural, or exceptional powers or capacities" (p. 19), ability to prophesy or read minds, to heal or to harm, to control or manipulate the environment in remarkable ways. These characterizations of charismatic leadership, with developments of and departures from Max Weber's original formulations, have become commonplace. They become alive and illuminating only when fresh theory is introduced or when case studies of significant leaders are probed in depth.

Willner's study achieves this when it discusses the invocation of myth in charismatic legitimation (Chap. 4) and when it relates, in intimate detail and with unpublished sources, the case of Sukarno. His leadership is analyzed, for example, in an original and cogent manner as "mythic warrior and semidivine lover" (p. 65) in chapter four. Then the theme is further developed in chapter six with an incisive comparative analysis between Sukarno's and Gandhi's sexual practices as they relate to enhancing their charisma.

When the account moves from Sukarno, though, to some of the other leaders, Willner's command of history and biography falters. This is most striking in the instance of Gandhi, perhaps because his example of charismatic leadership has already been presented so well by Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph, whose original conceptualizations and masterful use of Gandhi's own writings combined with those of Indian historians set a standard of scholarship that Willner does not approach. The discussion of Gandhi here is unfortunately marked by mistakes of dates, places, spelling of names (pp. 124–126) as well as by repetition of errors and exaggerations by the Mahatma's hagiographers. The result is a superficial commentary that, on the one hand, does scant justice to his most dramatic *satyagrahas* or the leadership skills that informed them, such as his ingenious exploitation of the media on the famous "salt march" that sparked his civil disobedience campaign. On the other hand, historic feats are attributed to him that he never in fact came close to attaining. For example, Willner states that with his 1932 fast against untouchability, " . . . Gandhi's charisma had produced a miracle. The long tradition of acceptance and approval of untouchability was shattered and the basis was laid for its ultimate disappearance" (p. 191). In fact, Gandhi failed utterly in this attempt, as in many others before and after it, to achieve his aim of abolishing untouchability. A study of his charisma must discern its limits, of how it did not, despite his best efforts, reach either Harijan or Muslim communities, for these failures explain almost as much about the sources of his power as his successes. Willner, in general, does not examine the limitations of her leaders.

The connection between the spellbinder and the spell that he casts is, as Willner recognizes, a matter of much more than his personality traits. The relationship that is forged with the followers depends in part on the ideology that is formed and projected. One of this book's strengths lies in its analysis of how myths and symbols are devised to enhance ideology. Yet, there should be more focus on the precise relationship of charismatic leadership to ideology. As Edward Shils and Robert Tucker (whose writings deserve more use here) have emphasized, there often exists a dynamic interaction between charismatic leadership and its corresponding ideology, so that the latter as well as the former assumes a distinctively charismatic form. Several parts of this book indicate this and provide points of departure for a systematic study of the peculiar style and components, role and function, of a charismatic form of ideology.

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The Spellbinders establishes more than any other book before it the validity of the study of charismatic leadership. If it does not always advance our knowledge of each element considered, it certainly does stimulate a desire to explore its subject further. For if we are to grasp the reasons for the extraordinary political power wielded by these remarkable mass mobilizers—some of them leaders of the largest political movements in history—then Ann Ruth Willner has, through decades of sustained effort, put us on the right path of enquiry.

DENNIS DALTON
Barnard College, Columbia University

Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood *by Kristin Luker. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. 324 pp. $14.95.*

In a sense this is two books in one; both are well written, meticulously researched, and related to each other. The first, a scholar's attempt to understand her subject matter before she settles down to a more restricted piece of investigation, is a history of the early phases of the abortion controversy, with an emphasis on the interplay of medical knowledge and morality. Here author Kristin Luker's central argument is that the physician's crusade against abortion, which took place in the United States between roughly 1857 and 1880, turned abortion into a "medical treatment" controlled by physicians. By taking it out of the realm of political and philosophical controversy, this removed it from public discussion for most of the next century. The medical profession had mixed motives for seeking legislative prohibitions against abortion, but its campaign had two results: a large segment of the American public was convinced that the fetus was a human being from the moment of conception, and almost every state in the union passed legislation making abortion a crime except where necessary to protect the life or health of the mother. But the laws were not strictly interpreted and the medical profession kept a good deal of discretionary control over who would have the operation. (The discussion in this section explains what had always seemed a mystery—why Justice Harry A. Blackmun's opinion in *Roe* v. *Wade* devoted so much time to praising the doctors. Of course. The decision deprived them of control of a matter which had been a medical monopoly.)

The second half of the book is an illuminating survey of the views of California women activists on either side of the abortion dispute and was designed to discover what they believe and why their views are irreconcilable. The author, a professor of sociology at the University of California at San Diego, submits the thesis that the debate over abortion that has taken place since 1973 is really a "referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood" (p. 193). The reason the debate is so passionate and intense and the participants on either side so angry and unwilling to compromise is that it symbolizes choices they personally have made in their own lives. The author has documented her thesis by doing a series of in-depth interviews with women who have been identified as leaders in pro-choice and pro-life campaigns at the state level. What she has found is that pro-life and pro-choice partisans hold views that are diametrically opposed, not only about the

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personhood of the fetus, but about family structure, men's and women's roles, sex, contraception, and the nature of motherhood. She also found that there are significant differences in the class, income, and educational backgrounds of the two groups. The pro-choice women are likely to be upper income, more highly educated, employed more frequently outside the home, and to want lives which include children, but which are not restricted to raising families. The pro-life women see motherhood as an almost sacred role with many rewarding compensations. By focusing on the views of these activists, who are articulate and dedicated women, Luker is able to outline the ideological basis of each position and to show why compromise between such opposing world views is almost impossible. Although the she does not try to relate her findings to broader trends and to the "backlash politics" of the New Right, we are given a good deal of insight into the reasons why abortion has become such a difficult political issue.

EVA R. RUBIN
North Carolina State University

The Feminist Challenge: The Movement for Women's Liberation in Britain and the United States *by David Bouchier. New York, Schocken Books, 1984. 252 pp. $18.45.*

David Bouchier has written a sympathetic, well-balanced history of the twentieth-century feminist movements in Great Britain and the United States, with some emphasis on the former. While the focus is on the many ideological and organizational components of feminism, the analysis contributes to the literature of poltical movements more generally.

Two themes are of particular interest. Bouchier locates the movements within the constraints and the possibilities offered by their respective cultural, political and economic environments. Thus it is shown why two movements sharing broad ideology and goals have emerged with different ideological emphases and organizational styles. In the U.S., where there has been little history of class-based politics, feminists have worked most successfully within the framework of a liberal reform movement. Radical feminism, which emphasizes the primacy of patriarchy rather than class as the root of most evil, has also been an important component of U.S. feminism. British feminism, like British politics generally, has been much more oriented to class-based issues. Socialist feminist theorizing has been strongest in Britain, and there has been more fruitful cooperation between the feminist movement and organized labor than in the U.S. While this description has sacrificed subtlety for brevity, Bouchier's book happily does not. His rendering of the relationships between the movements and their respective political environments is lucid, complex and fair.

Bouchier also does a commendable job of analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of feminist organizational styles. There has always been tension within the feminist movement between those (liberals) who work in hierarchical, centralized organizations and those (radicals, and to some extent socialists) who believe that leaderless, decentralized means are on essential prerequisite to feminist ends. Bouchier argues sensibly that the

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different types of organizations have their uses, and that the movement should try to continue to utilize as many differing strategies as possible in order to reach the widest audience and to maximize the number of battles won.

While this book is, therefore, valuable for its intelligent analysis, it suffers as a history in two important respects. There are errors of fact (for example, Women Against Pornography was founded in 1979, not 1976; the U.S. has 50 states, not 52) and strangely unsupportable generalizations: we are told, for instance, that "powerful and successful women have no personal interest in equal opportunity or equal pay" (p. 194).

Most importantly, this book suffers badly from a paucity of citations. Chapters one and two seem to be taken entirely from secondary sources that are mentioned in a bibliographic section at the end of the book called "Further Reading," but that are never cited specifically.

This failure to acknowledge sources becomes more irritating in later chapters when the author is not retelling a frequently told story, as in the first chapters, but presenting new material. For example, it is a striking contention that U.S. corporate leaders, believing that "constitutional equality for women would make an already crowded labor market intolerably rigid," threw the winning financial resources into the fight against the Equal Rights Amendment (pp. 203–4); how unfortunate that the author offers not a single bit of supporting evidence or lead for the reader follow. This frequent failure to cite the interviews, secondary sources, or primary print sources on which the analysis is built makes this a much less useful and honest book than it could easily have been.

LESLIE J. CALMAN
Barnard College, Columbia University

Political Equality in a Democratic Society: Women in the United States *by Mary Lou Kendrigan. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1984. 149 pp. $27.50.*

The emergence of a feminist movement almost two decades ago was accompanied by a resurgence of interest in the political behavior of women and a normative political theory made newly vital by those writing from a feminist perspective. Yet, as in the social sciences generally, these philosophical and empirical analyses have proceeded on separate tracks. In this short book, Mary Lou Kendrigan utilizes both traditions in assessing the feminist quest for political equality within a democratic system. Empirically, she is concerned with identifying those public policies which lead to greater gender equality. In doing so, she raises a variety of questions: the relationship between politics and women's equality; the impact of social change on gender equity; the nature of egalitarianism; and the relationship betweeen democracy, political equality, and the larger social and economic system.

This book is a good starting point for one seeking a concise survey of current literature on women and conventional politics, feminist theory, and the economic and social status of American women. The author takes the position that politics is both a significant source of current discrimination against women and a potential avenue to redress. Political participation can result in greater political equality, but such tools are of limited use

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in effecting changes in inequalities based in employment stratification, familial roles, or the basic socialization process.

A major strength of the book rests with its argument for an equality defined in terms of equal results. Recognizing the powerful symbolism of equality, as well as the lack of consensus over its meaning, Kendrigan considers and rejects a variety of definitions in favor of one which treats people differently in order to treat them more equally ("equality of results"). Unfortunately, she is better at delineating the pitfalls of competing definitions than at persuading the reader of the feasibility of policies geared to an equality of results. For example, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (based on a definition of equality as "equal treatment") has proven to be clearly inadequate in a labor force stratified by gender. Conversely, treating persons as equal because of their common humanity and accepting differences between the sexes in order to deal equally with all have enormous abstract appeal. But, in a credentials-happy society such as ours, the support needed for such a redefinition of "merit" may well be lacking. Given the radical differences between an "equality of results" and "equality of opportunity" or "equal treatment," the author needs to provide a better developed blueprint for implementation. At a minimum, she might have suggested policies—actual, proposed, or merely visionary—that would facilitate equality of results.

More satisfactory is the thoughtful discussion of the dual nature of social change in achieving gender equality. Although both female participation in the paid labor force and smaller families have the potential to reduce gender inequalities, their relationship is not a simple one. As family size had decreased, the standards for "mothering" may have risen. Further, since women's economic advancement is closely tied to the state of the economy, economic deterioration may actually decrease the status of women.

In general, the weaknesses of the study stem from goals too ambitious to be met within such a short book. The links between political equality and democracy remain underdeveloped. Nor does the author deliver on her promise to evaluate the impact of feminist theory on politics, although this shortcoming rests primarily with theorists who have largely ignored the realm of conventional politics. As it stands, the book raises several important questions but stops short of providing innovative answers.

JANET K. BOLES
Marquette University

Power, Passions and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations *edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati and John Gerard Ruggie. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1984. 338 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $12.50.*

These twelve thoughtful and thought-provoking essays were first presented in January 1983 at the Conference on Global Negotiations in New Delhi, jointly convened by the Indian Council for Research in International Relations and the International Economics Research Center of Columbia University. The major recommendations of that conference were to suspend temporarily or to bypass the Global North-South Negotiations, and to

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convene an international monetary conference in their stead. Not surprisingly, the former recommendation in particular was hotly contested. However, by the time of the non-aligned countries' meeting in March 1983, both ideas had won wide acceptance. The Global Negotiations were put on the back burner for a year and calls for an international monetary conference have proliferated.

In addition to making a compelling argument for these recommendations, by briefly describing and explaining the changing style and substance of the North-South dialogue, these relatively short, tightly argued, hard-nosed essays also seek to answer the question of what alternatives the South has to negotiations, given the prevailing global power configuration and the authors' judgments as to its likely stability. Whereas the alternatives aren't necessarily new, the essays are generally quite good, in part because the authors—economists, political scientists, and practitioners—have been carefully selected. For example, Padma Desai's essay on so-called East-South possibilities is both historically and empirically grounded: her conclusion offers little comfort for those believing that the South has much to expect from the Soviet Union. Sanjaya Lall's chapter suggests that South-South economic prospects are a bit more promising, but only if developing countries are willing to ease the restrictions on access to their markets.

A similar argument for free markets is evident in Martin Wolf's essay in which he boldly suggests " . . . that the demands of developing countries, however understandable in origin, were mistaken and were indeed damaging to the sustainability of the liberal trading system where they were not directly damaging to developing countries themselves" (p. 203). Carlos F. Díaz-Alejandro's position is not very different. It is his "basic viewpoint" that " . . . a major lesson of the early 1980s is simply a variation on that of the 1930s: Deep and prolonged slumps, especially if accompanied by protectionist pressures in industrialized countries, are incompatible with international financial markets of tolerable efficacy and threaten international monetary cooperation and stability" (p. 181). As these quotes suggest, some will find this collection of essays a bit unbalanced in terms of ideological representativeness. Such concerns are likely to be exacerbated by the fact that Muchkund Dubey's essay, "A Third-World Perspective," is far from the strongest in the collection.

Much more original is John W. Sewell and I. William Zartman's investigation of the negotiating process in order to "formulate the possibilities of a favorable outcome and to change the perception of non-negotiability" (p. 92). They do this by analyzing both the "center ring" negotiations, such as the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) and the United Nations Committee on the Whole (COW) and also the less prominent negotiations, such as those resulting in the Multifiber Agreement and the International Wheat Agreement. By so doing, they discover that North-South negotiations have too often been divorced from domestic concerns both in the North and the South. After teasing out some fascinating implications of this and other findings, they make a series of concrete suggestions about how to improve the negotiating process.

Indeed, an added strength of many of these essays consists of concrete suggestions about what should be done right now. Building on and updating an earlier work done with Miriam Camps, Catherine Gwin does this in terms of international economic institutional reforms. And Jere R. Behrman includes suggestions in his up-to-date evaluation

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of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The book concludes with an interesting "Statement on North-South Economic Strategy," drafted by Bhagwati and Díaz-Alejandro.

MICHAEL G. SCHECHTER
Michigan State University

Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis *edited by Giovanni Sartori. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1984. 455 pp. $27.50.*

Valiant and unafraid, Giovanni Sartori, and eight of his most faithful knights, here venture forth to slay the monsters and dragons, the sloppy connotations and denotations, and the ambiguities that lurk so menancingly in the forest of symbols. They are sustained in the good fight by a firm belief in the true doctrine of logical positivism as taught by the wise men of the Vienna Circle. They believe firmly that if they only succeed in cleaning up the conceptual apparatus of political science discourse, the promised land of a truly empirical science can soon be entered.

Sartori provides "Guidelines for Concept Analysis" in the first part of the book. The second part consists of applications of these guidelines to such selected concepts as "Consensus" (by George J. Graham, Jr.), "Development" (by Fred W. Riggs), "Ethnicity" (by Robert H. Jackson), "Integration" (by Henry Teunel), "Political Culture" (by Glenda M. Patrick), "Power" (by Jan-Erik Lane and Hans Stenlund), and "Revolution" (by Christoph M. Kotowski).

Although the authors differ in their approaches, some of them mainly intend to illustrate the conceptual confusions now prevalent in their areas of inquiry; others attempt to provide their own conceptual clarification of the semantic jungle that surrounds the concepts they discuss; they are all largely guided by Sartori's main precepts. They all argue that political science concepts are at present marred by much ambiguity inasfar as they lack specification of the meanings of the terms used. These writers argue further that specification of meaning is not enough since political science concepts are also infested by the vagueness of referents and denotations. Political scientists can only come to grips with the "real world" if they have precise concepts. By cleansing the conceptual apparatus of ambiguity and vagueness, by defining terms so that they are unequivocal and consistent, by specifying connotations and denotations, and by seeing to it that any concept is clearly differentiated from related concepts within specific semantic fields, one can attain a purified set of tools. The reconstruction of political science must proceed through the reconceptualization of its vocabulary.

That the language of political science is beset by a confusion of tongues, that it is a Tower of Babel, to use a term that Sartori and his collaborators used as the title of a previous book, there can hardly be any doubt. Not only do various authors define the terms they utilize in confusingly different ways, but even the same authors use terms like "modernization" or "development" with drastically changed meanings from one study to the next. To S.N. Eisenstadt, political modernization means differentiation in an early

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work, whereas in later work differentiation is no longer alluded to and the term now refers to mobilization, democratization, and centralization. To David Apter, modernization meant differentiation, stability and choice in earlier work, whereas it refers only to emulation in labor writings. And so it goes.

The many examples of variant, contradictory, and confused conceptual thinking by various authors are valuable and instructive. They should serve the next generation of political scientists to eschew the sloppiness of their elders. Yet I remain skeptical about the hope that once the conceptual apparatus is cleaned up, a beautiful new world of positivistic political science is bound to dawn. What Sartori and his collaborators tend to forget is what Max Weber used to call the *Wertbeziehung* (value relevance) of all scholarly endeavors in the social sciences. You cannot get rid of the divergent interests and orientations of political scientists by cleaning up their language. This is clearly too weighty a question to be taken up at the end of a short review, so let me just use one example from this book. Kotowski (p. 413) defines violence as "illegal actions to do physical harm to persons or property in violation of recognized social norms." Thus, when a French cop hit me over the head during an antifascist demonstration in the late 1930s that wasn't violence at all, even though it hurt like hell. Surely definitions have consequences and Kotowski's definitions, far from being antiseptically neutral, can surely be used as a weapon in the arsenal of conservative thought. We still need the sociology of knowledge alongside the disciplined clarification of language that is advocated here.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Obbligato: Notes on a Foreign Service Career *by Wiliam H. Sullivan. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1984. 279 pp. $16.95.*

Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, in their analysis of the fall of the Shah of Iran, describe William Sullivan as "a tough-minded professional, whose political independence had earned him the suspicion of successive American administrations. Nixon thought he was a 'Johnson man'; the Carter people considered him a 'Kissingerian'." That, surely, is the state of affairs which should exist in the foreign service, the model of the diplomatic art. A man about whom it is said that he combined great ability and independent thought with a close fidelity to the policy of the government should have a lot of which to be proud.

And so it is here. William Sullivan has written his memoirs, or a selection of vignettes from those memoirs, with great pride and evident satisfaction. He remarks that he graduated from Brown University *summa cum laude*, and his rendition of his experiences in the Navy during World War II, and in a variety of diplomatic posts afterwards, tend toward self-praise. These stories are well told and quite interesting in their own right. Coups in Thailand and gaffes in Italy are the stuff of adventure, and the author has a fine sense of connecting the nice moments of his career with larger issues of world politics or international cultural developments. When Sullivan emerges as a highly valued civil servant,

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consulted by Kennedy and Kissinger and highly valued by W. Averell Harriman, it comes as no surprise, for we are led to expect that the shrewd hero of these tales is definitely on his way up. The last chapter deals with the most exciting and important segment of Sullivan's work, his time as ambassador to Iran, and the book ends fittingly with the author's choice comments on other people's (Americans, Iranians, etc.) folly. In an intentionally revealing recollection Sullivan tells how he and Duncan Sandys worked together to assuage Pakistani-Indian hostility in 1962, only to see much of the work aborted by Sandys's tactless conduct with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The old cliché about British suavity and American lack of sensitivity is turned on its head. Here the American is an accomplished man of culture (Sullivan quietly points out his easy command of French and other languages throughout the book), while the Englishman is something of a bounder. Very deft.

This theme is the leitmotif of the book. America has come of age, but it is a difficult age. It is not Harry (never Henry) Luce's American Century. The responsibilities of Americans in this difficult epoch are vast, and in the Introduction the author suggests that they may well be too hard for most of us. It is mighty fortunate that the handling of the "elements of our hegemony we no longer wished to dominate" can be "left to a collection of specialists and professionals to muddle through" (p. 12). The use of words is careful and significant; diplomacy is definitely not too important to be left to the diplomats, but on the other hand important enough to require the best trained and experienced (and smartest?) professionals. Nor is this merely a good idea for our republic; it may be literally vital.

The charming anecdotes which comprise this little book are, therefore, not aimless products of a fine raconteur's memory, but deliberate cautionary tales designed to edify and instruct. The heroes of the last forty years are, aside from the author himself, men of professional excellence. Averell Harriman is a prime example of the public figure Sullivan admires, while Henry Kissinger might qualify if he sticks to the better part of his nature. The Lyndon Johnsons and Jimmy Carters of American life are subtly cast as interlopers in the delicate business of world leadership—interesting men (as Johnson is clearly shown to be) but not truly up to their tasks. The conclusion that the world, and our country, would be safer and finer if affairs were left to the likes of William Sullivan is pounded, or rather insinuated, home.

This is not a popular message, but that does not preclude it from being a valuable one. This is, in the jargon of our time, an elitist book, and a quite effective one.

JOSEPH LOSOS
St. Louis, Missouri

Controlling Regulatory Sprawl: Presidential Strategies from Nixon to Reagan *by Howard Ball. Westport, Conn, Greenwood Press, 1984. 206 pp. $29.95.*

This is a highly opinionated book on a very important subject: the control of government regulatory behavior by the president. Unfortunately, it contributes very little to the on-

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going debate over presidential oversight. Ball has a definite point of view: he believes that strong central control is important as a way of coordinating policy and improving the political accountability and analytic capacity of agencies. He supports the aims of President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 which seeks to increase oversight by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and mandates cost-benefit analyses for major regulations.

While I am very sympathetic with the author's basic perspective, a book should do more than state a strong thesis. It should also increase our understanding of the issues it raises. This Ball does not do, at least not for readers already familiar with the literature on executive oversight. The bulk of the book (Chapters 1–4) is a review of this literature with extensive quotations and citations and very little analysis. These chapters may provide a useful introduction for some readers new to the topic, but the author makes no original contributions, either empirical or theoretical. Finally, in Chapter 5, the author does spend a few pages analyzing the Toxic Chemical Labeling Standard, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that was originally criticized by OMB. The OMB ruling was protested by OSHA, and the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief eventually overruled the OMB staff. The documents on which Ball bases his discussion take up sixty-five pages at the back of the book. Thus it would be possible to use this material for a case analysis within the context of courses on regulation or the presidency. While publishing internal government documents on the Toxic Chemical Labeling Standard will surely be useful to some students and scholars, the author himself uses them mainly for descriptive purposes. His "evaluation" of the issues covers only four pages and is neither deep nor enlightening. In fact, this case of OMB failure is hardly the most congenial example to use to buttress his position in favor of presidential oversight.

In considering the toxic chemical labeling case, the author does not confront one fundamental problem with the Executive Order: the Order does not lead to the coordination of overlapping regulatory regimes. It is only a requirement dealing with individual regulatory proposals. Thus it is not responsive to the need to increase coordination which Ball, rightly I think, sees as a major responsibility of the presidency. The author never directly discusses reform proposals which might respond to this problem.

In short, the book is not a genuine contribution to scholarship. The author is opinionated, but he has not backed up his point of view with either hard analysis or newly developed facts.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Columbia University

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Dismantling America: The Rush to Deregulate *by Susan J. Tolchin and Martin Tolchin. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983. 323 pp. $16.95.*

Although Susan Tolchin is a professor of public administration at George Washington University, and her husband Martin Tolchin is the veteran congressional correspondent of the *New York Times*, their book is dominated by the perspectives of journalism rather than those of academic research. This is to say that it contains a great deal of information, quotations from named and anonymous sources, numerous examples, and not very much in the way of systematic analysis.

The authors are unabashedly in favor of both the older variety of economic regulation exemplified by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission and the newer form of consumer, occupational safety and health, and environmental protections that came into vogue in the 1960s and early 1970s. On page 1, they quote approvingly the late Jerry Wurf, president of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, to the effect that "Regulation is the key to civilized society." Half way along, on p. 135, they cite Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Nicholas A. Ashford to the effect that "the American people save billions of dollars each year as a direct result of federal regulation in the areas of health, safety and environment." Ashford is that rare economist who occupies himself computing the benefits rather than the costs of regulation, among them estimates of Occupational Safety and Health Administration annual savings of $15 billion in medical costs and time lost, and gains from clean air standards somewhere between $5 billion and $58 billion per year.

Naturally the Tolchins can't discover anything good in the Reagan drive to deregulate practically everything that this administration's true believers discovered to their horror to be regulated when they arrived. The bill of indictment, as here drawn, is long. The president appointed opponents of regulation to the regulatory agencies. Administrators like the Environmental Protection Agency's now departed Anne Gorsuch Burford lobbied Congress for smaller budgets, a startling reversal of bureaucratic tradition. At the Federal Trade Commission where a free marketeer, James Miller, succeeded the activist Michael Pertschuk as chairman, the new Reagan broom swept away numerous proposed regulations and sedulously refrained from any hint of new ones. The Tolchins charge that at least one fatal air crash should be charged to the relaxation of regulatory vigilance. Their quick inspection of drug regulation, mine safety, product reliability, and workplace protection produces the common judgment that in their bigoted devotion to free enterprise, the Reagan deregulators have put the public at risk and, incidentally, removed one of the pressures for high quality products badly needed by American competitors in world markets.

Cost-benefit analysis particularly outrages the authors on legal, ethical, and analytical grounds. Citing Justice William J. Brennan in their support, the Tolchins blame the Office of Management and Budget for insisting on cost-benefit tests for exposure to cotton dust in textile mills in defiance of Congressional standards. As ethicists, they ask indignantly how anyone dares quantify the value of a human life. As analysts, they make some shrewd points about the difficulties of quantifying such public benefits as the beauty of

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the Grand Canyon and about the tendency of the dull types who are drawn to cost-benefit studies to ignore whatever they cannot place a dollar sign before.

As polemic, this book is a success. It fails to make an equally persuasive case for regulation and to distinguish as clearly as is desirable regulation which genuinely protects public health and safety from the variety of regulation which serves mostly to shield existing entrepreneurs and workers from the blast of competition.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
City University of New York

Majority Leadership in the U.S. House *by Barbara Sinclair. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 263 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.95.*

Barbara Sinclair offers a solid, clearly written analysis of how the leaders of the Democratic party in the U.S. House of Representatives sought to achieve their goals during the Carter presidency and during the first year of the Reagan presidency. She skillfully sets the efforts of the 1977–1981 period in the context of the changes in rules, expectations, and membership that developed rapidly in the House in the early 1970s. The particular individuals serving as leaders in 1977–1981 and their strategies come alive through adroit use of apposite examples, both brief and extended, involving specific bills.

The book contains a few general propositions about leadership in Congress, some categories of activities and strategies in 1977–1981, and lots of detail based primarily on participant observation and interviewing during the period under examination. This mix has been used in other good books on Congress and works well again here.

The author has some major themes that integrate the book. Four come through as being most important. First, leaders in the House derive much of their influence from being in a position to satisfy the expectations of those who are led (the rank-and-file Democratic members of the House). These members pursue the goals of reelection, influence within the House, and participation in the shaping of national policy. This fact of leadership dependent on followers immediately puts the leaders in a delicate position.

Second, the leaders must constantly pursue two major goals: building winning coalitions on legislation and, simultaneously, maintaining harmony within the party ("keeping peace in the family"). Often the demands of the two goals logically lead to different patterns of leadership behavior. Successful leaders somehow have to balance those competing demands and make the right choices to further both goals as best they can.

Third, the leaders in 1977–1981 developed a three-part strategy in searching for success. They provided a variety of services to members; they sought to structure the choice situations facing House members by using their powers over such matters as scheduling and assignment of bills to committees; and they developed a "strategy of inclusion." This latter part of the general strategy was the key to their attempts to reconcile the inherent conflicts built into the two major goals. By selectively altering the patterns of inclusion of Democrats they sought both to accommodate some dissidents or potential dissidents and, at the same time, to persuade the loyal to remain loyal and some of the dubious to

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become loyal, at least for one struggle, and thereby produce enough Democratic votes to win on the House floor.

Fourth, the leaders are constrained not just by events, rules, personalities, and other factors within the House, but they are even more severely constrained by external forces. The most severe restraint of all is that members, motivated by the desire for reelection, take many cues about policy behavior from their perceptions of constituency preferences. The leaders cannot create policy beliefs. The pattern of member beliefs is simply a given to which the leaders must adjust.

The only generalization the author has not supported convincingly, in my opinion, is that the situation she portrays is a lot different from that in the House prior to the reforms and other changes of the early 1970s. There are certainly some differences. But the best literature on the pre-1970s House leadership draws a general picture quite similar to Sinclair's. However, this generalization is not central to her argument. She also refers briefly to major constraints on leadership behavior that have existed consistently since 1910, when the House revolted against Speaker Joe Cannon. These references, if pursued, would find strong support in relevant literature. This one caveat, however, does not diminish her central contribution: a definitive picture of the House majority party leadership at work during these five years.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY
The Ohio State University

The State and the Poor in the 1980s *edited by Manuel Carballo and Mary Jo Bane. Boston, Auburn House Publishing Co., 1984. 328 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $14.95.*

This stimulating book is a repeat of a similar 1970 study also sponsored by The Kennedy Institute of Politics of Harvard University. At the request of a key Massachusetts state senator, Manuel Carballo recruited a team who brought up-to-date and expanded the previous study. This version was prepared by a group of individuals who had benefited from a combination of government and academic experience. At his recent untimely death Manuel Carballo was Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Human Services; Mary Jo Bane has recently become Executive Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services.

This is a study of issues and programs affecting the poor in Massachusetts, although the authors attempt to generalize some of their conclusions. There are three main sections: policies to prevent poverty; policies to ameliorate poverty; and implementing and financing programs for the poor. Inevitably there is some overlap, and material could have been organized differently, but on balance the arrangement works well. There is so much material that this reviewer found frustrating the inevitable space limitations.

The editors define the nature of the poverty population with its multiple causes and possible responses. Bane's analysis of the dynamics of poverty, the increase in poor

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female-headed families (especially minorities) and the troublesome issue of a possible underclass is especially thought-provoking.

The first section focuses on employment, health care, and primary and secondary education. In his chapter on work, David Ellwood emphasizes the difficulties of poor people in attaining self-support and the need for a variety of approaches, including part-time and supported work, education, and training. At best progress will be slow and expensive which is even more true of the current situation.

In discussing health care, David Blumenthal and David Calkins point out that national programs have improved the health status of the Massachusetts poor, but not up to that of the nonpoor. They emphasize the values of programs such as community health centers and Supplemental Food Programs for Women, Infants, and Children and make helpful recommendations, although providing cost estimates and some priorities would have been valuable.

Rosemary Salamone's chapter on education is specific, with a good analysis of the impact of Proposition 2½ with its taxing and spending limitations. Her recommendations make sense but raise questions as to political feasibility.

Section two—policies to ameliorate poverty—includes income transfers, transportation, housing, and crime. Bane proposes that welfare programs be part of the income security system—what she calls "the Social Security ideal" (page 118). She emphasizes the need for work incentives, expanded child support, and higher welfare levels while recognizing the inherent dilemmas and conflicts among adequacy, equity, costs, and administration.

Transportation, housing, and crime pose well-defined issues and proposals for action. Surprising was Jose Gomez-Ibanez's conclusion about the importance of private automobiles and the limited relationship between transportation and unemployment.

The analyses of taxation, policy planning, and governance are also of high quality. Policies for fairer taxation, for specific policy planning for the poor, and for improved service delivery make sense. But the difficulties are overwhelming and probably understated.

Carballo's concluding chapter on governance is first-rate with emphasis on the limited political power of the poor and what he defines as the current political dialogue that has "made the sole end of government not to govern well but to govern least" (page 304). His recommendations are convincing, including his emphasis that good management and good professional care are not mutually exclusive.

Inevitably, a thought-provoking book raises questions about which there are legitimate differences of opinion. I would give more emphasis to the federal role in income support and related programs; the roles of local government and the private sector also get very limited attention.

There will be differences as to the extent to which the Massachusetts experience is applicable to other states, and the book will have a special appeal to those familiar with that state. However, it is deserving of a much wider audience for the thoughtful and provocative ways in which it presents the issues and policy and program proposals. Above all, I

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hope it stimulates similar studies in other states. That indeed would be an outstanding contribution.

MITCHELL I. GINSBERG
Columbia University

The Frustration of Policy: Responses to Crime by American Cities *by Herbert Jacob. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1984. 188 pp. $9.95.*

For several years, Herbert Jacob, Robert L. Lineberry, and a number of junior associates have engaged in an ambitious and fascinating study of how and why ten American cities (Atlanta, Boston, Houston, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Newark, Oakland, Phoenix, Philadelphia, and San Jose) responded to the problem of crime over the period between 1948 and 1978. Because of their efforts to amass comparable, longitudinal data, for the first time we have solid evidence about the evolution of this vexing problem and how governments in quite a diverse array of jurisdictions perceived and coped with it. To gain a sense of the quality and quantity of responses, Jacob and associates collected statistics about crime and governmental actions and indications of press attention to crime, assembled chronicles on campaigns in municipal elections, spoke with local observers to reconstruct the cities' histories, and recorded the changes wrought by state and local bodies in legislation. It appears as though Jacob's *The Frustration of Policy* contains the highlights of the project's findings, though I suspect that one can still consult a number of the previous published and unpublished reports with considerable profit.

Someone with a glib sense of humor might summarize Jacob's findings as establishing that different cities in different situations responded in a variety of ways with different consequences. For he did uncover striking variations across the ten cities. But, quite apart from the intriguing differences from city to city, Jacob demonstrates a series of amazing commonalities of experiences. In the final reckoning, similarities overwhelmed the differences, which allows Jacob to speak in generic terms of the goverment's reactions to crime.

Page after page, chapter after chapter, Jacob narrates a tale of woe. He lists at the outset three basic reasons for "the frustration of policy" on crime: fragmentation of the structure of government and of law enforcement; lack of understanding of crime among the public; and the lack of technology to fight crime. By the 1970s in these cities, crime had risen on the public agenda, conflict over crime had increased, law enforcement had become enmeshed with the politics of race, and the days in which the management of the police was solely a matter for the chief had ended. In the face of awakened interest in public order, officials could not seem to fashion an adequate grip on the problem. Policy makers, Jacob remarks, "are uncertain about how much crime there is, of what elements the crime problem is composed, and what causes crime" (p. 34). Not only do crime statistics "play tricks" on officials, but also the mass media supplement confusion in reporting on crimes beyond municipal borders. Officials failed to deal with the problem

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because they mistakenly believed that crime stems from local sources, when in fact crime is a function of the "pool of potential offenders," "the availability of targets," and the "degree to which those targets are guarded" (p. 55).

Even if few officials understood the nature of the beast, surely these local governments must have responded with greater funding as the problem rose higher on the agenda. Yet, as Jacob nicely demonstrates, for the most part expenditures grew incrementally, "cities did not in fact respond to rising crime rates by allocating more resources to the police" (p. 87). Much of the increases in budgets simply dribbled away into salaries of police officers already on the job rather than into new positions. And federal funding, rather than feeding innovation, permitted localities to reduce their own contributions to the support of law enforcement. Police, Jacob argues, did little to cope effectively with the changing environment of modern urban society. As communications have improved, police have become more and more "reactive" rather than "proactive," which translates into more calls for help and fewer resources for more traditional functions. Police became more professional, better paid, more efficiently organized, but nonetheless could not stem the tide of common crimes. Perhaps the expansion of resources for law enforcement would have come to naught, because, as Jacob shows, the ten cities did increase the personnel available to the courts and the prosecutors with a result no more pleasing.

Toward the end, Jacob suggests some avenues that governments might travel in dealing more effectively with crime. The most plausible proposal, I thought, concerned a benign neglect toward crime on the part of the mass media. He contends silence on the issue might allow officials to act responsibly and sensibly without making false promises that backfire in the final analysis. Of course, none of these points of departure can escape the central facts that Jacob argues so well: strategically placed actors do not understand the problem, police lack proper technology to respond to common crimes, and we as a society show no evidence of the resolve to devote adequate resources to law enforcement. So long as crime carries an explosive emotional load, ambitious politicians on occasion will utilize the issue in a manner inimical to the effective combatting of crime. To focus, as Jacob has done, on one area of policy permits intensive analysis but also obscures the connections between issues on the urban agenda. Jacob demonstrates an awareness of this problem, and I mention it only to suggest that researchers might well find profit in analyses of other policies along the lines of *The Frustration of Policy.*

GREGORY A. CALDEIRA
The University of Iowa

The Politics of Law and Order: Street Crime and Public Policy *by Stuart A. Scheingold. New York, Longman, 1984. 238 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $13.50.*

Ten years after the publication of *The Politics of Rights*, Stuart Scheingold has produced a companion volume on crime policy. The sequence of the two books is appropriate, for the first followed a twenty-year period of extensive civil rights activism and the second appears after a twenty-year period in which crime was an extremely salient political issue.

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Both books are devoted to the question of the possibility of achieving coherent public policy goals in their respective areas. Both end on very skeptical, if not pessimistic, notes.

The Politics of Law and Order is rooted in the sociological school of thought known as "conflict criminology." "The underlying premise of confict criminology," Scheingold writes, "is that individuals differ from one another in a variety of ways that affect the goals they choose as well as their chances of reaching those goals." Moreover, "organization and struggle tend to reinforce the interests and values shared within groups and to distance them from their competitors" (p. 21). This orientation differs from both mainstream criminology, which too easily assumes that public debate can lead to a coherent public policy, and the Marxists view, which holds that the crime issue is but one symptom of an irreconcilable division of society along class lines. Scheingold's use of conflict criminology leads him to suggest a continuing public policy stalemate, although one that does not escalate into overt class conflict.

As he did in his earlier book, Scheingold draws heavily upon Murray Edelman's analysis of the symbolic aspects of politics. Individual citizens derive their views on crime policy less from personal experience (that is, victimization) than from what they see as the symbolic aspects of certain policy proposals. Thus, most of the public debate is "sound and fury" (p. 204), the manipulation of images for purposes of political mobilization. Scheingold effectively argues, in the course of several chapters, how the sound and fury of the law and order debate is irrelevant to the formulation of coherent policy on particular criminal justice issues such as policing and plea bargaining.

The chapter on neighborhood justice (Chap. 8: "Beyond the Politics of Law and Order") is particularly valuable as Scheingold offers an early analysis of what has been emerging as a popular, if not trendy, approach to criminal justice policy. He makes a persuasive case that the attempt to develop a more informal and less legalistic approach to dispute resolution faces a number of fundamental obstacles—essentially the same obstacles encountered by other recent reform efforts.

The Politics of Law and Order is highly recommended as a provocative analysis of contemporary criminal justice policy.

SAMUEL WALKER
University of Nebraska at Omaha

The Contested City *by John H. Mollenkopf. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1983. 328 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $6.95.*

This excellent study examines the role played by governmental and political forces in shaping the contemporary urban landscape. More specifically, it focuses on the rise and decline of the political coalition associated with the urban liberal wing of the Democratic party that helped bring about the transformation of the nation's old central cities from locales of manufacturing to sites for office work. This coalition developed and enacted a series of governmental programs which were of primary import in the emergence of the "postindustrial city" (p. 12). In the course of implementing these programs, the coalition

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engendered opposition which led to its disintegration, with the consequence for the nation's cities that the metropolitan areas of the Sunbelt are growing at a much faster rate than the urban locales of the Frostbelt.

To elaborate the author's thesis, while the industrial city had been the product of private market forces, the "postindustrial city" owes its existence to governmental intervention which channeled and shaped economic trends. It was during the New Deal that a national urban program first made its appearance. The public employment programs of Franklin D. Roosevelt—the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA)—primarily employed the urban working class, core of the New Deal's electoral support, on public works projects which initiated the transformation of the old central city. In succeeding decades, a "progrowth coalition" (p. 3), composed of many of the disparate elements of the Democratic party such as labor, the political machine, minorities, the new urban professionals, and the Central Business District (CBD) business community, was formed and helped promote the enactment of such programs as urban renewal, subsidized housing, and aid to mass transit. While the activities of this "progrowth coalition" initially helped the Democratic party retain its traditional sources of support and majority party status, the implementation of these programs led to the break-up of the coalition. The development of the old central cities into administrative centers undercut the employment base for many in the white working class, while minorities found themselves displaced from their neighborhoods. The Great Society attempted, but failed, to placate these groups through such programs as the community action program, model cities, and the Housing Act of 1968.

These developments provoked two sets of responses. On a political level, the Republican party opposed the funding of these programs and sought to shift federal spending towards the newer cities of the Sunbelt and suburbia via such programs as defense spending and the "New Federalism." Moreover, in the private sector, economic disinvestment in the older central cities took place as the market reacted against the turbulence sown by the "progrowth coalition." The 1970s witnessed a major shift in investment patterns as growth rates soared in the metropolitan areas of the southwest while cities in the heartland went into relative and even absolute decline.

The study is outstanding in several respects, Its description of the changes which have occurred in American cities during the past half-century is comprehensive and well organized. Its analysis of the political forces and programmatic aspects of the urban development arena is sensitive and insightful. There are two excellent chapters presenting a case study of the implementation of the federal development programs in the cities of Boston and San Francisco which document the split that occurred within the Democratic party. Another excellent chapter analyzes the relative importance of political and economic factors in explaining the decline of northeastern cities and the explosive growth of southwestern metropolitan areas during the 1970s.

The author's argument is highly persuasive in its analysis of the impact of urban development programs on the liberal coalition. The question raised by the thesis, however, is whether its conceptual lens—the program and policies of the development arena—is too narrow for some of the conclusions that are drawn. It would seem that economic forces—such as the white ethnics becoming middle class and the mechanization of

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agriculture which led to the movement of blacks into northern cities—would have led to the break-up of the New Deal coalition irrespective of events in the public sector. Moreover, even if one limits one's focus to the political sphere, it would appear that issues in the areas of foreign policy, national economic policy, and social values were also relevant in understanding the disintegration of the coalition. Despite this limitation, *The Contested City* is an impressive and valuable study of the urban development arena during the past half-century and its impact on the nation's politics and cities.

STEPHEN DAVID
Fordham University

City Money: Political Processes, Fiscal Strain, and Retrenchment *by Terry Nichols Clark and Lorna Crowley Ferguson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. 440 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $15.00.*

It seems like only yesterday that several American cities were flirting with bankruptcy, while multitudes of others were hastily exploring the infant science of cutback management. Today, San Francisco has a large budget surplus, Boston has hired back its laidoff workers, and New York has been back on its fiscal feet for several years. Even Cleveland seems to have recovered from its glimpse into the fiscal abyss. Yet for close observers of the urban scene, the specter of city fiscal problems hovers just off-stage, and it is this underlying concern, not the new optimism, that prompts this book by Terry Clark and Lorna Ferguson and makes it interesting.

Using data from sixty-two cities from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) Permanent Community Sample, the authors argue that fiscal strain, especially in the short term, is essentially a product of political decisions, specifically, a failure by local officials to adapt municipal expenditures and debt to fluctuations in available resources. Indeed, fiscal policy in general is less a function in this view of the nature of the real property tax base, population growth or decline, or patterns of intergovernmental aid than it is of the political process. This process is conceptualized in a systems analysis in which the influence on fiscal policy of political leaders and large interests ("sectors") in the city—the middle class, minorities, public employees, and ethnic groups—is explored through a series of regressions. Thus a large middle class seems to have fueled pressures for taxing and spending limits that took on the appearance in some places of a taxpayers' revolt. When the black population is large, on the other hand, its preferences, articulated by sympathetic mayors and organized groups, increased spending in the early 1970s. The various ways in which citizen and group preferences emerge and combine to influence fiscal policy are the products of distinctive urban political cultures: New Deal Democratic, Ethnic Democratic, Republican, and New Fiscal Populist.

The authors tell us early on that their data challenge many widely accepted views, and at times they are certainly right. Perhaps the most striking example is the demonstration that fiscal strain is only weakly (if at all) related to local resources and indicators of deterioration. All sorts of targeting formulas assume otherwise, but this analysis shows that

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most "Northeast syndrome" characteristics—population loss, poverty, old housing, low market value of taxable property—are very modest predictors of urban fiscal strain.

Pittsburgh is employed as an illustration of the transcendent importance of the political process in fiscal policy outcomes. Mayor Peter Flaherty, the prototypical New Fiscal Populist, came into office in the late 1960s in a period of sharp job loss and growing poverty in Pittsburgh. Through vigorous work force reductions, tax cuts, little borrowing, and productivity increases, the city avoided the sort of fiscal crisis that beset other cities that failed to adjust to their diminished circumstances. Flaherty's success is attributed in part to the desire of the citizenry for restraint.

Although the book ends with two chapters of advice for government officials on what sorts of policies are more or less likely to reduce urban fiscal strain, nonspecialists in the social sciences are likely to find the book a difficult read. Lengthy descriptions of index construction, passages on the problems of operationalization, system model diagrams, and tables of regression coefficients do not make for smooth prose. The hardy reader, however, will find much of interest in this systematic analysis of the sources of fiscal stress and health.

PETER K. EISINGER
University of Wisconsin

Puerto Rican Politics in Urban America *edited by James Jennings and Monte Rivera. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1984. 166 pp. $27.95.*

Mainland Puerto Ricans are among the worst-off of all minority groups. For example, in 1980, slightly over half of Puerto Rican families had annual incomes below $10,000; for almost a quarter, annual income fell below $5,000. Because they form a relatively small portion of the U.S. population, however, and for other reasons as well, their economic, social, and political situation has largely been neglected as a subject for serious study. This volume, though not without its problems, is, therefore, a welcome addition to a meager literature.

The book is organized into three major parts. Part One traces Puerto Rican politics between the 1860s and the 1970s. Part Two examines contemporary politics in three cities—New York, Boston, and Chicago. Part Three looks at two substantive areas, labor activism and education, and contains a concluding chapter by Jennings. A bibliographic essay at the end, by Angelo Falcon, provides a concise overview of the literature on Puerto Rican politics.

The central theme that runs through the book is the issue of low electoral and organizational political participation. Voting rates for mainland Puerto Ricans hover in the range of 30 to 40 percent. While one is tempted to explain these rates by the population's low socioeconomic status, voting rates in Puerto Rico, where income is lower, have ranged between 73 and 83 percent since popular elections for governor were first allowed in 1948. Measures of organizational behavior are less precise, but it is fair to say that Puerto Ricans have not been as politically organized, or effective, as their Hispanic cousins, the Mexican-Americans of the Southwest, or American blacks.

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Several factors emerge from this collection to explain this low level of political activity. Among these are a "sojourner mentality" which derives, in part, from Puerto Ricans' U.S. citizenship, the island's proximity, and the relative ease of return; an urban Democratic party that, in the absence of serious political competition, historically has not sought Puerto Rican votes; and structural obstacles, such as gerrymandering, that have served to keep Puerto Ricans and other minorities from political influence equivalent to their numbers and that discourage interest in politics. Even when the rules of the game are changed, inadequate resources have prevented Puerto Ricans from effectively mobilizing, as suggested in an essay by Luis Fuentes, which chronicles the dominance of the teacher's union in a local New York community school board election.

The book has its share of flaws. Though Jennings and Rivera attempt to provide a unifying framework for the collection in the preface, they fail to do so; it is, in the end, a more disparate set of readings than they own up to. In several places, authors fail to provide supporting data for their arguments or, in the absence of data, sufficient caveats for their conclusions. On a more substantive point, Jennings' general conclusions that Puerto Ricans are moving toward increased electoral activism remains, in my view, a question open to empirical verification. Finally, the quality of the essays is very uneven. Recommended are Angelo Falcon's bibliographic essay as a good place to start; two very good pieces that cover Puerto Rican politics between 1860 and 1945, and then the post-World War II period, by Falcon and Sherrie Baver respectively; Jennings's piece comparing Puerto Rican politics in New York and Boston; Monte Rivera's interesting case study of organizational politics in East Harlem, even though its focus is more on "poverty politics" than Puerto Ricans per se; and Isidro Lucas's piece on Puerto Rican politics in Chicago. The others can be skimmed.

WILLIAM A. DIAZ
The Ford Foundation

Labor Relations in the Public Sector *by Richard C. Kearney. New York, Marcel Dekker, 1984. 337 pp. $29.75.*

Public employee unions, to a degree not widely understood, have reshaped the political structure of American government over the last twenty years. Their impact has been particularly profound on state legislatures and municipalities. Through a combination of lobbying, electioneering, bureaucratic and legal tactics, together with their newly won rights in collective bargaining, public sector unions have gained remarkable influence throughout the country.

As Richard Kearney notes, the literature on these organizations has been dominated by writers with an industrial relations background, but generally lacking a political perspective. It could also be said that there has been little policy analysis by those principally concerned with methods for the resolution of legal or economic disputes. As a political scientist, Kearney sets out to provide a more politically sophisticated, interdisciplinary approach to the political economy of public employment.

However, *Labor Relations in the Public Sector* is disappointing because it generally

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fails to enlarge, or even clarify, the methodological viewpoint suggested by its title. When it does, it is often dismaying in its lack of analytical rigor and its ideological, pro-union bias.

The opening chapter reflects all of these difficulties. The history of labor relations focuses primarily on legal developments, with scant attention to the political history of American labor and major gaps in its chronology. There is a reference to the criminal prosecutions of workers seeking to jointly negotiate wages in the early nineteenth century on the ground of conspiracy to restrain trade, but no mention of the use of the Sherman Antitrust Law of 1890 to recover civil damages on the same ground; nor to the Clayton Act of 1914, called "labor's Magna Carta," which exempted collective bargaining from the antitrust laws. There is only a passing, unexplained reference to the Wagner Act, which established collective bargaining rights in the private sector.

More troubling is the author's frequent and uncritical reliance on the broad conclusions of others and his own ideological preferences to define the issues examined in the first and succeeding chapters. In describing the contention that the delegation of executive authority to the labor and management parties in the collective bargaining process conflicts with the principle of democratic sovereignty, he makes the following noteworthy statement: "The argument would perhaps stand if American governments could demonstrate their delegative virginity. However the national government and the various subgovernments have for over two centuries consorted with private sector entities without the express permission of the electorate. (A common example would be the contracting out of weapons systems to private manufacturers.)" [p. 9].

This passage fails to distinguish between government purchase contracts, which are entered into after legislative appropriation of funds, and labor contracts negotiated before the appropriation process. It confuses direct and representative democracy and suggests that, once violated, sovereignty is lost irretrievably, regardless of the merits of the subsequent situation. The landmark work of Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *The Unions and the Cities*, which examined such theoretical issues and related policy questions, is dismissed in a single sentence with a parenthetical string of four citations, as having been "rebutted on numerous occasions" (p. 214).

While Kearney does cover a great deal of ground, most of it is familiar and he rarely pauses to define the issues, much less consider them. In fact, many of the terms defined in the text or the abbreviated glossary are poorly explained or unexplained. Moreover, while he observes that politics pervades the entire labor relations environment in government, Kearney spends only one page each on his description of the crucially important lobbying and electioneering activities of public employee unions. The three chapters on collective bargaining and the two on strikes make up two-thirds of the book and are largely based on prior works. The four sections called "case studies" (p. 206–207, 211–212, 224, 227, 234, 236) on public employee strikes are actually short recitations of the events, followed by the author's conclusions.

Kearney has correctly pointed out the need for "a broad, multilevel approach" (p. v) to the subject of public employee unions and public employment. A new analytical synthesis, drawing upon political, historical, legal, and labor relations insights, would help to shed light on state and local government, the quality of public services, and the

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emerging shape of American politics. The task of developing such an approach is a challenge to which others will hopefully rise.

FRANKLIN J. HAVLICEK
Columbia University

Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide *by Doris A. Graber. New York, Longman, 1984. 241 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $15.95.*

We have been told that we are in an information age; we are being inundated by more information than ever. Thus it is timely to get some insight into how mass society assimilates this tidal wave of data and to speculate on what the implication of this is for handling even more information and, in the case of political information, the implications for democracy.

In the spirit of Robert Lane, this ambitious work of Graber's eschews survey research to delve more deeply into the minds and behavior of twenty-one adult citizens of Evanston, Illinois. She and her team spent a year with the panel. They ranged in age from twenty-three to seventy-eight, nearly equally divided among men and women. Two were black women. They were each interviewed ten times in the year 1976, for a total of about twenty hours each. Graber spends a fourth of the book describing and justifying the research design. She acknowledges the limitations and advantages of this approach, but clearly felt that the benefits outweighed the drawbacks.

Graber's message is a positive one. She concludes that people have developed ways of managing information and that they are even relatively well informed. In the end, she believes that "Average people know how to accept and reject information" and are not likely to be "manipulated into large-scale acceptance of schemas that conflict with the basic tenets of American culture" (p. 216).

Along the way, Graber provides something for just about everyone. For students of mass communication, she provides some nifty content analysis of newspapers and news broadcasts and some findings on what these people see and don't see (or remember) from the newspaper and news broadcasts. For example, she found that her panelists ignored two thirds of the stories in the newspaper and, of the stories read, only 12 percent were on page one (p. 82).

For the learning theorists, she reviews the literature on uses and gratifications, cognitive balance, and agenda-setting theories, information-processing models, and schemas. And for the political scientists she discusses the implications of information processing activities for how people make political decisions.

In the end the pieces are more useful than the whole. In large measure this is because the author makes the leap (which she acknowledges as not being totally kosher) from specific findings from her panel to the population at large. Thus, whereas the content analysis stands on its own and the description of schema as applied to the panel is legitimate, her conclusions "gamble a bit and interpret the evidence boldly" (p. 201), with the hope that they will be ultimately substantiated.

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In addition to concluding that people are coping with the information explosion (at least her panel is), she feels that schematic thinking helps people sort out conflicing messages and reduces their resistance to influence from the media. Nonetheless, she warns that the words and verbal configurations of newspeople and politicians do bias reaction and response because of these schema. For example, while people will respond favorably to programs labeled "public assistance programs to the elderly and disabled," they are not as supportive of "welfare" programs (p. 213).

The author concludes further that, contrary to some popular wisdom, printed stories are easier for people to process than television stories (p. 214). She notes that 48 percent of the stories remembered by the panelists were attributed to newspaper stories, compared to 27 percent to television.

Among the shortcomings of the research, besides the admitted limitations of generalizing from nonrandom small group surveys, is the restricted scope of the information being studied. Although the title says "processing the news," most effort focused on the *political* news associated with the 1976 presidential election. Are train crashes and tennis match reports handled differently? What about commercial messages? It will also be up to others to make hypotheses from Graber's generalizations and see if, indeed, they are as robust as the author ventures to say.

BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE
Harvard University

Powers of the Press: Twelve of the World's Most Influential Newspapers *by Martin Walker. New York, Pilgrim Press, 1983. 401 pp. $20.00.*

The news industry, strengthened by electronics technology, is more pervasive and powerful than ever before. Yet its role in society and its rights and methods of operation still are not widely understood. For these reasons, this book is a valuable and timely contribution to fuller knowledge of the press, particularly as it performs in the international arena. It takes a rare look at, and compares, a dozen of the world's influential newspapers against a background of mounting concern, notably in the Third World, about the power and behavior of the Western news media.

The author, who has been a columnist and foreign correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, reflects this concern in an all-encompassing conclusion: "Our newspapers and our journalists have traditionally served their own freedoms and constitutional rights (and thus, by extension, the rights that Western society holds dear) rather bettter than we have served our readers' perceptions of the world around them. And plainly as the twentieth century draws to a close, this will no longer suffice" (p. 393).

The special importance of the so-called elite newspapers is that they set the agenda for all of the news media, including radio and television. Government leaders and other policy makers receive impressions of what is happening in the world filtered through the judgments of these newspapers.

Nine of the newspapers surveyed in this book are based in Western Nations: *The Times*

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of London, *Le Monde*, *Die Welt*, *Corriere della Sera*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Globe & Mail* (Toronto), *The Age* (Melbourne) and the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg). The others are *Pravda*, the organ of the Soviet Communist Party; Egypt's *Al-Ahram*, recognized to be well-informed about the Arab world; and *Asahi Shimbun,* the largest paper in Japan.

Certainly it could be argued that other newspapers deserve classification as "powers of the press"; the author concedes that his list is not exclusive. He says the selected twelve best fit his criteria for "influential" within the world context: they are committed to solid coverage of international affairs; they present editorials as their own institutional voices; they are known and read outside their own national boundaries; they are perceived as reflecting the shared experiences of their nations' leaders.

The bulk of the book is devoted to concise histories of how the newspapers attained their prestigious status, from which they derive their influence. In an attempt to indicate the political direction and concern for international news of each newspaper, the book offers two unusual features. The author has chosen sample editorial comments on twenty topics, seventeen of which are international crises since 1945. The comments are brief and thus only hint at the papers' views. He gives quantitative and qualitative surveys of each paper's coverage of Iran from 1971 to the fall of the Shah. The author concludes from these surveys that none of the papers did an adequate job of preparing the world for the revolution.

He extends this negative judgment by saying, "This failure is not confined to the Iran story. One has seen echoes of this process elsewhere, and in particular in covering the Islamic countries" (p. 390).

The author's conclusions may be debatable, but his well-researched study is of significance to those concerned about the media's vital role in an increasingly complex world. The significance would have been even greater if the book had dwelled less on the past and more on the present thinking and activities of the powers of the press.

DONALD H. JOHNSTON
Columbia University

The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy *by Montague Kern, Patricia Levering, and Ralph B. Levering. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1983. 290 pp. $29.00.*

Do presidents dominate news about foreign policy crises, using it as a tool to support their policies? Or do they react to crisis news, shaping their foreign policies to meet the concerns raised by news stories? The answer is "both," depending on the political circumstances which vary from crisis to crisis and even during various phases of a single crisis. These conclusions emerge from a carefully designed and elegantly executed study of media coverage and policy development in four foreign policy crises during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. The crises involve U.S. attempts to curb expansion of communist political control in Laos and Berlin in 1961, in Cuba in 1962, and in Vietnam in 1963.

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The authors, whose academic credentials encompass history and political science, have tapped a wide array of sources, including political actors and news people involved in these crises, to produce a vivid, multifaceted account of the forces that shaped policy in each case. Thousands of news stories were analyzed from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and *San Francisco Examiner* to determine the sources whose views were aired and the policies they favored. These major papers run the gamut from liberalism to conservatism, as well as illuminating regional differences. As is true of interpretive accounts generally, the motivations attributed by the authors to various actors involved in each crisis, while convincing, cannot be fully substantiated. Future historians of the period may disagree with a number of inferences and interpretations.

The book begins with a general appraisal of the interaction of the Kennedy administration with the press and an assessment of the differences among the various news sources examined. This discussion provides a welcome instructive antidote to the common practice of talking too broadly about "the presidency and the press" as if the differences among presidents and news sources were insignificant. With the scene set for careful probing of specific situations, detailed analyses of each of the four crises follow. A concluding chapter summarizes the insights gleaned from the four case studies and the political implications.

The book, which is illustrated with attractive graphs and photographs, makes fascinating reading. It shows that even a master of handling the press, who carefully cultivates press coverage and has close friendship ties with many journalists, cannot fully control the press. Kennedy's ability to win supportive press coverage varied from situation to situation and throughout various phases and aspects of each crisis.

As the authors describe it, the press exercise even less control over story coverage than the president. The press is characterized as a "reflective" institution. Political actors are the real newsmakers. If they are prominent enough, readily accessible, and if they provide exciting news, the press will usually serve as the mirror that reflects their stories, albeit distorted somewhat by the reporter's perspectives. The strongest competitors of the president for media attention, particularly during election periods, are other government officials who have substantial interests in foreign policy. Special interest groups and public opinion are given less coverage. If, as happens often in the realm of foreign policy, the president's voice is the only one and no competitors vie for attention, presidential views of political reality, by default, dominate the news scene. This is especially true for papers whose publishers share the president's perspectives.

In Kennedy's case, opposition views were publicized early in each foreign policy crisis but the president was able to eclipse his rivals in the latter stages of each crisis. Other presidents have fared less well. The chief power of the press over policy choices rests in news people's ability to foster their policy preferences by choosing among available views those that will be publicized and by emphasizing particular questions. Once issues and perspectives have come into news focus, presidential policies have to respond to them. The authors contend that the customary emphasis of the news media on audience-attracting confrontations and conflicts have pushed American presidents toward hard-line policy stances. They also criticize the press for failure to seek out a sufficiently broad array of

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foreign policy opinions whenever these opinions do not come to the fore spontaneously. These are serious charges. They place the book among the growing number of serious studies crying out for a more responsible American press.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

The Twenty-Year Century: Essays on Economics and Public Finance *by Felix G. Rohatyn. New York, Random House, 1983. 175 pp. $12.95.*

By the end of 1978 the New York City fiscal crisis seemed resolved and investment banker Felix Rohatyn, chairman of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), which helped save the city from bankruptcy, began giving speeches and writing articles. *The Twenty-Year Century* is a compilation of these speeches and articles.

These essays strongly reflect Rohatyn's experiences. His professional experience gives him insight into the world of business and politics. His personal experience as a refugee from Nazism motivates him to search for democratic solutions to what he sees as America's most pressing social and economic problems. Rohatyn is a self-proclaimed activist and negotiator. He sees the power and dominance of America as on the wane. According to Rohatyn, unless we act to solve our economic and social problems through active government intervention and the establishment of new institutions based on negotiated solutions to specific problems, we run the risk of creating a political climate that can breed populist but undemocratic responses to these problems.

The book hammers away at a limited number of themes: America is in crisis, its basic industries are threatened, the Sunbelt is growing at the expense of the Northeast and Midwest, the disparity between rich and poor is increasing, the banking system is overburdened, America must lead the free world. Being a book of essays written over a five year period, these themes are frequently repeated, revised, and expanded.

Unfortunately, Rohatyn's answer to most problems seems to be to reestablish the depression era Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which he likens to a national version of MAC. The new RFC would "provide (or withhold) capital in exchange for concessions (from management, labor, banks, suppliers, local governments) leading to healthy industries, economical public works and greater job security" (p. 15). It would seem to be based both on the voluntary cooperation of business, labor and government, and on coercive powers to compel agreements.

Over the span of the book Rohatyn presents many versions of the RFC. Although the latest is scaled down from earlier proposals, those proposals, because they are included in the volume, cannot be ignored. They include: financing inner city manufacturing facilities to create jobs, fight crime, and drug abuse; financing public works infrastructure; redressing regional disparities; financing Third World development; investing in alternative energy sources; and revitalizing declining basic industries. Taken together, they are a nagging reminder of the dark side of Rohatyn's proposal, the potential for it to be a magnet for special interest pleadings and a bureaucratic interference, slowing change, and causing the economy to become even more inefficient.

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In the end, what stands out about *The Twenty-Year Century* and makes it worthwhile reading, is the sense one gets that Rohatyn is talking about something of fundamental importance to the American political economic system and that some of his ideas, in particular the RFC, may one day come into being, even if strongly modified. One is struck by the idea, repeated in several of the essays, that Rohatyn's role model is Jean Monnet, who was widely acknowledged as the father of the European Economic Community (EEC). Rohatyn describes Monnet as playing the role in Europe of "negotiator, agitator, propagandist, tactician and strategist" (p. 84), roles sought by Rohatyn in promoting institutional change in the United States. Monnet changed the face of Europe when he created the European Coal and Steel Authority, which paved the way for the EEC. Although Rohatyn's RFC is not likely to be passed by Congress soon, there is a reasonable likelihood that before the end of this century, the intellectual and political groundwork being laid by Rohatyn and others may result in its adoption.

ELLIOT SCHWARTZ
Congressional Budget Office

Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change *by John Zysman. Ithaca. N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983. 358 pp. $24.00.*

John Zysman's overarching insight is that industrial growth and stagnation result from struggle, in which the political executive may be one of the fighters, and which he or she may win or lose. The central argument is that basic differences among the financial markets of different countries have profound implications for these politicians. Three types of financial system are correlated with three models of adjustment to changed industrial market conditions. In countries where finance flows to companies through long-term bank loans and where the government has the authority to allocate this flow, the state will lead the industrial struggle by operating its financial levers. But where the financial system consists of a few large banks not subject to such official tools, the state will have to negotiate with other economic players to establish arrangements that distribute the costs and gains. And where companies raise funds primarily through stock and bond markets, and where the chief executive lacks the full arsenal of financial instruments, financial markets will shackle the state, forcing it to accept a company-led process of adjusting. "Selective credit allocation is the single discretion necessary to all state-led industrial strategies" (p. 76).

The body of the book includes a historical essay on each of three countries that illustrate the correlation best—France, West Germany, and the United States, and it also dwells on Britain and Japan. Fresh, interesting insights emerge from Zysman's ability to perceive connections between distant events, and from his multicountry scope. For instance, with the financial focus he reveals different degrees to which companies are subject to influence. The notion of policy measures as means for forming alliances with supportive interest groups is appealing. The British material is potentially the most fertile,

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since the outcome is deviant because of this hypothesis: company-led adjustment was absent. The author does not focus, however, on this aspect.

Unfortunately, the argument is weakened by conceptual problems. The dependent variable is often expressed in vague phrases like "dealings between business and the state," and its meaning seems to waver. At some points, the book seems to want to explain government actions, and at others, to explain the degree to which intervention attempts actually work. Still other passages clearly aim to explain aspects of national economic performance itself (growth and decline, market share, inflation). The three types of adjustment process are not defined precisely, and the "negotiated" and "company-led" concepts are never even illustrated. The discussions of West Germany and the U.S. are quite brief and seem to have been appended almost as afterthoughts.

The tripartite financial-system variable is defined so as to include features of government policy; the three types are not limited to market characteristics. Thus the central argument—that this variable accounts for differences in government behavior or capacity—is circular in part.

The book's fuzziness also derives from a shortage of concrete evidence throughout. Zysman leans more toward metaphors than precise data. While the text is rich in brief historical references, it does not stop to develop a detailed case history of any industrial policy episode.

It also fails to establish why financial institutions and policy should be more decisive than other weapons in the political leader's arsenal. Executives nourish domestic alliances through spending, tax measures, and import restrictions, for example. The book does not compare the several alternative weapons systematically.

Still, this study is more ambitious and substantial than many other recent writings on industrial policy. It makes interesting and valuable contributions, even though it does not succeed completely. It will be particularly challenging to comparative policy analysts who believe that industrial policies are determined by industrial market conditions, government institutions, or ideologies.

JOHN S. ODELL
University of Southern California

Worker Capitalism: The New Industrial Relations *by Keith Bradley and Alan Gelb. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983. 186 pp. $20.00.*

Historical studies of social and political reforms have taught us that "progressive" changes are sometimes supported and pushed through for "conservative" reasons and vice versa. In contemporary politics, we usually think that the battle lines are clearer, but this study provides a powerful demonstration of the indeterminacy of contemporary reforms. Bradley and Gelb elaborate a conservative defense of the value of government policies to facilitate employee buy-outs of factories and firms that are being closed down by management. While most of the literature on employee buy-outs has focused on their efficacy as part of a project of radical social change, this study views employee buy-outs as a pragmatic and cost-effective aspect of industrial policy.

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Bradley and Gelb emphasize the paradox that there have been more experiments in employee buy-outs in the United States than in West European countries with far stronger socialist traditions. Their explanation is that the very weakness of the socialist tradition in the U.S. has made it possible for investors and governments in the U.S. to see employee buy-outs as a pragmatic response to plant and business closings. In Europe, in contrast, such experiments are likely to be resisted because they are perceived as posing some type of threat to capitalism.

The core of the book elaborates a series of case studies of employee buy-outs in the United States, Britain, and a number of other countries. While much of the American material is familiar, the British case studies, particularly the one on the *Scottish Daily News*, provide a great deal of valuable detail. Out of these comparisons, the authors develop a number of persuasive hypotheses about the circumstances under which employee buy-outs are likely to be successful.

They also develop a set of economic arguments about the cost-effectiveness of employee buy-outs. While they warn against government policies that are too generous in offering to save any faltering business, they suggest that if government loans are only offered in those cases where employees are willing to make considerable sacrifices, then such interventions can be justified on a cost-benefit basis. In developing this argument, they effectively critique standard economic arguments, such as the claim that if a firm were actually viable, then a normal capitalist purchaser would certainly make a reasonable offer for it.

But the contribution of the book is far more modest than its title would indicate. The authors are relatively unconcerned with the different industrial relations that characterize worker-owned firms. They make no connection between employee buy-outs and other types of innovation in management and industrial relations. Moreover, the book reads more as a collection of discrete sections, rather than as a well integrated manuscript. Still, as the Western economies continue to struggle with high levels of unemployment, employee buy-outs might well increase in significance. In that case, Bradley and Gelb's book represents a solid first step towards a political analysis of this phenomenon.

FRED BLOCK
University of Pennsylvania

The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade *by Harvey Klehr. New York, Basic Books, 1984. 511 pp. $26.50.*

One of the peculiarities of the surprisingly large—and still growing—historiography of the American Communist party (CP) has been the absence of any survey of the party during the 1930s, the era of its greatest influence. Harvey Klehr's book, based on massive research in the party press, FBI records, and manuscript collections, aims to fill that remarkable gap. In clear but dry prose, Klehr provides the most detailed account available of the CP in the Great Depression era, one that will serve as a starting point and reference work for future scholars of the party's history.

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Yet for all its enormous detail, Klehr's book is surprisingly limited. In his emphasis on the twists and turns of official party policy, Klehr takes a fundamentally institutional approach to the party's history. Although he discusses the party's organizing efforts among the unemployed, intellectuals, industrial workers, farmers, blacks, and youth in a series of chronological and topical chapters, his concern is not really with the grass roots organizing. Like some members of the party leadership in the 1930s, Klehr's gaze is fixed firmly on party headquarters in New York and even more on the offices of the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow. "To understand Communist actions in America," he writes, "it is not enough to study the CPUSA. . . . It was abroad, in Moscow, that the decisive formulations were made . . . " (p. 11).

In his narrow focus on party policy and party headquarters and his obsessive interest in the heavy hand of the Comintern, Klehr cuts against the grain of recent scholarship on the CP, which has emphasized its *social* history—the stories of the men and women who passed out leaflets, sold the *Daily Worker* on the corner, and marched in demonstrations. These scholars, who generally write from the perspective of the non-Communist left, have also made extensive use of oral history, a source that Klehr views with suspicion. Given these differences in focus, research, and politics, it is not surprising that their interpretation of the party's history also differs sharply from Klehr's. While they have generally offered a critical but generally favorable assessment of the party's actions and have emphasized the party's flexibility and responsiveness to local conditions (the willingness of organizers to ignore or reshape party directives that did not apply), Klehr finds nothing positive in the party's history. He continually hammers home his theme that "the ultimate source of Party policy was the Soviet Union," not "any internal changes in American society or the Party itself" (pp. xi, 415).

One problem with Klehr's argument is that his research design tends to rule out evidence that might undermine it. By examining the often unrecorded stories of local activists and organizers, one can see that the party was considerably more creative, flexible, and diverse than the grey manifestos emanating from party and Comintern headquarters make it appear. But the larger difficulty is that Klehr's dogged efforts to demonstrate repeatedly the close links between the American party and the Comintern, as well as party control of "front" organizations, lead him to neglect the more interesting and important historical question: why did the Communist party appeal to so many committed people and become the dominant force on the American left during the 1930s? Indeed, if one accepts Klehr's unrelentingly negative portrait of the party, this question becomes particularly puzzling. Any complete answer would have to begin by rooting the party's history in varied and specific ethnic, regional, racial, and industrial contexts. It would also have to explain—as Klehr does not—how despite the party's close ties (and even subservience) to Moscow, it became, at least for a time, an authentic expression of the American radical tradition.

ROY ROSENZWEIG
George Mason University

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The Politics of Recovery: Roosevelt's New Deal *by Albert U. Romasco. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. 276 pp. $19.95.*

Economic policy is the *locus classicus* for theoretical debates about the relationship between state and society. Two systems interact: capitalism and constitutional democracy. The poles of debate are easy to set out: the instrumental view of liberal-pluralist or Marxian theory, which sees the state as the register of the parallelogram of social force vectors or the statist view, which stresses the role of institutions and political entrepreneurs in shaping society, defining interests, selecting issues. Much energy is spent proving the other side wrong, all too often by caricature.

In this sequel to his book on Herbert Hoover, Romasco provides not explicit examination of theory, but, like good history, clearly developed material informed by theory that is able to combine varying elements into a coherent portrait that contributes both to an understanding of the specific subject, and to more general questions of theory and other historical events. From his account the reader can see the way each theoretical element accounts for a *different* element in the historical record.

Upon taking office, Franklin D. Roosevelt saw immense social unrest and pressure which threatened the political system. Particularly important was agitation from farmers, but more broadly from debtors of all kinds—silverites, urban elements, and many businessmen. This pressure could not be contained without action. Just what scenario inaction would have caused is not clear, though Europe offered plenty of possibilities. In Burkean fashion, the system had to be changed in order to save it.

So, à la Gandhi, FDR rushed to get ahead of his troops so that he could lead them. He pushed for legislation and action that would be politically gratifying and that would earn some support through policy satisfaction. Romasco shows carefully how concerned FDR was that unless he took steps, the initiative would pass to other hands, more fragmented, more diverse, more radical, more uncontrollable. He supported action and legislation the policy content of which he found questionable, but that would contain the energy of agitation. Thus, the role of pressure.

But in each case, the pressures had some ambiguity, slack, and openings for different responses. FDR chose to interpret in a conservative bent, supporting the more cautious elements demanding change. He blocked the more radical: in money, rejecting the most inflationary and loose money proposals; in farming, rejecting cost-plus production subsidies; in business, rejecting nationalization and planning, and so on. New Deal legislation repeatedly requested considerable grants of discretionary authority to the executive, creating even more room for the importance of leadership and choice. Again, repeatedly, this discretion was used in a conservative way—to sterilize the monetarization of silver, for example. Frequently, the legislation created or legitimated public and private organizations, from the Work Projects Administration (WPA) to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and trade unions belonging to the Congress of Industrial Organizations, which served the purpose of increasing state power and strengthening organizations loyal to FDR's political goals. This strengthened the importance of the state, the autonomy of leadership, the role of institutions in providing leverage for power, and the role of government in creating and defining constituencies.

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Yet, the way FDR used the discretion of a leadership situation tells us a good deal about the distribution of power in society, hence about societal pressures. Romasco's all too brief summary of FDR's hierarchy of response (pp. 244–45) notes that the "first beneficiaries of the New Deal's cornucopia included bankers of all sorts (bailed out from bankruptcy), commercial farmers of staple crops, large businessmen, home owners, states and cities." Others were added later, but, as Romasco's account shows, while the development of social security and the NLRB certainly annoyed the conservatives, this shift from First to Second New Deal also marked the decline of intervention in the management of firms and markets. Like the Swedish Social Democrats, FDR expanded the welfare state and some regulatory measures, but not public ownership or planning.

Is this leadership or an expression of the balance of forces? Unlike the diehard conservatives, FDR thought some change essential. But the change was channeled and contained, repeatedly the more radical measures beaten off. Against the threat of populist agitation was also the pressure of private property. The view of FDR as a masterful politician is a familiar one; so is the argument about the balance between undertaking reforms against the desires of capitalism. Romasco's contribution lies in the careful articulation of these themes in the context of specific arguments over economic policy. In each policy area, he sets out the other policy options being pushed so that the reader is better able to understand the choices actually made, hence to consider alternative explanations of that choice. The result is a fine source for comprehending the New Deal as a policy battle in political terms.

PETER A. GOUREVITCH
University of California, San Diego

The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations *by Richard Falk. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1983. 358 pp. Cloth, $39.50; paper, $16.50.*

This is a collection of essays, most of which have been previously published and some of which are a bit dated. They do not add up to a systematic treatise; they have unity, not in the sense that they constitute a book, but in the sense that they all contribute to the reader's understanding of the mind and mood of the author. Falk makes no pretense to scholarly objectivity—for that, in his view, implies endorsement of the status quo, and he is, proudly and insistently, a radical. He writes as a leading figure in the World Order Models Project (WOMP), and his dedication to the Movement is consistently evident. Nonetheless, his tone is not shrill or polemical. Although this is not the book to which one should turn for balanced analysis of the record and status of the state system, it does provide a provocative introduction to a point of view that seriously and soberly challenges mainstream thinking about world affairs.

Falk's condemnation of the state system is tempered solely by his friendly regard for peoples of the Third World, which makes him sympathetic with their achievement of statehood. This approval can only be fleeting, however, for his fundamental conviction

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is that the division of the world into states is utterly incompatible with the realization of the values that are featured in the WOMPish vision of world order: peace, economic well-being, social and political justice, and ecological balance. The author's radicalism lies in his insistence upon a planetary outlook that demands the repudiation of the state system and many of the institutions and loyalties that undergird it.

What is to replace the bad old system? Falk has little of the easy self-confidence that characterized the last generation's world federalists, who simply prescribed a centralized political system as the solution to the problem of war. Far more sophisticated than they were, he disclaims a grand design and foresees a long and difficult struggle toward an end that he admittedly can perceive only in vague outline. He and his WOMP colleagues pursue multiple values in contrast to world federalism's single-minded devotion to peace, and are less preoccupied with the structure of the future system than with the attitudes and outlooks of the people who will constitute that system. Ultimately, Falk sees a world federation as the nefarious state writ large, and prefers the libertarian socialism of anarchism to the centralization of authority in a global government. For him, the state is at once too large and too small, too formidable and too incompetent. He aspires to promote planetary, rather than national, loyalties and global management of problems that recognize no boundaries, but the "small is beautiful" motif has captured his heart. "Decentralizing potentials are more significant than centralizing ones because it seems so essential to reduce to the furthest extent possible the intrusion of bureaucratic ways and means on people's lives" (p. 246).

There is much to think about in these essays, even for those of us who do not share the author's absolute pessimism about the possibilities of the state system.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle *by Theodore A. Couloumbis. New York, Praeger, 1983. 232 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $12.95.*

The purpose of this highly readable book is to examine the nature and the application of American influence on Greece and Turkey since 1945 and the corresponding efforts of the two "client" states to influence Washington. In the process, an elaborate web of interrelated factors, bilateral relations, and triangular politics is considered. Thus, in addition to a brief theoretical framework concerning the concept of influence, the book reviews U.S.-Greek, U.S.-Turkish, Greek-Turkish relations, the birth and collapse of the Republic of Cyprus, developments at various levels of the international environment which affected the trilateral relationship, as well as those major domestic events in the United States, Greece and Turkey which helped shape their foreign policies. This is clearly an ambitious undertaking, and the treatment of the many components remains necessarily brief and rather underdeveloped. That it succeeds as well as it does is a tribute to the author's breadth of knowledge and analytical skills.

Relations between the United States and its two partners are examined in a

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chronological-thematic order, and the level of influence is assessed for each period. During 1947–1955, when Greece and Turkey served as the "demonstration vehicles of America's determination to confront the rise of communism" (p. 13), Washington's power position was at its zenith. Devastated by civil war, suffering from a general crisis of confidence, and governed by conservatives, Greece was especially susceptibile to American control. Although Turkey resisted the more onerous features of foreign dictation, its desire to secure military and economic assistance, as well as entry into NATO, compelled Ankara to accept a considerable American role in its domestic and external affairs. In short, while relations between Greece and Turkey were good and the perception of a Soviet threat remained strong, the two states willingly submitted to Washington's wishes. However, this situation was not destined to last.

During 1955–1965, developments within the triangular relationship and the changing character of the East-West confrontation adversely affected American influence over its two allies. In particular, the problem of Cyprus, which poisoned Greek-Turkish relations and became the dominant issue of Greek foreign policy, as well as the declining fear of Soviet aggression, strained Washington's relations with both Athens and Ankara and helped bring to the surface other points of friction. In the mid-1960s the Greek government sought to assert its independence and broaden its foreign policy options, only to be followed by a military dictatorship (1967–1974) which "U.S. policymakers quickly chose to embrace" (p. 51). Turkey, unhappy with the American position over Cyprus and plagued by domestic upheaval, also began to have doubts about the value of its partnership with the United States. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the collapse of the Greek junta, the heightening of Greek-Turkish tensions, and the festering controversies over the Aegean ushered in a new era for the "troubled" triangular relationship.

In the final period under review, 1974–1982, Couloumbis considers the relative importance of Greece and Turkey for the projection of American power in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond, and pays special attention to the issue of the bases which the United States maintains in the two states. He also examines the consequences for U.S.-Greek relations of the socialists' victory in Greece, particularly in light of Andreas Papandreou's strongly anti-American and anti-NATO rhetoric. Similarly, he reviews the impact on U.S.-Turkish relations of political stability and economic crisis in Turkey and the imposition of military rule. Finally, he offers some practical suggestions for opening a cautious path to the eventual settlement of the Cyprus and Greek-Turkish problems.

Much has been written about American policies toward Greece and Turkey. However, this is the first serious attempt to examine systematically the linkage between Washington's relationship with each of the two governments and to place bilateral diplomacy in its triangular setting, while at the same time showing the impact of domestic pressures in the three states on their foreign policy. Couloumbis has succeeded in viewing the many issues involved from the perspective of each of the three capitals. His account is fair-minded, balanced, and free of polemics. It can, of course, be argued that the study of influence requires access to diplomatic records and to the inner workings of the entire decision-making process in each of the states involved, a requirement which could not possibly be satisfied in this case. And although the theoretical scheme is useful, at times the attempt to conceptualize appears a bit strained. Nevertheless, considering the paucity

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of primary sources available and the elusive nature of influence, this is about as good a study as one is entitled to expect. Students of contemporary diplomacy will find this book interesting and useful: one can only hope that it will also be read and digested by the practitioners of diplomacy in Washington, Athens, and Ankara.

JOHN O. IATRIDES
Southern Connecticut State University

Parties and Democracy in Britain and America *edited by Vernon Bogdanor. New York, Praeger, 1984. 284 pp. $25.95.*

Conferences sometimes produce good volumes; they seldom produce good books. Even when, as in this case, those who gave papers at the original conference—including Leon Epstein, Austin Ranney, David Butler, and S. E. Finer—are all eminent in their fields, the result is almost inevitably characterized by both repetition and omission. On the one hand, because no very clear division of labor is laid down, a number of the contributions are almost bound to go over the same ground; on the other, unless the conference organizer is lucky as well as single-minded, some subjects will get left out.

So it is here. Readers are told so often that their minds glaze over about the effect of the proliferation of primaries on presidential nominating politics, about the Republicans' organizational and fund-raising prowess under Bill Brock, and about the effects on the parties of America's weird and wonderful campaign finance laws. It is the main omission, however, that is more serious. Americans, when they think of political parties, think of them mainly as nomination organizers and vote gatherers. The British think of them as both of these things (and think of their own parties as being more successful in playing these roles than their American opposite numbers) but also, crucially, as government dominators. Margaret Thatcher is a Conservative; she was elected party leader by her fellow Conservatives; she heads a government composed entirely of Conservatives; her government dominates the legislature, which has a Conservative majority. The government and that majority are pursuing identifiably and distinctively Conservative policies. The implications for democracy, as well as for Britain's future, are profound. Yet this aspect of party—party in government, party as government—is almost entirely slighted in this volume.

Still, the eleven papers it contains, taken individually, are all of good quality; the best deal with big subjects succinctly and thoughtfully. Philip Williams's overview of the present state of the American party system is authoritative and magisterial, if somewhat overcompressed, as with many of his writings. Leon Epstein points out that, in the way they select candidates and choose their leaders, Britain's "modern" political parties, especially Labour, are coming in some ways to look more like America's allegedly "primitive" parties. William Schneider makes out a convincing case that what is often grandly described as voter alienation from the American two-party system is little more than a manifestatioin of voters' feeling "that their political leaders are incompetent and their institutions ineffective"—a "sort of disaffection [that] is not an ideological sentiment" (p.

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101). Ivor Crewe shows that support for the Liberal-Social Democratic Party alliance in Britain is of the same nonideological, the-major-parties-haven't-delivered-the-goods character. And *Parties and Democracy in Britain and America* contains much more that is equally good. Few political scientists will want to read it from cover to cover, but it is certainly a quarry to be mined.

ANTHONY KING
University of Essex

Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences *by Thomas T. Hammond. Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1984. 261 pp. Cloth, $26.50; paper, $11.95.*

This volume does a credible job of sketching the events leading up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ramifications of the invasion for U.S.-Soviet relations. The author, a professor of history at the University of Virginia, has written other studies of communist takeovers, and this book follows in the same vein. Throughout, the author compares and contrasts the Soviet invasion to earlier actions in Mongolia (1921), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). Hammond delves into the long history of Russian and Soviet penetration in the region, which helps to place the present situation in a much-needed wider perspective.

However, the examination of the events from the 1978 overthrow of Mohammed Daoud through the December 1979 invasion unfortunately lack needed detail and analysis. For instance, the chapter dealing with the Kremlin's growing dissatisfaction with Hafizullah Amin and his radical policies runs a scant four pages.

The most detailed and substantive chapter deals with the Carter administration's failure to anticipate the invasion and its fumbling responses in its wake. The author attributes much of the blame for the invasion of Afghanistan to the Carter administration's failure (especially that of Cyrus R. Vance and Marshall Shulman) to issue sufficiently stern and public warnings to the USSR on the consequences of an invasion. It is obviously conjecture to assume that American ultimatums could have deterred the Soviet invasion, and Hammond presents no solid evidence to support this position.

The author acknowledges that the invasion was in all likelihood undertaken for a variety of reasons and that Soviet aims (both offensive and defensive) were diverse. Yet, little attention is devoted to the role played in Soviet calculations of a potential superpower confrontation in the region. It is plausible, even likely, that the invasion was, among other things, designed to precede and perhaps preempt anticipated American military action directed against Iran.

In the final chapters Hammond assess various options open to the USSR and the U.S. He reaches the predictable conclusion that the Soviets are likely to continue their present course in waging a war of attrition against the Afghan "freedom fighters." In response, he advocates stepped-up American aid to the Afghan rebels and the Pakistan government, expanded refugee relief programs, and a heightened U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf region.

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The book is strengthened by interviews with several prominent diplomats and former Carter administration officials and documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. However, the discussion reveals few new insights into the invasion, Soviet motivations, or the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy formulation; rather it confirms the adage that hindsight is better than foresight.

GORDON B. SMITH
University of South Carolina

Panama Odyssey *by William J. Jorden. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1984. 746 pp. $24.50.*

Panama's President Roberto Chiari used the "flag" riot of 1964 in and around the Panama Canal Zone to convince Lyndon Johnson that Panamanians were chafing under the 1903 treaty, which gave the U.S. ownership in perpetuity of a strip of territory splitting their country. Johnson eventually agreed that a new treaty recognizing Panamanian sovereignty should be negotiated. He estimated negotiations should take two or three months.

Over the next thirteen years, Panamanians continued to threaten the use of force. Omar Torrijos would tell Jorden, staff member of the National Security Council from 1972 to 1974 and U.S. ambassador to Panama from 1974 to 1978, that Panama might follow "the other road" if talks were unproductive. These reminders were intended to make the canal a high priority in the U.S., which had no domestic constituency for a new treaty.

The second way to make Panama a priority was to gain international support. Chiari and Torrijos had the issue frequently raised at the United Nations, where colonialism was considered an act of permanent aggression. The tactic could have drawbacks. Dutch, Swedish, and Indian investigators of the 1964 riot rejected Panama's claim that the U.S. had violated Panama's rights. Some Latin leaders wondered if Panama's unreasonable cash demands were slowing negotiations.

Jorden's detailed descriptions of all the negotiations, many of which he attended, reveal how difficult it was to resolve the issues that Panama was striving to make important to the U.S. Transference of sovereignty to the canal and to such areas as Ancon Hill had to be integrated with guarantees that the U.S. could rightfully defend the canal's neutrality. Torrijos could not make that guarantee if it meant a U.S. right to intervene in Panama's domestic affairs, as Senator Dennis DeConcini wanted. Negotiators Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz also found ways to make Panama's share of the canal income more equitable and to agree to cooperate with Panama if a new sea level canal was to be built.

Jorden also fully describes the politics of negotiations: Zonians opposed to any change in the status quo, Panamanian extremists who wanted to keep alive the issue of U.S. imperialism, the U.S. Defense Department haggling with State, the effect of leaders' personalities, senators who had to be swayed, among others. He does not mention that the political capital Carter spent while lobbying for these treaties was unavailable later for Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) II.

What Jorden saw as Congressional irresponsibility made him hope for a return to the

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seniority system, justified by majority leader Robert Byrd's and Howard Baker's skillful statesmanship during the Senate debates. Jorden says that a diplomat or a scholar "should become an expert in scars. Yesterday's wounds tell a great deal about present-day illnesses" (p. 64). The battle for Senate ratification seems to have left Jorden with some scars, which may be why he criticizes more than analyzes the treaties' opposition. Supporters of the just, fair, and right treaties are said to be modern, thoughtful, articulate, penetrating, and astute. Opponents are childish, superficial, emotional, parochial, inane, close-minded, and frivolous. Indeed, a few Congressional foes of the treaties were later caught in Abscam, or censured for sexual or financial irregularities (pp. 682–683).

Also, it is more distracting than enlightening to learn that negotiators took a shower and nap before talks, that their planes refueled in Puerto Rico, that their houses were rented in their absence, that they wore lightweight suits, that they used a certain gate upon entering the White House grounds, and that technicians changed light bulbs in preparation for their arrival (pp. 55, 78, 292, 450, 641).

Nevertheless, these are minor flaws in an otherwise valuable study of the treaties which allowed Panama's President Demetrio Lankas to tell U.S. negotiators, "I've waited a long time for the day when our little country and the big United States would be real partners. I'm glad that day has finally come" (p. 436).

LOWELL S. GUSTAFSON
University of Virginia

"The Government of God"—Iran's Islamic Republic *by Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984. 240 pp. $25.00.*

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, there has been a proliferation of books that explain this significant event. Many of the early books were written in response to increased public curiosity and dealt with their subject in broad generalities. Others were more specific and focused on particular aspects of Iranian politics and economics, often reflecting their authors' special interests, with at best tenuous links to the larger issue of the revolution—its why and how.

Nevertheless, most of these books were serious academic works and contributed to raising the level of general and specialized knowledge about Iran and its revolution. They also raised as many new questions as they answered old ones.

The ambition of "*The Government of God*," as its authors state, is to "bring some order" to these questions. Another purpose, although not as clearly stated, is to explain why political scientists, especially those concerned with the process of development, failed to assess accurately and thus predict the evolution of events in Iran and their outcome. By focusing on cultural biases and misperceptions that render effective communication difficult, the authors seek to explain the failure of Western—and especially U.S.—policy makers to assess Iranian problems and to deal successfully with them. The rest of the

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book is a very general survey of Iran's internal developments and external relations since the revolution, plus some comments on Iran's prospects.

The most useful contribution made by "*The Government of God*" lies in its illustration of the variety of interacting factors that should be considered in analyzing Iranian events. But it fails to make that analysis effectively. A principal flaw of the book is that it wastes too much time on preliminary discussion of development theory, cultural prejudice, and the relationship between Islam and modernization, and spends too little time on their specific links to events in Iran. Even so, the authors leave out a number of important points on the basics, as in Chapter I, which deals with the failure of development theorists to assess Iranian events correctly and to recognize the true nature of the Khomeini phenomenon. For instance, the authors do not examine the widely accepted premises of the 1950s and 1960s that economic development would lead to political modernization and stability and to gradual, peaceful democratization of developing societies more-or-less along Western lines. These premises were seriously challenged during the 1970s by both Third World and Western scholars. In his 1976 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel Huntington made a convincing case that the process of economic development and modernization in its early stages is politically destabilizing. He also pointed out that at this stage there is a revival of traditional forces rather than a strengthening of modernizing elements.

Iran's experience under the Shah and with the Khomeini phenomenon has in fact proved many development theorists to be right. The authors of "*The Government of God*" are themselves right, however, when they point out that many theorists on both sides of the political spectrum are unwilling to draw the proper lessons from Iranian events and thus persist in trying to find in those events proofs for their own theories.

Similar omissions have been made in other chapters. For example, in Chapter IV, on cultural prejudice, the authors say little about the Iranians' view of the outside world and about their experience with foreign powers that has led them to adopt the patterns of political behavior that have been so intensely despised by outsiders. Likewise, given the fact that this book is about Iran, it would have been better in Chapter III, which deals with Islam and modernization, if the authors had used more Iranian sources that do exist and had more extensively traced the historical evolution of this issue in Iran.

In sum, "*The Government of God*" is a useful book; it raises a number of interesting questions and provides some interesting, albeit partial, answers. Its chief weakness is that it sets too difficult and ambitious a task for itself, which it then fails to achieve.

SHIREEN T. HUNTER
Georgetown University

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After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s *edited by Robert F. Byrnes. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983. 457 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

Since the death of Leonid Brezhnev on 10 November 1982, much has been written on the Soviet succession process and the transition of power within the Kremlin. Indeed, the true significance of the post-Brezhnev successions rests, to a large extent, upon the political and social, economic and structural issues that will constitute the Soviet agenda for the 1980s. This collection of essays, which represents the initial contribution of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies to the current revitalization of Soviet studies in the United States, establishes a standard of scholarship for this renewed commitment.

The first essay, by Seweryn Bialer, discusses in full the Soviet political system in the 1980s and the influence it may exercise on Soviet foreign policy. Bialer primarily concentrates on three major areas: the domestic and foreign legacy of the Brezhnev era; the successors to the Brezhnev government; and the factors that will influence Soviet domestic and foreign policies in the 1980s. In the second chapter, Robert W. Campbell investigates the state of the Soviet economy, and concentrates his inquiry on the following factors: consumption; military expenditures; investment; research and development; energy; agriculture; international economic relations; labor supply; and, of course, the prospects for economic reform. Coit D. Blacker's analysis of the Soviet military raises several interesting questions while examining the growth and character of the Kremlin's military capabilities and the connections in Soviet thinking between military power and the conduct of foreign policy. In the chapter on "social trends," Gail Warshofsky Lapidus discusses the potential constraints on the Soviet regime's performance by focusing on the following issues: the stagnation in living standards, the declining opportunities for upward social mobility; unfavorable demographic trends; the rise of ethnonationalism; and the decline of civic morale. Maurice Friedberg's chapter on the cultural and intellectual life within the USSR looks at the following "facets": cultural isolationism; education and science; the mass media; film; youth; and literature. The Soviet Union's relations with Eastern Europe are analyzed by Andrzej Korbonski, who very skillfully critiques Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe. Such topics as Soviet security and political interests, as well as ideological and economic interests, are fully discussed. Adam B. Ulam, in a chapter entitled "The World Outside," looks at the anatomy of Soviet policy making, and focuses on the choices and the areas of Soviet opportunity within Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the eastern areas of the Muslim world. Soviet relations and the prospects for cooperation with China, Western Europe, and the United States are also explored. In the final essay, Robert F. Brynes discusses Soviet "critical choices" for the 1980s, and provides an excellent conclusion for a superior study.

This book, which represents an eighteen-month effort by thirty-five scholars from various institutions in the United States and the United Kingdom, is truly an interdisciplinary contribution to Soviet and East European studies. Each essay is written with a clarity and

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a confidence that should appeal to the student and scholar, and indeed anyone interested in the issues that will confront Brezhnev's successors through the 1980s.

JOHN MICHAEL CARFORA
Dartmouth College

Dezinfomatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy *by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson. Elmsford, N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1984. 211 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $12.95.*

The authors, associate professors at Georgetown University and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, respectively, propose to demonstrate "how the leaders of the Soviet Union use active measures in . . . the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] region" (p. 3). They do not, they write, attempt to evaluate the success of these measures to weaken the Western alliance and promote Soviet preeminence, but they do estimate the budgets given to these activities and assume Soviet satisfaction with the effect.

"Active measures" refers to both overt and covert techniques for influencing other countries. Overt activities include propaganda through mass media, cultural, and other public activities. Covert activities include the use of influential citizens to promote Soviet views, international front organizations, and deliberate misinformation. The book is not a comprehensive study of all these techniques: the chapters focus on organization, a description of themes used with reference to NATO countries by two Soviet print sources, a discussion of some covert activities, and an interview with two former Eastern bloc intelligence officers. The most interesting and successful parts of the book are these interviews and the section on covert activities. In the latter, there is a description of the large front organization, the World Peace Council, and of the French journal, *Synthesis*, published for three years by Charles Pathe (of the film family) until his arrest as a Soviet agent in 1979. A summary of the contents of the journal is interesting primarily for its unwavering fidelity to the Soviet line.

The rest of the book lacks rigor. In the second chapter, the discussion of the organization of Soviet foreign propaganda activities is so fuzzy as to be confusing. For example, the predecessor of the very influential Propaganda Department of the Central Committee is referred to, but, inexplicably, no mention is made of the renaming and leadership changes. The Politburo and Secretariat are described in the usual general way as the acme of Soviet policy making, but the authors fail to mention the important role played by the secretary responsible for all communications and propaganda, currently Mikhail Zimianin. The International Department is said to be more important than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though the head of the former is a candidate member of the Politburo, while the head of the latter is the well known and powerful Andrei Gromyko. The International Information Department, a relatively new organization of the Central Committee, poses a real problem for the authors. Not much is known about this department, but it is surely far less influential than the authors suggest. The International Information Department prepares, mainly for the foreign press, information on Soviet foreign policy,

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and its creation does not appear to have resulted in any changes in the output or organization of the Soviet media themselves. Such a development would mean downgrading powerful agencies within the Central Committee on the Party side and among state committees on the governmental side. That reduction of influence has not taken place, and it is, therefore, incorrect to place a discussion of Soviet foreign broadcasting under the heading of the International Information Department, as the authors do in this chapter. Their organizational chart on page 20 is similarly misleading.

The longest chapter is devoted to a research project that analyzes a section in *Pravda* between 1960 and 1980, together with supplementary materials from a journal. The research design and, therefore, the findings are problematic. It is asserted that a weekly column in *Pravda* represents themes of Soviet foreign propaganda. References to the United States and its NATO allies are noted, as is the "theme" of the reference. No count is made of the total number of references to foreign countries, so it is impossible to judge how salient these Western materials are. Then themes are distinguished and aggregated for thirty-four time periods over the twenty year span. The ebb and flow of these themes is described at considerable length. Typical of the methodological confusion is the authors' often repeated finding: the theme of threat or immediate danger to the Soviet Union or its allies is encountered considerably less frequently than more generalized themes of aggressiveness and adventurism. The authors, therefore, conclude that "in reality the Kremlin did not perceive any direct threat or challenge to its security interests emanating from alleged U.S. aggressiveness and militarism. The incongruity between Soviet propaganda and Moscow's actual threat perception may be explained partially by considering the tactical foreign policy objectives of the Kremlin—especially the desire to weaken the Western alliance—rather than its immediate security concerns"(p. 101). To distinguish without any further investigation or evidence certain themes as propagandistic (i.e., manipulative) and others as evidence of the regime's unmediated perceptions is unacceptable research practice. Moreover, anyone reading this same column in *Pravda* in the last nine months would find ample expressions of anxiety about direct threat to the Soviet homeland. The authors' methods would not permit them to evaluate this radically changed circumstance.

This book is not the successor to Frederic Barghoorn's *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (1964); the topic is timely and interesting, but it requires a more considered and informed analysis.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ
Emory University

China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World *by Ralph Thaxton. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 286 pp. $27.50.*

In this book Ralph Thaxton sets out to challenge much of the conventional wisdom regarding the Communist victory in rural China. In a work as bold and iconoclastic as this,

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it is incumbent upon the author to argue and document his case carefully. In his eagerness to make a new and innovative contribution to our understanding of the role of the peasant in the Communist revolution, Thaxton, unfortunately, does not exercise such care.

The book is, for the most part, an application of James Scott's moral economy model. Thaxton argues that even during the height of Confucianism, peasants adhered to a "folk counterculture" with its own "expectations for justice." This counterculture was the basis of the peasants' political agenda when the fall of the Qing dynasty, the growth of international pressures and, most of all, "Republican warlord" rapaciousness, made life unbearable. Holding to their conceptions of justice, the peasants of China generated their own revolution. The Communist Party was successful, he contends, to the extent that its policies conformed to the "revolutionary instructions" of the peasantry.

The success of this thesis depends, then, on Thaxton's ability to demonstrate the existence of a "folk counterculture," its activation into a revolutionary program, and the fact that such a program guided Communist policy. I, for one, was left unconvinced on all three counts.

Take, for example, his efforts to establish the existence of a peasant counterculture in traditional China. Are assumptions about peasant mentality from the author's own inferences or from studies of other societies, convincing evidence? Can one use materials from the anti-Confucian campaign to depict Confucian society or to describe a rebel ideology which Thaxton argues reflects the traditional peasant counterculture? Are twentieth-century impressions of seventeenth-century rebel movements articulated by "peasant and urban youths in Chengdu and Kaifeng market places" (p. 240, note 81) a credible corroborative source? I think not. This historiography is too weak for a work so bold.

Thaxton's case for the implementation of a "counterculture" by the peasantry in the years after the fall of the Qing is similarly weakened. His argument suffers from a strong reliance on retrospective and fictional accounts and a lack of care in distinguishing clearly and consistently, either in his footnotes or text, what appear to be novels from what might be memoirs, local histories, or, simply, hagiography. All are used as if they carried equal historical weight. Once again, his use of evidence gives his conclusions an air of inconclusiveness.

Although his documentation on the period after 1936–1937 has some of the same problems, it is a bit more comprehensive. In addition, in a chapter based entirely on one novel, he does identify his source as such and does address the problems of using fiction in historical analysis. Still, I did not come away with the feeling that Thaxton had proven his case that the Communist Party "validated" a preexisting peasant vision.

Certainly, as other scholars have shown, there were peasant preferences the Party had to accommodate in making policy. There was a good deal of give and take. Thaxton is on target when he suggests that much earlier writing underestimated this "two way interaction." I applaud his call to illuminate such a dialogue. When it comes to developing his own view, however, he seems to go to the opposite extreme and presents a peasantry with a revolutionary program shaping the Communist movement. Thaxton, falling victim

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to his own zeal, presents a largely one-way interaction. My reaction here, as with much of the book, is to say that it was really not that simple.

STEVEN M. GOLDSTEIN
The Asia Society

The Age of Interdependence: Economic Policy in a Shrinking World *by Michael Stewart. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1984. 192 pp. $15.00.*

This book by Michael Stewart is a well-meaning, closely reasoned treatise by a concerned, intelligent British economist and former government adviser about the economic and ecological problems the world faces as it approaches the twenty-first century. Stewart argues that unless certain modes of policy making are changed, and certain economic and energy policies are reconsidered, we will face long years of recession and unemployment, as well as possible eco-catastrophe by the year 2000.

Stewart's central thesis is that the way in which governments make policy is temporally and spatially "myopic": only two or three years into the future are considered, and only the needs of the country's citizens are taken into account. As an alternative to this method, he urges that policy be made with a view to the long-term. This is particularly stressed in regard to energy policy making, for decisions made today regarding conservation and the development of energy sources will have an effect on the economy and ecology of the future. He also proposes that policies be made with a view to their effects on other countries because countries have become economically interdependent. Thus, policies made in one country affect, and will be affected by, policies made in another country as well as by the reactions of the international financial community. Independent, uncoordinated economic policy making, he argues, most often leads to recession and unemployment. This is because there is a deflationary bias in the system, especially a system in which policy is informed more by supply-side economic theories than Keynesianism.

The author believes that along with uncoordinated policy making and short-range planning, the other major economic mistake the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are making is the use of monetarist (or supply-side) economic theories to inform policy. As he puts it: "Alas, the supply-side scenario . . . [is] a fairy story; something smacking more of Disneyland than of Washington" (p. 72). Stewart argues that the economy is not self-regulating, that even monetarist politicians ultimately intervene more in the economy than they plan to (that is, they do more than regulate the money supply and balance the budget). A balanced budget, he reminds us, is not necessarily compatible with all economic goals. In fact, one could argue (Stewart doesn't, as the book was written in 1983) that the 1984 boom that the U.S. economy is experiencing is a result not of supply-side economics, but of Reagan's ultimate Keynesian capitulation: it is the astoundingly high level of the deficit that has been the major

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stimulus for the U.S. economy. But high interest rates, now rising again, are the counterpart of the deficit in this administration, and may cause the boom to be relatively short-lived. They have also been a cause of Europe's economic woes. Stewart is correct in calling Reaganomics an aggressive economic policy.

While the book is well-written, tightly argued, and full of illustrations based in part on Stewart's government experience, there are two main problems with this book. First, curiously absent from Stewart's analysis is any notion of the asymmetries of interdependence and power which exist among states. These have a major impact on the ability of states to obtain their economic goals. Second, the author does not fully think through the feasibility of his policy suggestions. In the economic sphere, Stewart suggests that in order to avoid chronic contraction, states must either delink or coordinate national policies. He dismisses delinking as being bureaucratically clumsy and costly in welfare terms. Although he admits, and his own examples tend to show, that cooperative action faces the stumbling blocks of state autonomy and sovereignty, he urges that the costs of not cooperating are so high that state's should get over this block and cooperate anyway. Easier said than done! A more thorough discussion of the constraints on cooperation and the possibilities and incentives would have been useful.

On balance, though, Michael Stewart has written a book that has a well-expressed, urgent message for citizens and policy makers. Given that it is a message that was more popular in the early 1970s, the book performs a useful function as a reminder in the 1980s that aggressive economic policy making and energy planning without regard to ecological considerations or future supplies of resources may ultimately be counterproductive, and potentially disastrous, policies.

DEBRA L. MILLER
Barnard College, Columbia University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

A Documentary History of Communism: vol. 2, Communism and the World *edited by Robert V. Daniels. Hanover, New Hamp., University Press of New England, 1984. 448 pp. $14.95.*

The Effects of Nuclear War *prepared by Peter Sharfman et al. Detroit, Gale Research Co., 1984. 283 pp. $45.00.*

The Europa Year Book 1984: A World Survey, 2 vols. *prepared by Europa Publications. London, Europa Publications, 1984. 2,762 pp. $210.00.*

Latin American Politics: A Historical Bibliography. *Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 290 pp. $60.50.*

OECD Economic Surveys, 1983–1984: France *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1984. 72 pp. $4.00.*

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OECD Economic Surveys, 1983–1984: Germany *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1984. 69 pp. $4.00.*

OECD Economic Surveys, 1983–1984: Japan *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1984. 94 pp. $4.00.*

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vols. 10–11: Columbia University *edited by Louis P. Galambos. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 1708 pp. $60.00.*

The Presidential-Congressional Political Dictionary *by Jeffrey M. Elliot and Sheikh R. Ali. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO Information Services, 1984. 365 pp. $28.00.*

Statistics on External Indebtedness: Bank and Trade-Related Non-Bank External Claims on Individual Borrowing Countries and Territories at End-December 1983 *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1984. 14 pp. n.p.*

U.S. Government Directories, 1970–1981: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography *compiled by Constance Staten Gray. Littleton, Colo., Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1984. 260 pp. $35.00.*

World Development Report 1984 *compiled by the World Bank. New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. 286 pp. $20.00.*

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Correspondence

Japanese Political Culture

To the Editor:

When I first read the review of my book *Japanese Political Culture* in your journal (PSQ Spring 1984: 162–63), I wanted to ignore it without making any response because it did not really deal with the content of the book.

On second thought, however, I felt it necessary to respond to the review, because I feared that readers of the review who had not had the opportunity to read the book might be left with a distorted image of what the reviewer sees as "postwar Japanese political culture dominated by radical-left" ideologies.

If one were to read the book without prejudice and assess it on its own terms, it would be evident not only that this view of postwar Japanese political culture is incorrect, but also that this book is not the product of a "left" perspective. Indeed, it is ironic in view of the reviewer's criticism that my work has continuously been attacked by Japanese Marxists for what they consider to be an inappropriate viewpoint.

Takeshi Ishida
University of Tokyo

Mr. Kataoka replies:

Professor Ishida makes three points: that my view of postwar Japanese political culture as being dominated by radical-left ideologies is "incorrect"; that his "book is not the product of a 'left' perspective"; and that his being attacked by Marxists is the proof of the second point. I will not answer the second point above and beyond what I have already said in my review. Ultimate judgment rests with those who read Professor Ishida's book.

To say that postwar Japanese political culture was dominated by radical-left ideologies would be to put it mildly. Surely Professor Ishida remembers those

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pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese pacifists who rioted against the ratification of the existing treaty between Japan and the United States, and who forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Tokyo. Tokyo University was the veritable den of radical intellectuals as well as those helmeted Zengakuren mobsters.

By accident of history, Marxists in Japan are to be found in both the Socialist party and the Communist party. Lower down, they are splintered and fractionalized. They attack each other more intensely and sometimes with deadly force than they collectively attack the rest. I can quite believe Professor Ishida being so attacked, but that by itself says nothing.

TETSUYA KATAOKA
University of Tsukuba

Correction: In Robert Y. Shapiro's review of Edward R. Tufte's *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information* (*PSQ*, Summer 1984: 369–70), a minor editorial change may have altered the meaning communicated by one sentence. What Professor Shapiro wrote was: Tufts argues that in graphic displays, "Things aptly called (since they are) 'chartjunk, vibrations, grids, and ducks' should be avoided."

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

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